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Chapter One 
The Study setting, methodology, objectives and significance   
Introduction: 
Uganda has been independent for forty eight years since 1962. It has had eight rulers; 
Mutesa, Obote, Amin, Lule, Binaisa, Obote II, Tito Okello and Museveni1. All these 
rulers assumed leadership through unconstitutional means for example coup d’état2, 
election rigging3 and armed insurgency4, save for the first government from 1962 to 1971 
which came into office through national consensus and order. As such the country has 
been engulfed in intermittent turmoil characterized by political instability, ethnic conflict, 
intense human suffering and misery, economic decay and breakdown of the rule of law.  
The main cause of this has been competition for state power and economic resources 
through the manipulation and politicization of ethnicity5 and the militarization of politics. 
It is worth noting that the military has been at the centre of political turmoil in Uganda. It 
should also be realized that its role and involvement has not been by default but rather by 
design. Politicians have sought to use the military to suppress their opponents in order to 
entrench themselves in power. In 1966 Obote used the army to storm the ‘kabaka’s’6 
                                                  
1 Mutibwa Phares, M, “Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes”, London, Hurst and 
Company, (1992) p. 11-58, 125-86 
2 Amin came into power in 1972 through a coup d’état that ousted Obote from power 
3 In 1980 Obote the president of UPC party came into power by winning the elections but which were 
widely perceived by Ugandans as rigged and which led to Museveni to wage a guerrilla campaign against 
his regime 
4 In 1986 Museveni captured power after waging a five-year guerrilla campaign against the UPC 
government  
5 Juma Okuku, “Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda”, Discussion Paper No. 
17, Uppsala (2002) p. 7 
6 Sir Edward Mutesa II was the ‘kabaka’ (king) of Buganda and the first president of Uganda while Obote 
was the Prime Minister 
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(king) palace, a precedent that marked the formal entry of the army into Uganda’s politics 
and which, six years later deposed him from power7. Since then the army has not only 
committed gross human rights abuses against the people but also interfered in politics to 
the extent of influencing the outcome of a political contest or determining who should 
rule Uganda.  Indeed as pointed out by Brett, “bullets rather than ballots have determined 
politics in Uganda”8. It is within this context that Museveni waged a guerrilla campaign 
against the UPC Obote government, capturing power in 1986. This led to the shift of 
political and military power that had been in the control of the northerners to the 
southerners.  
Since 1986 when Yoweri Museveni captured power, he has tended to personalize and use 
the security forces and especially the army to maintain a grip on power and also to crack 
down on individuals and groups with divergent political opinions. Indeed as pointed out 
by Muhumuza, “--Museveni’s determination to retain power has degenerated into 
militarization of politics. Not only has president Museveni maintained a strong grip on 
the security forces through appointing and promoting loyal cadres to top positions, but 
has also purged those insubordinate and disloyal to him. The army is also deployed 
during presidential elections purportedly to keep peace”9. +He further points out that 
“Uganda’s transition to democracy under Museveni’s National Resistance Movement 
regime is a typical case of a flawed democratic transition that has fallen prey to vested 
                                                  
7 Joshua B. Rubongoya, “Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda, Pax Musevenica”, Palgrave 
Macmillan, (2007) p. 36-40  
8 Brett. E. A, “Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics”, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No, 1, (March 1995) p. 130-152  
9 Muhumuza William, “From Fundamental Change to No Change: The NRM and Democratisation in 
Uganda”, p.22 http://www.ifra-nairobi.net/cahiers/Cahier_41/2Muhumuza.pdf; see also, Joel Barkan, 
Simba Kayunga, J. D. S. Ngethe and N. Titsworth, “The Political Economy of Uganda: The Art of 
Managing a Donor-Financed Neo-Patrimonial State”, Kampala, World Bank Commissioned Report (2005)  
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political interests and manipulation”10. The security forces have been accused of being 
partisan and also fomenting political violence intended to intimidate and marginalize 
some individuals and groups of people from meaningful participation in the politics of 
the country. The 17th February 2011 a presidential election is a case in point. During this 
election, the national army (UPDF) influenced the process to the extent that it determined 
the final results of voting in favour of the incumbent Museveni.  
Military-led intimidation and violence characterized the exercise. Local and international 
human rights organizations, religious leaders, independent observers and opposition 
political parties11 expressed concern over the activities of the military and militia groups 
which not only created fear and uncertainty, but also increased repression in opposition 
strongholds for example in Acholiland.              
This situation has tended to exacerbate ethnic tensions as successive rulers mobilize 
support along ethno-linguistic and regional lines to oust incumbent governments only to 
replace them with members of their own ethnic groups. In tandem with the above 
situation and aggravating it is the fact that political parties in Uganda have been formed 
and organized largely on the basis of ethnicity and religion. For example, the Uganda 
National Congress (UNC) the first party which was formed in the 1950s was 
predominantly protestant and based in Buganda12. Other parties which were formed 
                                                  
10 Muhumuza William, “From Fundamental Change to No Change: The NRM and Democratization in 
Uganda”, p. 35-36 
11 See Daily Monitor, 20th March 2011, “Politicians accuse the military of vote theft”, and Daily Monitor of 
19th October 2009, “Autocratic tendencies killing Uganda’s status”  
12 Mugaju, J. B. “The Illusions of Democracy in Uganda, 1955-1966”, in Oyugi, W. O. and Gitonga A, 
(Eds.), “Democratic Theories and Practice in Africa”, East African Educational Publishers Ltd. (1987) p. 
86-95 
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around the same time for example the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) was 
overwhelmingly protestant, while the Democratic Party (DP) was catholic both in 
membership and leadership13.  
Other parties formed later also followed the same trend for example the Uganda Patriotic 
Movement (UPM) formed in the early 1980s and which later transformed into National 
Resistance Movement Organization (NRMO) was predominantly protestant. Because the 
formation of many of these political parties was motivated and driven by personal 
grievances of the founders against the leaders of other political parties especially the one 
in power rather than genuine political processes, the resultant asymmetrical ethno-
religious and regional social stratification nature of the party formed often led to mutual 
distrust and antagonisms, discrimination and recriminations which fueled ethnic conflict.  
On the other hand, state building in Uganda has been problematic as each successive 
government has tended to improve in certain areas in order to earn a positive international 
image while neglecting others. For instance the NRM concentrated on reconstructing the 
economy and tackling the HIV/AIDS pandemic but has not made progress in such areas 
as conflict resolution, good governance and ethnic integration through accommodation of 
divergent views and consensus building.  Indeed as aptly observed by Khadiagala, recent 
political happenings in East Africa indicate that there is still enduring tension between 
state building and progress on fronts such as representation and good governance.  He 
particularly notes that “in Uganda, changes of regime have only partially succeeded in 
                                                  
13 Mazrui Ali A. “Religious Strangers in Uganda: From Emin Pasha to Amin Dada”, African Affairs, Vol, 
76, No, 302, (January 1977) p. 24-38    
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resolving this tension”14.  In addition to this, governments in Uganda have tended to 
prefer the use of force to resolve political differences. But this escalates the problem as it 
does not solve the underlying causes of the discontent but merely stifles peaceful avenues 
for negotiation. Moreover, force is often not an exclusive monopoly of the state but the 
ethnic groups suffering the deprivation may also mobilize and use force to fight back. 
The civil war that started in Acholiland in 1986 and the enduring tension should be 
understood in this context. This chapter sets the stage for investigating the relationship 
between this conflict and ethnicity by presenting the context of the study, its background, 
significance and research methodology.  
The Study Setting 
Uganda is a landlocked country situated in East Africa and along the Equator. It was a 
colony of Great Britain until independence on October 9th 1962. It lies within the 
Latitudes of 4.12o N and 1.290 S and Longitudes 29.340 E and 35.0o W15. Total land 
surface area is approximately 2416, 550.7 square kilometers, with a population of about 
30.7 million persons16. Its neighboring countries are the Republic of Sudan in the north, 
Tanzania in the south, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the west, Rwanda in the 
southwest and Kenya in the east. The Acholiland which is home to Acholi ethnic people 
and which is the main focus of this Study is located in northern Uganda.  
                                                  
14 Khadiagala M. Gilbert, “Uganda’s Domestic and Regional Security since the 1970s”, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No, 2, (June 1993) p. 250 
15 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), Statistical Abstract, (June 2010) p. xv 
16 Ibid, p. v 
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It comprises of seven districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Amuru, Lamwo, Agago and 
Nwoya respectively with a total land surface area of approximately 28 138.1 square 
kilometers and a combined population of approximately 2 048 208 people. In 1986 when 
the NRA/M captured power, Acholiland which is about 380 kilometers from the capital 
city of Kampala comprised of two districts of Gulu and Kitgum. In 2001, Kitgum was 
subdivided to create a third district of Pader. This subdivision continued in which the 
latter four districts were curved out of the three districts by the NRM government in a 
policy aimed at improving service delivery but which critics point out that political 
patronage by way of allocation of jobs through clientele networks rather than improved 
service delivery is the primary explanation17. The population density in Acholiland is 
lighter, average rainfall is lower and less reliable18 for a bigger part of the year.  
The neighboring areas of Acholiland are the Republic of Sudan in the north, Kotido 
district in the east, Lira, Apac and Masindi districts in the south and Nebi, Arua and 
Adjumani districts in the west. Although the insurgency war between the LRA and the 
government of Uganda affected other areas of northern Uganda for example Lango and 
Apac and also spread to eastern Uganda around 2003, Acholiland has been the most 
ravaged area since 1986. It is also worth noting that though the parties in this conflict, 
their motives and methods have changed over the years, the effect on the local population 
has been one of devastation of the Acholi cultural fiber, family and traditional 
relationships.   
                                                  
17 Elliot Green, “Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda” Studies in Comparative 
Development, Vol. 45, No, 1, (January 2010) p. 84-89, 92-95  
18 Basalirwa, C. P. K. “Delienation of Uganda into Climatological Rainfall Zones using the Method of 
Principal Component Analysis”, International Journal of Climatology, Vol. 15, No, 10, (year), p. 9-15 
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 Map of Uganda showing Acholiland and its boundaries19. 
 
 
                                                  
19 Source: Justine Nannyonjo, Conflicts, Poverty and Human Development in Northern Uganda, Bank of 
Uganda, Research Department, prepared for the WIDER Conference on Making Peace Work, Helsinki, 4-5 
(June 2004) p. ii 
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Ethnic groups in Uganda: Geographical spread and settlement  
In order to understand the ethnic question in Uganda, it is important to have an overview 
of the different ethnic groups and their configuration. Uganda’s population is composed 
of a complex and diverse range of ethnic groups which can be classified into four broad 
categories of the Bantu, the Nilotics, the Luo and the Pygimoid. The Bantu occupy the 
central and southern part of the country, the Nilotics or Nilo Hamites occupy the north 
and eastern, the Luo are found in the West Nile and northern parts, while the Pygmoid 
occupy the south western part bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo.   
There are more than 60 ethnic groups (also referred to as tribes) in Uganda with varying 
size in terms people and the geographical area occupied by each group. The point being 
emphasized is that while some ethnic groups are large, some are small. For example, the 
percentage of the following ethnic groups in terms of the total population is estimated to 
be as follows; “Baganda 17%, Banyankole 8%, Iteso 8%, Bakiga 7%, Langi 6%, Bagisu 
5%, Acholi 4%, Lugbara 4%, Batooro 3%, Banyoro 3%, Alur 2%, Bagwere 2%, Bakonjo 
2%, Japodhola 2%, Karamojong 2%--”20. The Kuliak are small ethnic communities found 
in the mountains of northeastern Uganda. They share similar characteristics with the 
Nilotic but are more distinct because of the language difference. The Acholi people who 
are the main subject of this thesis occupy the northern part of Uganda   
  
                                                  
20 Source; Demographics of Uganda, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Uganda  It should be 
realised that while these figures may not represent the most current and up-to-date picture in terms of the 
real percentages, they nevertheless give an indication of the approximate size and diversity of ethnic groups 
in Uganda. For a comprehensive statistical data, see Table 2.1C: Census population (1991 and 2002) by 
region and district and projected (2010 and 2011) mid-year population, Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS 
2010) Statistical Abstract, p. 95-100    
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Map of Uganda showing the ethnic groups and their geographical spread and 
settlement 
 
Source: Downloaded from Demographics of Uganda on 08th August 2011 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Uganda  
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The context of the Study: 
One of the major threats that have characterized a number of developing countries and 
more especially those on the African continent is violence and especially one involving 
the use of arms. In several aspects, this violence has manifested itself into intra-state wars 
with dire consequences for the populations involved. The resurgence of these wars on the 
African continent is a result of factors, both domestic and international. From the 
international perspective, three factors that have a relationship with these wars are 
colonialism, cold-war era and globalization. The roots of Uganda’s socio-political 
disharmony, ethnic conflict and tension can be traced back to the colonial period and is 
intertwined with the artificial nature of the state in Africa.  
The historical context and the manner in which this context gave rise to African states led 
to emergence of weak states in Africa in several aspects. First, the genesis of the weak 
state begins with the manner in which the boundaries of African countries were drawn by 
the imperial powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, a period popularly referred to as 
the ‘scramble for Africa’ where the colonizers ignored, and in actual fact, did not have a 
well-defined criteria to take into account the demographic and ethnographic 
configurations but simply adopted the rule of drawing lines on maps, moreover of 
territories they had not been to or even having sufficient knowledge about21.  
 
                                                  
21 Jeffrey Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa”, International 
Organization, Vol. 43, No. 4, (Autumn 1989) p. 674-682; see also Mutibwa, Phares, Uganda since 
Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, London. Hurst and Company, (1992) p. 1-4      
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The exercise of partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference was guided and conducted 
mainly from the prism of economic resources. Consequently, the post-colonial state 
begun as a weak one in the sense that the state and society were not mutual symbionts in 
as far as their political, economic and social relationships are concerned. This scramble 
for Africa witnessed the artificial sub-division of the African continent by European 
powers in their struggle for influence, expansionism and resource exploitation22.  
Resulting from this colonial demarcation, many African countries share a common post-
colonial history of ‘artificial nature’ of their state borders. These arbitrary borders often 
split homogenous communities thus disregarding ethnic cohesion, economic potential and 
distribution of economic resources. This not only disturbed the peaceful coexistence 
among societies by catapulting them into a completely new structure that was alien to 
them and prone to hostilities, but also set the stage for ethnic conflict, territorial disputes 
and disputes over natural resources which to some extent, has contributed to political 
instability and a challenge to legitimacy and nation building23.   
Second, understanding the ethnic conflict in northern Uganda necessitates understanding 
the colonial context in which colonization employed the imperial policy and technique of 
‘divide and rule’24. This strategy was used in order to extract easy capital from the newly 
                                                  
22 Schoeman, M. “Africa’s International Relations, in Power, Wealth and Global order”, edited by P. Nel 
and P. J. McGowan, Cape Town: Cape Town University Press, (1999)  
23 Pierre Englebert, Stacy Tarango, and Mathew Carter, “Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution 
to the Debate on African Boundaries”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No, 10, (2002), p. 1094-
1098,  
24 Mutibwa, Phares M. “Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes”, London. Hurst and 
Company, (1992) p. 1x; see also Kabwegyere, T. B., “The Politics of State Formation”, Nairobi. East 
African Literature Bureau, (1974); Museveni, Y. K. Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom 
and Democracy in Uganda, London, Basingstoke, Macmillan, (1998) 
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created states on one hand and also to coerce the colonized people to submit to the 
colonial authority on the other25. The manner in which this policy was conducted in 
Uganda provided both reasons and fertile ground for ethnic hatred which seriously 
undermined peaceful relationships among the people of Uganda, a phenomenon that still 
exists to date. In this policy, the British colonial officers used a mechanism of indirect 
rule and employed Baganda chiefs as their agents in order to extend their rule to the rest 
of Uganda, a policy that not only set the ethnic groups on the path of collision but also 
sowing the seed of resentment and hatred that would result in ethnic confrontation and 
conflict. However, whether the sowing of seed of hatred and resentment by the colonialist 
was by design and intent or erroneous, Ugandans must accept the blame for nurturing 
rather than uprooting those seeds. If we are to understand the dynamics of the ethnic 
conflict in northern Uganda, we must now turn our lens to the context of the politics in 
Uganda since the 1980.      
 On the domestic scene, it has been argued that the cause of ethnic conflict is attributed to 
human agency and that is, the behavior of rulers themselves26 rather than imposition of 
state idea on top of existing traditional political and social structure which was based on 
kin and blood relationship. This human agency can be better understood especially if we 
consider the events that took place in Uganda after the 1980 presidential elections. These 
elections were contested by a number of candidates representing different political 
parties. Among them were Milton Obote for UPC, Kawanga Semwogerere for DP, and 
                                                  
25 Shelton George, “From Authoritarianism to African Liberalism: the Ugandan experience”, The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 17, No. 6, (May 2004). p. 2-3 
26 Reno, William. “Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa”, Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 53, No. 2, (Spring 2000) p. 434-440, 443-448 
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Yoweri Museveni for UPM.  Obote emerged victorious and UPC assumed leadership of 
the country.  
However, soon after election of Obote in office, Museveni refused to recognize and 
support his government claiming that the elections were rigged and vowed to go to the 
bush and wage a war against him. He launched his guerrilla campaign in the jungles of 
Luwero, located in central Buganda, the choice being strategic in the sense that he knew 
he would exploit the hatred between the ethnic Baganda and the northerners in general 
and Obote in particular because of the 1966 crisis27 in which their king was deposed by 
Obote, an ethnic northerner. The choice was thus a deliberate strategy to manipulate 
ethnic hatred against the northerners in his ambition for political power. When the war 
started in 1982 between the NRA and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and 
as it progressed through the years, many people were killed, others displaced from their 
villages and property destroyed.  
Because the government army the UNLA was predominantly made up of ethnic 
northerners, these killings and destruction were blamed on them in order to amplify and 
exploit further the ethnic hatred against them. Indeed as observed by the Human Rights 
and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), “--the real significance in the war in Luwero Triangle has 
not been the skulls, which have been used as exhibition of Acholi atrocities, but the 
initiation of the conflict in Luwero based on ethnic and religious divisions which 
                                                  
27 In 1966 Obote who was then the Prime minister of Uganda sent troops commanded by General Idi Amin 
to storm the palace of the ‘Kabaka’ the king of Buganda who was the President of Uganda. The king had to 
flee into exile in Britain where he later died  
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produced those skulls”28 which explains the ethnic dimension of the conflict that the 
NRM government continued to pursue in Acholiland.   
The context of the military and Uganda’s political scene is also worth noting. From 
independence in 1962, Uganda’s political and military scene had been dominated by 
leaders’ hailing from the north. In addition to this, the country’s post-independence 
political scene has been one of turbulent history, characterized by politically motivated 
violence, social chaos, intermittent dictatorships, military invasions and civil wars29. 
Security forces and especially the military have given their allegiance and loyalty to the 
president rather than the constitution, a factor that makes them to be partisan in politics, 
giving their loyalty and support to the incumbent government.  
After the NRA/M captured state power in 1986 which shifted the balance of power to the 
south30, this resulted into mistrust, suspicion and resentment by the northerners who 
believed that the incoming regime would not only revenge on them, but also marginalize 
them in the politics and governance of Uganda. Constriction of political space coupled 
with inability to deliver security and social economic development proved their suspicion 
of marginalization by the Museveni regime, further deepening the north south divide 
which fueled and provided fertile ground for rebellion31.  
                                                  
28 See Report by Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), “The Hidden War: The Forgotten People, 
War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda” (October 2003) p. 29  
29 Gooloba-Mutebi, F. “Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda, an Analytical Narrative on State-
Making”, Crisis States Working Papers Series, No. 27. (January 2008), p. 1 
30 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and Human Rights 
Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 
Vol, 10, No, 3, (September 2005). p. 409 
31 Several scholars, independent writers and political analysts have written extensively about the inequality 
in development between the north and south commonly referred to as the north-south divide. See for 
example, Joshua, B. Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda, Pax Musevenica, Palgrave, 
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Museveni has consistently rubbished the northern rebels as agents of evil forces of the 
past regimes, terrorists, murderers, and discordant forces with no coherent demand and 
thus not worth negotiating with.  He has also consistently blamed northerners and the past 
leaders as being responsible for the ills of Uganda. We must remember that dictator Idi 
Amin exhibited the same behaviour by using the same language to attack Obote after 
overthrowing him and the consequences were disastrous for the Langi and Acholi people 
during his rule from 1971-1979. Mazrui makes an important observation when he points 
out that to blame a catastrophe on someone who happens to belong to a certain tribe does 
not only affect that individual, but also the ethnic roots from where he comes32. This 
observation was made in relation to Amin’s behaviour of repeatedly warning Obote 
which ultimately led to the suffering of the Langi and the Acholi.  
In the context of Ugandan politics, the effect of use of this kind of language by a leader is 
sowing the seeds of hatred and disharmony which aggravates ethnic tensions and the 
potential for hostility and conflict arising out of this tension is high. This is because it 
invokes past memories of hatred and misbehavior and power-hungry leaders who wish to 
perpetuate themselves in power will always exploit these memories33. The 
marginalization and hostility against the Acholi people and the resultant insurgency in 
Acholiland should thus be viewed in this light. The study therefore emphasizes that 
understanding the northern conflict necessitates critical analysis of the ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                   
Macmillan, New York, (2007) p. 82-84; USAID country report, Uganda, Democracy and Governance 
Assessment: Republic of Uganda, (2005) ARD, Inc. Burlington, Vermont, USA, p. vii, 3, 26; Kasfir, 
Nelson, The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of 
Uganda, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London,: University of California Press, (1976) p. 95-99, 109-113   
32 Mazrui Ali A. “Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy”, New York, 
Sage Publications, (1975) p. 116 
33 Jaraslav Tir and Michael Jasinski, “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic 
Minorities”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol, 52, No, 5, (October 2008). p. 644-645  
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underpinnings and how it has been used by NRM rulers in order to have a tight grip on 
power at the expense of national integration.  
 Background to the study: 
This study examines the relationship between political repression and ethnic conflict in 
Northern Uganda, an area commonly referred to as Acholiland. The rebellion referred to 
here is one carried out by the LRA rebels led by Joseph Kony against the government of 
Uganda. Although the guns have fallen silent since August 2007, northern Uganda exists 
in a fragile atmosphere far from sustainable peace and stability. This is because the 
underlying conditions that led to the emergence of the insurgency have not been 
sufficiently addressed and also the fact that the LRA has not been destroyed. The point 
being emphasized is that ethnic tension still prevails in northern Uganda and there is no 
guarantee that hostilities cannot break out again as long as the underlying causes of the 
rebellion remain unaddressed34. In order to understand this conflict, it is better to trace its 
genesis from the colonial days.  
Uganda was a colony of Great Britain until independence on 9th October 1962. It is worth 
noting that colonialism was more often than not, a violent process35. Force rather than 
negotiations was often used to extend the imperial rule throughout the colonized territory 
in order to bring people under the colonial administration and to compel them to do what 
                                                  
34 Personal interview with Ugandan Member of Parliament, South Africa, September 2010;se also Daily 
Monitor of 9th May 2008, ‘Uganda has perfected the art of ethnic state’; Daily Monitor 25th May 2008, ‘I 
will die fighting-says Kony’ and the Independent of week ending January 2010, ‘Are conditions rife for 
rebellion in Uganda’ 
35 Shelton, George. “From Authoritarianism to African Liberalism: The Ugandan experience”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution. Vol. 17, No. 6, (May 2004). p. 1-3; Gardener Thompson, Governing Uganda: British 
Colonial Rule and its Legacy, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda, 2003. p. 43  
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the ruler wanted. The philosophy of divide and rule practiced by the colonialist led to the 
formation of the north-south divide in Uganda36.  
Northerners were generally considered masculine and war-like while people in the south, 
collectively known as westerners, were considered soft-spoken and tender. Consequently, 
people from the north were recruited to provide cheap labour in the tea and sugar 
plantations in the south. The north was also used as a reservoir for recruitment in the 
police, prisons and armed forces while the southerners were recruited mainly in the civil 
service and thus performed clerical and administrative tasks.  Indeed as observed by 
Mamdani, “it became a colonial truism that a soldier must be a northerner, a civil servant 
a southerner and a merchant an Asian”37.   
This imbalance in skills development ultimately resulted in an imbalance in regional 
development, creating the north-south divide. Consequently, the south became and still 
remains developed in terms of infrastructure, human resource and socioeconomic 
development while the north has remained poorly developed and chronically 
marginalized. Therefore, it is not surprising that bad decisions and policies by the 
colonial rulers continued to affect negatively the post-independent Uganda in general and 
northern region in particular. Successive post independent rulers have continued to play 
this regional and ethnic card in their contestation and struggle for power.  
                                                  
36 Roody Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message: A New Koine?” The Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda”, African Affairs, Vol. 98, No, 390, (January 1999)  p. 7 
37 Mamdani Mahmood, “Nationality Question in Neo-Colony: A Historical Perspective”, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 19, No. 27, (July 1984) p. 1049; See also Karugire, Samwiri, R. “Roots of Instability 
in Uganda” , Fountain Publishers Kampala Uganda, (1998) p. 29, 33   
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Dictator Amin’s rule in particular is notoriously remembered for murdering thousands of 
other ethnic tribes (Acholis were the most targeted) while he tended to favor his Kakwa 
and Nubian ethnic tribesmen. With the fall of Amin from power in 1979, and the 
subsequent coming of Obote, Ugandans experienced relative peace and looked forward to 
a new political dispensation characterized by democratic order, ethnic integration, and 
above all, peace and stability. However, this relative peace was short-lived as Obote 
himself a northerner, played the ethnic card and thus the underlying ethnic tensions 
continued.  
The emergence of the NRA/M under Museveni in 1986 has dramatized ethnic 
politicization and polarization, pushing it to greater heights, characterized by the northern 
rebellion, as this investigation will argue38. For the first time in post independent Uganda 
history, the northerners were divorced from state power. The composition of the armed 
forces formerly dominated by ethnic northerners also dramatically changed and was now 
in control of people from the south. Because ethnic revenge and reprisal has characterized 
Ugandan politics and more especially within the armed forces, the Acholi people feared 
revenge from the incoming forces, the NRA. Their fears were confirmed by the manner 
and the way the NRA deployed and conducted operations as it entered the north39.     
 
                                                  
38 See Daily Monitor, 9th May 2008. In the article ‘NRM has perfected the art of ethnic state’, Anthony 
Okuku argues that post-election violence that took place in Kenya could occur in Uganda because of a 
number of reasons including; ethnicity has exercised profound influence on Ugandan politics and the 
tendency by the incumbents, the ‘hunters’ to monopolize power and become life presidents, a situation that 
can easily lead to violent ethnic conflict.  
39 Ocitti, Jim. “Political Evolution and Democracy in Uganda: 1952-1966”, Lewiston, the Edwin Mellon 
Press, (2000) p. 341; Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? The Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Northern Uganda”, African Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 390, (January 1999) p. 13-15 
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Since 1986, this war has escalated and taken on different forms both in scope and 
magnitude, from local to regional, war by proxy and from ordinary civil war to near 
genocide and brutal tactics exemplified in the hacking and cutting off people’s limbs, 
ears, nose and other body parts mutilation, by the LRA. It is also worth noting that 
government forces, the UPDF, have not been exonerated from these atrocities40. 
Thousands of youngsters both male and female have been abducted by the rebels to be 
used as child soldiers, human ‘mules’ and sex slaves respectively41. A report by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), points at the heavy toll 
both in scope and intensity which the war impacted on the socioeconomic fabric of the 
Acholi people and consigning over a million people in the ‘Protected’ Internally 
Displaced People’s Camps (IDPs) that had never been secure”42. Testimonies of 
horrendous suffering by the victims of the war, the brunt of which was meted on the 
Acholi people by the protagonists in the war including amongst the Acholis themselves 
have been narrated by the population with pain43.   
 
                                                  
40 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and Human Rights 
Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 
Vol, 10, No, 3, (September 2005). p. 418; See also ‘The Cooling of Hearts’: Community Truth-Telling in 
Acholiland, Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), Gulu District NGO Forum, Special Report (July 
2007) p. 5, 17-18, www.justiceandreconciliation.com 
41 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Stolen Children, Child Recruitment by the Ugandan, The recruitment of 
Children into the Local Defence Units and their use by the UPDF, (March 2003); Ogenga Otunnu, “The 
Path to Genocide in Northern Uganda, Refugee, Vol. 17, No. 3, (August 1998) p. 6-8; Ruddy Doom and 
Koen Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? The Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda” 
African Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 390, (January 1999)  p. 15  
42 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Democracy and Governance 
Assessment: Republic of Uganda, 2005”, ARD Incorporation, Burlington USA, p. 26 
43 Chris Dalan, COPE Fieldwork Findings, Northern Uganda, “What Do You Remember?” A Rough Guide 
to the War in Northern Uganda, 1986-2000 
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As long as Uganda remains polarized along ethnic lines, coupled with the government 
failure or inability to deliver effective security, political and socioeconomic development 
to the north, perceptions of relative deprivation among the northern ethnic groups in 
general and the Acholi people in particular will continue to persist thus deepening the 
already severe legitimacy deficit rooted in the deep north-south division characterized by 
immense human misery and suffering44. The study therefore emphasizes that 
understanding the northern conflict necessitates critical analysis of ethnic underpinnings 
and how it has been used by NRM rulers in their exercise of political power to maintain 
their narrow ethnic or regional hegemony, at the expense of national integration.   
It thus aims at the search for causality in an effort to make sense between power 
dynamics and the rights and entitlements of ethnic minorities in society by reflecting on 
repression and marginalization factors which have tended to exclude the northern region 
in general and Acholiland in particular from the body politic. Seen in this light therefore, 
the northern rebellion can be said to be symbolic of a people who are attempting to resist 
persecution, discrimination and ethno-political marginalization.  
The study contends that the rebellion in northern Uganda is an ethnic conflict reflected in 
the failure by the Kampala regime to integrate the northern groups in general and the 
Acholi people in particular with the rest of the country and the perceived exclusion in the 
governance of the country. What this means is that the study will focus on violence in the 
north by analyzing the exercise of power by the NRM in Uganda. In this endeavor, an 
                                                  
44 Shelton George, “From Authoritarianism to African Liberalism: the Ugandan experience”, The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 17, No. 6, (May 2004). p. 9 
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explanation for the LRA rebellion will be examined by focusing on the political 
processes and ethnic polarization that have taken centre stage since the NRA/M 
government led by Museveni came to power. 
Statement of the problem: 
Peace in northern Uganda has remained elusive as the war between the LRA rebels and 
the government of Uganda remains unsettled. Despite the cessation of hostilities 
agreements45 between the two parties, which has witnessed relative calm and the silence 
of the gun since August 2006, the security situation in northern Uganda can still be 
described as being fragile and uncertain. Joseph Kony’s LRA rebels and his war 
machinery remain intact in the jungles of Sudan and the Central African Republic, 
although the Ugandan government claims to have destroyed its fighting capability. More 
than 1.5 million people were displaced from their homes, with tens of thousands killed, 
maimed, abducted and raped46, a good number of whom are still stuck in IDPs camps to 
date47.  
It is also worth noting that Uganda’s post-independence scene has been one of turbulent 
history, characterized by politically motivated violence, social chaos, intermittent 
dictatorships, contested elections, military invasions and civil wars48. This post-
independence history set the stage for armed struggle in which access to political power 
                                                  
45 See attached appendix 1; Agreement on cessation of hostilities between the government of the republic of 
Uganda (GoU) and the LRA/M  
46 Kevin, Ward, “The Armies of the Lord’, Christianity, Rebels and the State in Northern Uganda, 1986-
1999” , Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 31, No. 2, (2001)  p. 15  
47 See New Vision of 13th August 2010. In Pader district alone, about 233,849 displaced persons have still 
remained in camps as of this date 
48 Golooba-Mutebi, F. ‘Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-
making’, Crisis States Working Paper No. 27, (January 2008) p. 1 
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became the key source of wealth and violence became the foundation of that power. 
Ethnic politics became more pronounced and contentious as rulers organized political 
parties around religious and ethnic lines. Every regime tended to care about its people 
and ethnic patronage became the norm49. Because power has been obtained by force or 
manipulation of the political process through for example rigging elections, and coup 
detat, every regime in Uganda has tended to purge people from whom the previous leader 
springs.  
Following the 1980 presidential elections in which Obote, the UPC party president 
emerged victorious but which were considered rigged, Museveni refused to recognize and 
give support to his government and vowed to go to the bush. It was in this context that he 
decided to launch his NRA/M guerilla campaign which waged a protracted armed 
struggle from 1982 and captured state power in 1986. Upon ascent to power, Museveni 
promised and assured Ugandans amongst other things, to restore democracy, rule of law, 
peace and stability and to bring about sustainable development, saying that his regime 
was not a mere change of guards but instead, was ushering in a ‘fundamental change’50. 
However, soon after this capture of state power, armed rebellion against the NRM 
government started in several parts of Uganda.  
Whereas some of the rebel groups were defeated by military force while others signed 
peace agreement with government, the LRA has persisted to fight till to date. The official 
NRM explanation of the war has been given through several reasons for example, the 
                                                  
49 Jeremy, M. Weinstein, “Inside Rebellion, The Politics of Insurgent Violence”, Cambridge University 
Press, USA (2007) p. 66 
50 See Y. K. Museveni, What is wrong with Africa, NRM Publications, Kampala, (1992) p. 22 
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violent nature of the Acholi people, disgruntled politicians of the past regimes attempting 
to come back to power, and Kony being a mere thug and terrorist. While these reasons 
may seem to have convinced some section of Ugandans, especially those from the 
western, Museveni’s home region, there is prima facie something more that needs to be 
explained. In addition to this, the GOU and particularly the UPDF has on several 
occasions claimed that Kony and the LRA has been defeated and that the war is no more.  
To the contrary however, the war is still going on, except that what has changed is the 
location of the war theatre. That military force has failed to resolve this conflict requires 
that the northern war be analyzed from deeper issues that lie hidden beneath the official 
explanation and in this context, the ethnic question and resource allocation and the 
manner in which they have been handled by NRM be examined deeper. This study 
therefore aims at analyzing the link between the conflict in northern Uganda and the state 
by entertaining the statement of the problem; ‘To explain why the war in the north has 
persisted despite the NRA/M government and the international community’s sustained 
efforts to curtail it”. It is aimed at espousing the nexus that led to the emergence of the 
LRA rebellion’. 
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The central research question: 
The central research question in this thesis is: ‘Why has the NRA/M government despite 
its control of state machinery and military prowess failed to control the LRA rebellion?” 
The thesis also tries to answer the following specific questions; 
1. What caused and perpetuated the LRA rebellion, and how, if at all, is it linked to 
ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations in Uganda?  
2. How has ethnicity been politicized and used as an instrument of conflict by the 
NRM regime? 
3. To what extent do Acholi legislators think that the people they represent are 
formally or informally excluded and disenfranchised from meaningful political, 
social, or economic participation? 
4. How have ethnic mistrust and hatred been used in the Ugandan politics and to 
what extent, if at all, are they linked to the war in Acholiland? 
5. How can ethnic stereotyping, hatred and conflict be contained or neutralized in 
Uganda in general and Acholiland in particular? 
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Objectives of the Study: 
The objectives of this study are four fold. First, it tries to identify and examine causal 
factors that are central to the northern Uganda conflict. Second, it tries to analyze the link 
between the state and conflict and also contextualize and evaluate the concept of ethnicity 
and to assess its role and impact on the war in Acholi sub-region. Third, it examines to 
what extent, if at all, has the settlement of outstanding issues over which the war emerged 
been addressed. Fourth, it examines the entry of new players and the influence of new 
motives on the escalation of the war.  Lastly, it tries to explain why the war in the north 
has persisted despite concerted efforts to contain it.  
Justification of the Study: 
The justification of the Study is in two dimensions, that is, the academic justification on 
one hand and the policy justification on the other.  In the first instance, it is significant 
first because it provides insight into the nature of ethnic politics in the countries on the 
African continent in general and Uganda in particular. It tries to show how and why 
ethnicity came to the fore in the context of the rise of Museveni and how the Acholi 
people in the north have been brutally suppressed. It is hoped that it will provide input to 
policy makers in their effort to look for amicable solutions the northern conflict.  
It will also contribute to the existing lacuna on conflict and understanding of the role 
played by ethnicity in Africa in general and Uganda in particular and provide the basis 
for further (scholarly) research on the causes of war which has resulted in the loss of 
many lives and property destroyed with Acholiland being the epicenter of this conflict. 
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The humanitarian crisis created by this war, repression and perception of relative 
deprivation makes it an important subject for studying. It is the intention of this research 
therefore, to develop models and ideas that are generic to international conflict resolution 
principles and practice. It is therefore hoped to contribute to the existing scholarly thesis 
and to shed more light on a body of knowledge on linkage between ethnic politics and 
perpetuation of conflict by demonstrating that until national cohesion is made a 
prerequisite in Uganda, conflict and rebellion are not likely to end.   
 In the second instance that is on policy justification it seeks to explain the conflict in 
northern Uganda in terms of ethno-political dimension. The conflict has gone through 
intermittent phases of direct combat engagement between the LRA rebels and the Uganda 
national army, the UPDF, unilateral and negotiated cessation of hostilities. Many people 
have been killed, dozens maimed and or displaced and the infrastructure destroyed. 
Although the guns have been silent since mid 2006, the stakes remain high as the conflict 
has not been brought to a conclusive end.  
Indeed in the absence of a greater understanding of the causes of this war, peace and 
stability will remain elusive in northern Uganda. In such circumstances, there is a 
possibility that war can re-surface and cause renewed violence, moreover in a nastier 
form even if it may not be by Joseph Kony. The point being emphasized is that ethnicity 
has taken profound influence in Ugandan politics to the extent that it has exacerbated the 
tension between the people in the north, particularly the Acholi and those in the south. As 
such, the security situation in Acholiland can be described as fragile and far from 
sustainable peace and stability. It is hoped that the findings will provide insights and 
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therefore a valuable input that will help in finding amicable solution to the conflict in 
northern Uganda. 
Second, the study is important because the research setting is in a region that is prone to 
political instability and violence resulting from complex and rapidly changing 
social/geopolitical dynamics especially since the 1980s, of which there is paucity of 
literature. With increasing concern over peace and stability, and above all, the sanctity of 
human security by the international community, it is hoped that this research will make a 
significant contribution to enhancing the level of knowledge and awareness in this area. 
Third, it focuses on how to integrate the conflict resolution tools and mechanism within 
the political framework that involves all the stakeholders. Once again it is hoped that this 
research will make a significant contribution in this area. Fourth, the study is significant 
in the sense that although the primary focus of this research is on the conflict (war) in 
northern Uganda resulting from repression and political exclusion, it is hoped that the 
findings will shed more light on other conflicts resulting from other causes other than 
repression such as: inequitable distribution of resources, women rights, children and other 
disadvantaged ethnic minorities.  
Research Methodology and analytical procedures: 
The methodology used in this study was both qualitative and quantitative approach to 
gather field data. But overall, by conducting content analysis, qualitative approach 
remained the principal design method of data analysis to generate quantitative results. 
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This represented the best means to a broad, precise and richer detail of the complex 
environment in which the ethnic conflict occurs. Emphasis was put on process-tracing, 
congruence and within-case analysis, in an attempt to make the link between possible 
causes and observed outcome with a view of uncovering evidence of causal mechanism 
at work51. In other words, a sequence of events that are believed to characterize the cause 
and escalation of the LRA rebellion were traced from the prism of ethnic politicization 
and repression within the NRA/M political dispensation. 
Miles and Huberman52 explain that by counting frequencies of occurrences and 
sequencing particular words, phrases or concept the researcher is able to understand the 
interaction of the variable, elaborates, develops analysis and confirms results through 
triangulation that provides quick insights into the research.  Analysis was also guided by 
their pragmatic approach which combines the use of interview questions and themes 
emerging from data to inform analysis53. The presence of the team conversant in the local 
Acholi language made it possible to maintain quality assurance in the collection of data 
by following themes that are relevant to the research. 
The primary source of information consisted of in-depth interview with relevant key 
informants which included; politicians (especially the Acholi legislators), government 
officials, personnel of humanitarian and aid agencies, religious leaders, local and cultural 
leaders. The IDPs including social workers and managers within these camps formed the 
                                                  
51 See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development in Social 
Sciences”, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, (2005)   
52 Miles, M. B. And Huberman A. M. “Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook”, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks CA. (1994) 
53 Ibid, p. 58-65 
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core of the interviews, as these have got vital first hand information. Their views and 
account of the facts that have since taken place on the ground were vital in answering the 
questions set forward in the study. The point being emphasized is that tracing the role of 
ethnicity in the northern conflict was grounded in secondary or official sources that are 
available, but also heavily relied on in-depth focused discussions and interviews 
conducted in the war-torn Acholi sub-region. 
A number of primary documents from local and international agencies were consulted 
and these included; The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), Oxfam Uganda, Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development 
(ACORD), Speeches and documents such as Parliamentary Hansard, Statement to 
Parliament on the Peace Talks between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and 
the LRA, Uganda’s Quest for Democracy, Peace and Good Governance by Dr Kizza 
Besigye and Committee Reports. 
Secondary literature was also made use of and this was equally obtained from a wide 
range of sources which included but not limited to; academic journals, text books, 
workshop and seminar reports, magazines and newspapers including documentary 
information from religious and humanitarian individuals54 based and working in 
Acholiland. The validity of the outcome was ensured by avoiding bias in selection, which 
                                                  
54 Father Carlos Rodriguez, “The Northern Uganda War: The “Small Conflict” that became the world’s 
worst humanitarian crisis”, Health Policy and Development Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, (August 2004).   
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could have had negative consequences on the final results. By using qualitative research 
approach personal rather than detached engagement was applied and the validity of the 
outcomes was adhered to in a practical way.  
Although one hundred percent (100%) non-bias investigation seldom exists in practical 
research, my team and I tried to minimize the incidence of bias by not wittingly selecting 
cases that represent a truncated sample within the population of interest55. Acceptance of 
the unbiased data was guided by careful listening and observing the innuendo in the tone 
and answers given by the respondents, thus separating those with vested interest to 
protect from those representing ideal situation, consequently working with the latter.  My 
intuition played a large role in the initial stage of the raw data collection in as far as 
deciding which participant’s information to accept and which to dismiss. 
Selection of research sites: 
The three districts of Acholi sub-region, that is Gulu, Kitgum and Pader covers an area of 
approximately 28,138.1 Square Kilometers and is home to approximately two million 
people, 80% of whom lived in IDPs camps. In 2006, there were a total of 83 camps in 
Acholiland56. Although some of the smaller camps were merged with bigger ones as a 
security measure, there were still over 70 camps at the time of conducting this research in 
the three districts mentioned above. The research team visited two camps from each 
district. Although there is relative calm in most areas of Acholiland, selection of the sites 
was based in part on security considerations. Bellow is the typology of the camps visited  
                                                  
55  Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences”, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, (2005) p. 23 
56 See Appendices; Northern Uganda Region: IDP Camps and Population figures, November 2006   
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Name of District Name of camp Population 
Gulu Unyama 12, 593 
 Koro-abili 5, 597 
Kitgum Layamo 18, 578 
 Amida 28, 982 
Pader Pader Trading Centre 20, 626 
 Kwonkic 2, 632 
Kampala   
The above sites were also considered safe in terms of security as they are close to the 
urban centres, have got sufficient populations in terms of representation and are 
homogeneous in terms of ethnic identity. 
From the above typology, twenty cases for interview were identified from each site. This 
figure was considered representative and also manageable by the field investigative team 
which assisted in conducting out interviews. The targeted category of interviewees 
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included at least three local camp administrators, six social workers and eleven displaced 
persons. The decision to employ targeted selection was based on the premise that careful 
selection of cases is a good criterion for matching interviewers with respondents and also, 
to reduce reactivity and increase the comfort of disclosure. This “investigator 
responsiveness” to broader and specific contextual issues results in conceptual validity, a 
strategy for good analysis and working with rigor57.   
Selection of Kampala as a research site was based on the fact that there are people from 
the north who migrated to Kampala and therefore easy to access and whose views are 
important. Having Kampala as a site was helpful in the sense that, as an urban area, it 
includes cases that constitute tough test for the theory, as the Acholi people in the city are 
likely to express different opinion as well as identifying new causal variables. Although it 
is practically not easy to achieve full randomness in scientific research of this nature, 
minimizing bias was done in such a way that interviews were not conducted on whoever 
rushed to the team to give his or her story.      
Data Collection Methods:  
Qualitative methods of data collection were used in this study because of their ability to 
obtain information on sensitive topics, which are not amenable to quantitative 
instruments. A semi-structured instrument (interview schedule) developed in English was 
translated in Luo, (the Acholi local language), and used during one-on-one interviews. A 
team of research assistants capable of speaking fluent English and Luo was therefore 
                                                  
57 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences”, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, (2005) p. 19 
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crucial for this exercise, as questions in some cases necessitated asking and clarifying in 
the local language. This method is appropriate for in-depth individual interviews 
especially with those who are willing to participate.   
Prior to each interview, the interviewers introduced themselves, outlined the purpose of 
the study and asked the respondent for his or her consent. Strass and Corbin58 point to the 
fact that those who have used qualitative research have obtained satisfactory results and 
appropriate answers to the central research questions investigated. Silverman59 points to 
the flexibility of the qualitative method of data collection, the fact that it allows theory 
questions to be pursued in a highly effective and economic way and is particularly 
reliable when trying to report how “people see certain things”, or “why they behave in 
certain ways”, an indication that it was appropriate for this kind of study.  
Guided by Miles and Huberman60, my research team and I suspended as much as 
possible, any pre-conceived notions of the ways in which ethnicity might shape 
interviewees’ responses. The data collection process was guided by the questions, who 
are the people saying similar things? What is it exactly that they are saying? And, why 
might they be saying similar things?   
 
 
                                                  
58 Strass, A. L. and Corbin, J. “Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and 
Techniques”, Newbury Park, CA. Sage Publications, (1990)  
59 Silverman, D. “Interpreting Qualitative Data, Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction”, 
London, Sage Publications, (2006) p. 24-26  
60 Miles, M. B. and  Huberman, A. M. “Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Source Book”, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, CA, (1994) 
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Interviews:  
Interviews were conducted one-on-one and face-to-face with the respondents. The 
respondent’s identities were kept anonymous for security purposes. Partially-structured, 
face-to-face interviews were considered appropriate because of their flexibility. This is 
because, not only can questions be adapted to, but also the respondent feels motivated61. 
In addition to being motivated, the response rate or the proportion of the targeted people 
from whom completed interviews are obtained is typically high, partly because of the 
intrinsic attractiveness of being interviewed62, having someone’s attention, being asked to 
talk about oneself, the novelty of experience, and also the difficulty of saying “no” to 
someone asking something in person.  
The approach is also considered useful because of the fact that importance and credibility 
of the research is conveyed best by a face-to-face interviewer who can show 
identification and credentials. It is also helpful particularly with respondents whose 
writing skills are weak or have none at all or who are less motivated to make the effort to 
respond fully as is the case with some members of the local population, LRA and UPDF. 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
There is often a misconception that qualitative research and data analysis is ad hoc, 
intuitive, unsystematic and thus without academic rigor. Despite this perception, many 
                                                  
61 Singleton, Royce. JR. Bruce, C. Straits and Ronald J. McAllister, “Approaches to Social Research”, 
Oxford University Press, New York, (1998) p. 244; see also, Argyris, C. “Some Unintended Consequences 
of Rigorous Research”, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 70. No. 3, (1968) p. 185-197  
62 Mugenda, O. M. & Muganda, A. G, Research Methods, Nairobi, ACTS Press, (1999); Singleton Royce 
JR,  Bruce C Straits, Margaret M Straits and Ronald J McAllister, “Approaches to Social Research”, 
Oxford University Press, New York, (1988) p. 244  
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authors on qualitative analysis agree that data analysis occurs in various degrees 
throughout the research process, including the data collection phase. In this investigation 
my research assistants and I worked as a team and with rigour. Miles and Huberman 
offers a pragmatic approach which combines the use of interview questions (which are 
obviously shaped by the research question) and themes emerging from data to inform 
analysis. Data analysis was therefore informed and driven by Morse et al’s63 strategies for 
introducing rigour during analysis which includes: “investigator responsiveness”, 
“methodological coherence”, “theoretical sampling and sampling adequacy”, “an active 
analytic stance” and “saturation”.  Data was thus split into ‘spoilt’ and ‘un-spoilt’, 
consequently working with the latter 
In the initial phase of interview, fifty64 individuals in three sub-counties, namely 
Lakwana and Bobi in Gulu district and Purongo in Amuru were interviewed. These sub-
counties were purposively selected for their locations at the boarders between Acholi and 
Lango (Lakwana and Bobi), Acholi and Alur (Purongo). This was intended to give ethnic 
geographical representation of the people living in remote areas in Acholiland that have 
experienced the LRA war in the last 20 years.  In addition, a total of 5 key informant 
interviews were conducted with the local authorities in these selected sub–counties.  
For the purpose of this initial pre-test phase and for later data collection, interviews were 
mainly targeted to adults (male and female) aged between 19 and 70 years old. Of this 
age bracket, those respondents aged between 43 and 70 years of age were an important 
                                                  
63 Morse, M. Janice, Michael Barrett, Karin Olson and Jude Spiers, “Verification Strategies for Establishing 
Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research”, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, Vol. 1, No, 
2 (Spring 2002)  p. 1-19  
64 This number is based on pre-test sample 
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component. They are the categories of respondents we felt have experienced the ethnic 
turmoil in Uganda since independence in 1962.   
Outline of the Thesis: 
The Thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one provides the Study setting, 
methodology, and analytical procedures. It particularly explains the geographical location 
of Uganda and Acholiland, the main focus of the Study. It also provides the background 
as well as the significance of the Study. Chapter two examines the literature review. It 
focuses on the scholarly works that have been written on ethnicity and the concept of 
relative deprivation. It also analyses the construct of ethnicity in the colonial and post-
colonial context. Chapter three examines the emergence of the NRA/M and the 
reconstruction of the Ugandan state. It provides insight into the configuration of ethnicity 
under the NRM leadership and policies and how this created inter-ethnic disharmony, 
resentment and hostilities that led to emergence of insurgence in Acholiland. 
Chapter four analyses the social and power relations under the NRM. It particularly 
focuses on the state response to the insurgence in the north and the consequences of this 
response. It attempts to explain that the state’s heavy reliance on the military option did 
not and has not only failed to destroy the LRA, but entrenched mutual distrust and 
escalation of the conflict. Chapter five examines the impact of the LRA war and its 
implications for peace and stability in Acholiland. It attempts to explain that the war has 
led to increased impoverishment of the Acholi people and also failed to bridge the 
north/south divide. Chapter six analyses the attempts to mitigate the war between the 
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LRA and the GOU. It examines the various peace initiatives that have been undertaken 
by different players and their outcomes. It also looks at the ICC and its impact on the 
war. Chapter seven is divided into two sections. The first section highlights the 
Conceptual and Empirical contribution of the thesis to the paradigm of ethnicity and 
conflict and its impact on social cohesion, human security, socioeconomic development 
and above all, peace and stability. The second section summarizes the general conclusion 
of the thesis.  
Conclusion: 
The chapter has shown the geographical location of Uganda and the location of 
Acholiland, the main focus area of this study including its demographic outline. It has 
also indicated that in order to understand the war in northern Uganda, it is important to 
examine the domestic as well as international factors. The saliency of colonialism in 
constructing ethnicity is a crucial factor as well as the human agency especially after 
post-independence period. Of particular importance are the political events following the 
disputed 1980 presidential elections together with those after the 1986 capture of power 
by the NRA/M after waging a five-year guerrilla war against the Obote government.  
The ethnic skewed nature of the military and its intervention in politics has also been 
shown as one of the factors to be examined because of its potential to exacerbate ethnic 
conflict and in fact prolong it. To the extent that it is viewed as an instrument of the 
ruling party where military officers are mobilized and politicized for the purpose of   
enabling the incumbent regime perpetuate itself in power, at the expense of other ethnic 
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groups because its ultimate loyalty to the party rather than the state65, it has generated 
discontent and led to inter-ethnic disharmony and animosity.  
It has also demonstrated that ethnic conflict in Uganda is part of the deep north-south 
divide where the north has for a long time remained impoverished while the south is 
developed, a social-economic imbalance that has been perpetuated by successive 
Ugandan rulers.  Although Ugandans hoped that this imbalance and ethnic integration 
which has been at the heart of the country’s problems would be prioritized by the 
NRA/M government, through policies designed to accommodate and address the 
underlying structural causes, it instead became worse as ethnicity took center stage in the 
political processes of the NRM. Understanding the concept of ethnicity and how it can be 
used as a source of conflict is examined in the next chapter.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
65 Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No, 4, 
(1995) p. 9-11 
40 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
The nature of ethnic conflict in Africa, insurgency and relative deprivation: A 
theoretical frame work.  
Introduction: 
The manifestations of ethnicity in Africa and the socio-historical transformations that 
accompanied it can be traced to the colonial period when the process of organization of 
power within the colony, administration and extraction of economic potential was based 
on the concept of ethnicity. These manifestations have given rise to tribal identity, 
cultural prides and values which help many ethnic groups to claim self-determination, 
cohesion and a sense of belonging. However, they are also responsible for creating 
hatred, resentment and conflict as different groups compete with one another in order to 
gain access and control of scarce resources and political power at the expense of others.  
 
Ethnicity has taken central stage in the politics of many African countries to the extent 
that current political upheavals, civil wars, massive displacements and misery can be to a 
large extent attributed to ethnic rivalries and confrontation. Most conflicts on the African 
continent have taken place within intra-state although they have not been immune to 
outside interference. The people fighting together in these conflicts, justification 
notwithstanding, are more often than not members belonging to the same ethnic or 
religious affiliation. Because of this, there is a tendency to attribute the actions of the 
warring parties to primordial ethnic connotations (which is not true), for example that 
they are fighting the other because of cultural or religious differences. 
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Consequently, the underlying causes of conflict become ‘foggy’ as the tendency is to 
think of the trigger of conflict as embedded in ethnic differences; religious, tribal or 
customs. Indeed as observed by David, ethnicity and culture were until mid 1970s, 
relegated to the status of epi-phenomena” and periphery by the Dependency, Marxist and 
Development theorists on the notion that conflict is a natural phenomenon because 
“people seem to trust and prefer those of their own cultural group, while feeling more 
distant from, and distrustful of, those of other cultural groups”66.  
 
However, as the need for explaining ethnicity and politics on one hand and ethnicity and 
conflict on the other increased, it became apparent that “the causes of conflict were thus 
seen to lie, for example, in the mobilization activities of manipulative elites, or in the 
economic disparities between regions and communities. Ethnicity itself was not 
apparently the cause, but rather a consequence, of change in the social, economic and 
political arena”67. What this means is that conflict has taken on an ethnic dimension 
because of the manipulative behaviour of politicians in the competition for power and 
resources. This same observation is noted by Francis and Nafziger by pointing out that 
the causes of ethnic conflict “--are to be found in the interactions of power-seeking with 
group identity and inequalities”68.   
 
                                                  
66 David Brown, “Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on State and Society”, Third World Quarterly, Vo, 11, No,   
4. (October 1989) p. 1-4 
67 Ibid, p. 2 
68 Stewart F. “The Root Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies”, In Nafziger, Stewart, and Vayrynen (Eds.), 
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Within this context, ethnicity has become a strategy and means for mobilization where 
the ruling elites, often members of an ethnic cleavage use repression and marginalization 
against other groups in order to maintain a strong grip on power. This generates a feeling 
of relative deprivation on the part of the groups affected and spurs social discontent 
which provides the motivation and drive for collective violence. The dynamics of this 
situation are such that the group in power mobilizes for support using ethnicity to 
maintain power while the relatively deprived groups will tend to resort to war in the 
absence of amicable redress, by also mobilizing through ethnicity in order to remove 
those in power who are perceived as the source of their frustration and deprivation.  
 
Such a situation then results in a vicious cycle of violence in which the parties to the 
conflict use the discourse of group hatred to further mobilize on ethnic lines. The armed 
rebellions, coup d’états, insurgence and civil wars that have bedeviled many countries on 
the African continent should be viewed in this light. This section aims at explaining the 
link between ethnicity and conflict by employing theories advanced by scholarly works. 
This is because in order for conflict to be contained or eliminated, it is important to 
understand the motivation of actors and the conditions that predispose them to violence. 
In order to do this, we need first to have an overview of ethnicity and how it can be used 
as an instrument for conflict.  
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Ethnicity and Politics: An Overview 
Ethnicity as a concept has been extensively written on by scholars and independent 
analysts alike. It is worth noting that ethnicity per se is not a problem as people enjoy 
collective cultural and identity pride of where they belong and who they are. It even 
becomes an important political tool if membership of a society is mobilized on the basis 
of common values such as culture, social support, language, territory, and security69. In 
this case ethnicity becomes an important factor in galvanizing people and increasing the 
intensity of their participation in political activities as they will feel and see themselves as 
members of the same community with equal treatment and opportunities not only in 
politics, but also in economic, security, education, welfare and development.  
 
It is only when ethnicity is politicized and manipulated by leaders for their own selfish 
purposes such as favoritism, and rewarding resources to specific ethnic groups in 
exchange for their loyalty while neglecting others that creates feelings of relative 
deprivation, discontent and resentment, which then becomes a potent source of conflict as 
has been the case in several African countries. Understanding the role of ethnicity in 
politics is therefore important because politics is about control of the state, together with 
its distributive and allocative functions including policies and programmes.   
 
Because control of the state and distribution of (scarce) resources tends to be, and 
perhaps better put, is problematic in the case of Africa, in the sense that individuals in 
control and who are responsible for leadership of society define themselves on the basis 
                                                  
69 Kasfir, Nelson, “The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation of Ethnicity in African Politics with a Case 
Study of Uganda, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, (1976) p. 48  
44 
 
of ethnic nexus to which they belong and which often leads to conflict, a deeper 
understanding of ethnicity and how it manifests into violence is today, more greater than 
ever before. The study contends that it is in this broader context of hegemonic-directed 
competition for access to and control of the state and resources using manipulation and 
politicization of ethnicity and militarization of politics that makes ethnicity a violent tool 
by parties in the conflict, but more especially the ruling elites to punish or suppress 
dissent. 
 
Politics is about managing a state or government, allocation of resources, and the 
administration and control of its internal and external affairs. Within this context, 
government has a public responsibility to make and administer laws in the interest of the 
public and to provide the socioeconomic and political goods to its citizens in a fair, 
equitable and orderly manner in return for the taxes it collects, including the sanctioned 
authority and mandate given by the people. While politicians in many of the countries in 
the western world have, for the most part, separated politics from for example personal 
interests such aggrandizement, the situation in Africa seems to be different. In most 
African countries, ethnicity and politics are intertwined in such a way that ethnicity is to a 
large extent the organizing principle of politics and the basis for determining ones social 
standing in society as well as access to political opportunities such as jobs, government 
tenders, wealth and prestige.  
 
 
45 
 
Thus, it tends to be seen as a means of acquiring power and access to the scarce resources 
by the ruler in order to enrich himself and members of his ethnic group. As aptly noted by 
Zakaria, “--in societies without strong traditions of multi-ethnic groups or assimilation, it 
is easiest to organize support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines. Once an ethnic group 
is in power, it tends to exclude other ethnic groups. Compromise seems impossible and 
political competition that is so divisive can rapidly generate into violence”, and that 
“armed rebellions and coups in Africa have often been directed against ethnically based 
regimes”70.  
 
It is therefore no surprise that political decisions in terms of who gets what for example 
good infrastructure, schools, hospitals, roads, factories, and  employment opportunities 
are all made and allocated on the basis of ethnicity. Nyambegera notes that, this is “--
discrimination as it leaves the majority people in certain ethnic groups continually 
without access to society’s opportunities and rewords”71, which breeds social political 
and economic discontent and resentment amongst ethnic groups. Other scholars have 
written about multicultural societies or population heterogeneity as a source of conflict 
arguing that because of ethno-political competition, “it breeds conflict that is difficult to 
resolve and, as a consequence, political systems that are inherently more unstable”72.  
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Their assertion is guided by the reasoning that multicultural or heterogeneous 
communities are prone to conflict because of threats arising out of uneven access and 
consumption of scarce resources and threats because of their group (ethnic) belonging. 
Their conclusion is that “--heterogeneity has negative effects on civil society and 
provision of public goods”73.  Whereas this may vary from case to case and therefore is 
subject of debate, generalizing and viewing ethnic conflict and unstable government 
environments in this light is not only erroneous but also tends to miss the point. This is 
because if ethnic heterogeneity is a source of conflict, then almost all countries on the 
African continent would be in turmoil.  
 
Recent studies on ethnicity have focused attention on its relationship with culture and the 
state, the main issue here being the role of the state in shaping ethnic identities in a bid to 
find out why third world countries especially on the African continent continue to 
experience economic dependence, authoritarian rule, political instability and conflict. 
One of the reasons given is because “in country after country, a single ethnic group has 
taken control over the state and used its power to exercise control over others---, in 
retrospect there has been far less ‘nation-building’ than many analysts had expected or 
hoped, for the process of state building has rendered many ethnic groups devoid of power 
or influence”74.  
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74 David Brown, “Perspectives on State and Society”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, (October 
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Apparently this seems to be the trend in many African countries where state elites have 
tended to remove or restrict opportunities for political participation, which to a large 
extent explains the conflicts on the continent. In such a situation, politicization and 
manipulation of ethnic consciousness in order to gain control of and use of state power 
and resources generates discontent and hostility within the relatively deprived groups 
who may in turn mobilize through rebellions or coup d’états.  
 
Conceptualizing ethnicity: 
The concept of ethnicity has been analyzed through different theories by different 
scholars. It refers to mythology, symbols and artifacts, language and ancestry as ethnic 
groups try to define who they are in relation to others. The term finds roots in the fifth 
century Greek civilization where “ethos” referred to connotations of common culture, 
language and history and which in the fifteenth century became a term of self-definition, 
referring to a “we group”75. One of the major concerns of scholars in conceptualizing and 
analyzing ethnicity has been to understand its role in social relations, shaping political 
processes as well as its relationship with the state and political violence. 
  
The primordialists explain ethnicity as inherently inborn and that its characteristics are 
not only psychological but biological as they are passed on from generation to generation. 
They contend that ethnic bonds are in blood and are as strong as the history of the ethnic 
group itself, with strong psychological and emotional attachment, to the extent that “--the 
presence of ethnic divisions in a nation is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of 
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ethnic violence”76. Primordialists like Brown and Boswell77, Scott and Edward believe 
that the characteristics of a particular group of people stems from the ‘givens’ of being 
born into for example a particular religious community, speaking a similar language, 
behave in a similar manner, with bonds of blood relationship. As pointed out by Scott;  
 
“As one thought about the strengths of tensions in family attachments, it became 
apparent that the attachment was not only to the other family member merely as a person 
but as a possessor of certain especially ‘significant relational’ qualities which could only 
be described as primordial. The attachment of one member to one’s kinship group is not 
just a function of interaction---. It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed 
to the tie of blood”78.   
 
But critics of the primordialist’s approach point at a number of flaws. First, the 
explanation of ethnicity tends to be in absolute terms and static in the sense that the 
‘givens’, blood relations, language, and common history can never change. Contrary to 
this thinking however, ethnicity is not static but dynamic as cultural attributes are fluid, 
contextual and depend on relationships. In other words, ethnic identity varies overtime 
and across individuals79. A person, who moves from one place to another for example 
from the countryside to town, is likely to experience a change in several aspects including 
his political and ethnic consciousness. Consequently, he is likely to take on new loyalties 
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and identity, but this does not necessarily mean that he drops his old identity. Indeed as 
aptly observed by Kasfir,  
 
“The increasing change of social change is likely to make people more concerned about 
their identity and more prepared to form groups on the basis of ties which they have 
taken little interest in the past”, and that “as soon as an individual ventures outside the 
range of direct influence of his rural compatriots, he responds to a set of stimuli in which 
his previous ethnic identity plays a minor role”80.  
 
Second, ethnicity is a social construct and an invention by the colonial masters. As such, 
it can be deconstructed just like any other invention. Hence it is not true that it is in blood 
and cannot change. However, what is important is the role it plays in the contemporary 
society and politics. Prior to conquest and colonization of Africa by European imperial 
powers in the 18th century, the notion of ethnicity did not exist. Indeed as Thomas points 
out, “tribes were thus a product of colonial rule, as administrators created new chiefdoms 
-- and propagated African traditions--”81. Thus the tendency by politicians to manipulate 
and mobilize people on the basis of ethnicity for selfish ends has continued in the same 
way as it was used by colonial masters. 
 
Third, primordialists attribute the seriousness of the ethnic conflict to intense emotional 
power of an individual’s attachment to his ethnic belonging, “--a tie that ‘has to do with 
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something that is so basic to man’s life, it is not at all a mystery that he is willing, indeed 
almost eager, to die in defence of it”82. Because of the above shortcomings of 
primordialism, failure to take into account the social changes, and inability to encompass 
political and economic influences, it cannot sufficiently explain the ethnic phenomena.  
 
The Instrumentalist approach on the other hand emphasizes socio-economic and political 
factors as the main motivators and causes of ethnic conflict. They point out that (unfair) 
competition among ethnic groups for access to and use of scarce resources and political 
power is the problem and also that the process of modernization invigorates conflict. 
Scholars such as Newman point out that demographic, economic and political balance 
among ethnic groups within a state are crucial factors as they determine the chances and 
opportunities of who gets what, the strategy of which is determined by the ethnic 
leadership. He further points out that within this context, “the state often uses its immense 
resources to politicize ethnic identifications”.  
 
McKey points out that “renewed ethno-tension and conflict are not the result of any 
primordial need to belong, but are due to the conscious efforts of individuals and groups 
mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political and material 
resources”83, an argument supported by Brown and Boswell84. Viewed in this light 
therefore, it is not ethnicity that is the cause of ethnic violence but the political actors 
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especially the rulers who manipulate it in order to secure tangible goods and benefits for 
a particular ethnic group85. Neil makes an important observation by pointing out that “it 
is noted that ‘bad leaders are the biggest problem’ encouraging ethnic conflict, and it is 
clear that political entrepreneurs determined to attain and maintain power often place 
their personal prejudices above inter-ethnic coexistence or the national interest and 
promote ethnic outbidding”86. It is also within this context that scholars such as Kandeh 
argue that ethnicity is a multifaceted and dynamic phenomenon and that one of its 
attributes is instrumental because it forms the basis for political and social organization, a 
mechanism used for elite domination than as an emancipatory and resource mobilization 
for the interest of the people87.     
 
It is not surprising therefore that many communities and the political processes that 
influence and affect their relationships are based on ethnic identity and there is nowhere 
else this phenomenon is more prevalent than on the African continent. That ethnicity is 
not a fixed condition but a historical process that was derived from and profoundly 
shaped and influenced by the cultural, social, economic and political forces of the 
colonial administration, and which has continued to exert strong influence in the political 
discourse of many countries, makes it relevant to be studied under specific contexts. An 
analysis of contemporary ethnic dimensions in the African context needs to begin with a 
consideration of the colonial state and ethnic realms that shaped and nurtured it.    
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Colonialism and the construction of Ethnicity in Africa: 
The modern social relations in which ethnicity plays a significant role can be traced to the 
colonial period when the colonial system and processes of state formation were based on 
the colonial ideology and culture of divide and rule. This period which started with the 
Berlin conference of 1884-85, witnessed the division of African societies into political 
units called states with clearly defined boundaries. Ironically these boundaries split the 
traditional social structures, consequently ignoring ethnic cohesiveness, economic 
potential and distribution of natural resources88.  
 
Within these states, further subdivision was made whereby districts and counties were 
created with boundaries drawn on the basis of the concept of the tribe which was an 
invention of the colonial masters and not from the people making up these units.89 The 
point being emphasized is that the imposed boundaries for the most part ignored cultural 
patterns in the colonized societies”90, because after all, the colonialist was not interested 
in the formation of a state on the notion of western structure, but rather for expansionism, 
quest for markets, imperial aggrandizement, strategic reasons and extraction of capital.    
 
Soon after the exercise of partitioning, the colonialist then moved quickly to assert his 
authority and influence in the territory. This was necessary in order to deter competing 
rivals from taking over the territory on one hand, but also to identify and establish 
alliances with preferred natives through whom colonial rule would be extend to the rest 
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of the territory. Categorizing, and sorting out natives by forming a typology of the 
different groups and authoritatively defining and dictating the rules of the game; what 
was and wasn’t permitted, was a prerequisite for ease of administration. Within this 
sorting process, Young notes that “the colonial state visibly created new categories of 
identity” and that “Ethnonyms in East Africa such as Teso, Gisu, Toro, Acholi, Kiga, 
Sukuma or Luhya would hardly have been encountered at all a century ago”91, an 
observation shared by  Kasfir92.   
 
Arising out of institutionalization of colonialism in the process of state formation which 
relied heavily on the basis of ethnicity is the fact that the state begun as a weak state and 
has to a large extent remained a weak state. This is mainly because colonial powers 
omitted to transfer important aspects that characterize the modern state to Africa. 
Doctrines concerned with civil liberties, limitations of power, constitutionalism, 
liberalism and the principle of nationhood were carefully left behind93. However, 
explaining the context and nature of the state in Africa and its link with ethnicity 
necessitates having a working definition of a state.  
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Halliday defines a state as; “---a territorial association of people organized for the 
purpose of law and diplomacy--”94. Clapham points at “--an environmental base where 
values and identities define politics and authority between the rulers and the ruled--”95, 
while Ojo and Ranny emphasize the aspect of a sense of national identity and political 
culture96. For the sake of this thesis, a working definition of a state is ‘a geographically 
bounded sovereign territory which is inhabited by a permanent population that is linked 
together by social political cohesion and governed by a legitimate authority that is 
sanctioned by the people of that particular state. In light of this definition therefore the 
state and its citizens are mutual symbionts with the state having responsibility of 
providing an environment conducive for socio-political cohesion97.  
 
The state in Africa has been analyzed in the context of the state in Europe. While the state 
in Europe is characterized by factors such as consensus, ability to extend control over the 
territory, legitimacy and political order which to a large extent explain the sociopolitical 
unity and cohesion, in the developing world it tends to be characterized by sociopolitical 
exclusion and marginalization of some groups, hegemonic domination, and rule through 
patrimonial networks which leads to relative deprivation thus providing breeding ground 
for discontent, conflict, violence and political instability.  Although this generalization 
may not apply entirely to all countries as there are some where state-society relations are 
cordial and which are politically stable, many counties remain under personal rule based 
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on ethnic ties resulting in their legitimacy to be challenged by some sections of the 
population.  
 
As such, many countries in Africa including Uganda do not seem to suit this definition 
and can therefore be described as weak states where conflicts are attributed to the fact 
that governments have failed to assertively exert and extend their authority to the entire 
territory under their control and have also been unable to bring about and sustain ethnic 
unity or provide new incentives for different ethnic groups to live together. Moreover, 
ethnic manipulation exacerbates old conflicts and creates new ones as rulers try to 
concentrate their efforts on suppressing dissent. Leadership becomes more vulnerable and 
because of this vulnerability, the focus shifts from people relations to maintaining power 
at all cost. Clapham aptly captures this situation of weak states when he uses the 
metaphor of a ship’s captain to describe this type of rulers when he says that they cannot 
spend time setting the course and navigating but rather only concentrate on staying 
afloat.98 
 
Furthermore, colonialism effected ethnicisation through stereotyping. In this process, 
ethnic groups were compared with one another on the basis of capabilities and disabilities 
as the determinant criteria for collective group worth. While group comparison is an 
aspect of life that can be used positively for emancipation and mobilization of people to 
enjoy public goods and services, it can also be used for dividing, disempowering and 
discriminating against them. It’s potential to create feelings of prejudice and resentment 
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especially if its purpose is to extend favoritism and reward to groups considered loyal 
while neglecting others is high. In the African context, stereotype attributes such as 
industrious or lazy, warlike, backward, primitive, aggressive, gentle, intelligent or 
ignorant, receptive or antipathetic were assigned to different groups.  
 
It was on this basis that for example employment policy was determined and 
implemented. In support of this argument, Young points out that “military recruitment, 
for example, especially for the British and the Belgians, was concentrated upon groups 
perceived as “martial races”, a doctrine that emerged in early nineteenth century India 
and became firmly rooted dogma--”99, while those perceived gentle and intelligent were 
employed in the administration of the protectorate. This tendency to cleave and compare 
groups did not only create specific functions and roles for particular ethnic groups but 
also transformed and influenced inter-group relations in which the favoured in-groups 
and the discriminated out-groups became hostile to one another, which led to behavioural 
tendencies that often resulted in conflict and violence. Moreover, as Horowitz observes, 
“these were essentially congeries of clans, living in closest proximity under identical 
conditions and yet displaying rudiments of separate people-hood and propensity to 
invidious comparison”100.  
 
In addition to the above, distribution of economic opportunities and public goods were 
also based on ethnic stereotypes and the consideration being whether a particular group 
was perceived submissive, loyal or disloyal. As a matter of fact, good schools, railway 
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line, government offices, processing plants and commercial enterprises were to be found 
within the area of the favoured in-groups. As noted by Horowitz, “the location of an 
ethnic group’s home territory often provided a head start”101. Cultural, soils and other 
natural resource endowment factors also played a crucial role in the process of 
crystallization of ethnic groups’ stratification and configuration.  
 
Given the fact that regions have different economic endowment and are inhabited by 
different groups of people, the manner in which these material opportunities were 
distributed created distortions and also had location and ethnic meanings to particular 
groups to the extent that it inevitably created a sense of exclusive ownership that had to 
be guarded jealously. This uneven distribution of opportunities resulted in groups being 
unequally advantaged a factor that largely explains the interethnic rivalry and hostility, 
often expressed through armed rebellions as the disadvantaged groups attempt to remove 
the governments from power.  Jinadu takes this argument a step further by pointing out 
that “the asymmetrical ethno-racial stratified social structure of the colonial state, left its 
unwholesome unhealed, simmering scars, recriminations, mutual antagonisms and fears, 
all of which served to undermine – a sense of nationhood and common citizenship”102.            
              
One other factor that largely contributed to the establishment and growth of ethnic 
identity was the policy of indirect rule which heavily relied on collaboration with the 
local chiefs. This policy was used by the colonial authorities in such a way that natives in 
a particular area with more or less similar characteristics would be classified together, 
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counted and designated as an administrative unit under the jurisdiction of a ‘tribal’ chief 
or headman. This process of classifying people together, moreover in demarcated areas, 
was often accompanied by the application of native registration procedures. The purpose 
of registration which was not only aimed at knowing the persons in the zones, but also to 
track and control their movements outside their ‘home’ areas led to the creation of ethnic 
identity.  
 
As noted by Bruce, “through the application of such instruments of the state as consensus 
and maps, and even the establishment of colonial museums, all communities, persons, 
land and even physical artifacts were assigned a unique tribal identity and physical 
location”103. It was thus through this way that ethnic identities which often bore little 
correspondence to their previous social composition and set up were formed and ruled 
through appointed tribal authorities.  However, because this policy was practiced in such 
a manner that different groups were treated differently – the in-groups were favoured 
while the out-groups were discriminated –  created a long lasting impact and colonial 
legacy of inter-ethnic rivalry which has continued to fuel ethnic tension and conflict long 
after the countries in which it was practiced attained independence104. 
 
In Uganda, the indirect rule policy originated from the recognition of Buganda as the 
largest, wealthiest, well organized and most powerful Kingdoms in Uganda. Buganda 
served not only as a centre of political power and a favored mechanism of administration 
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which the colonialist wanted rolled out to other parts of Uganda, but also as a source of 
manpower for the expansion of colonial conquest and administration of the rest of the 
country. In order for the colonizer to achieve this, local agents (Baganda chiefs and 
Baganda foot soldiers) from the Bantu speaking central region were sent to the north to 
enforce the indirect rule of the colonialist.105 This brought about resentment and ethnic 
sentiments against the Baganda in particular and the Bantu speaking southerners in 
general. Consequently, this has remained a contentious rivalry between northern and 
southern tribes in Uganda106.  
 
The origin of these rivalries can also be traced in groups discrimination and the 
colonialist comparative process of evaluating the virtues and vices of ethnic Africans 
which were based on the premise that the ruled were unfit to manage their own affairs 
and in which even the most advanced ethnic groups among the colonial people were 
denigrated which further lead to fracturing of societies along ethnic lines. In tandem with 
the legacy of discrimination and aggravating it was the manner in which colonial rule 
handled and nurtured ethnicity in Africa. Ethnicity was handled unevenly and 
inconsistently to the extent that often there was deliberate use of a group against the other 
which led to feelings of resentment, fears, mistrust, and hatred among the different ethnic 
groups making the potential for ethnic conflict high.  
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As Horowitz aptly notes, “the nature of these feelings can be understood better by 
examining the stereotypes groups hold about each other”107. In Uganda, stereotypes and 
derogatory terms such as “Anyanya”, “adui”, “abakoko”, “kipingamizi” and songs such as 
“tulimupiga Anyanya--” have been used to insinuate and describe northerners as 
murderers, rebels and beasts. On their part, the northerners have often referred to Bantu 
speaking people especially those from Western Uganda as “nyarwanda” insinuating that 
they are weaklings and not Ugandans but foreigners from Rwanda    
 
Ideologically, European colonizers viewed Acholi tribe land as occupied by a tribe of 
quite different and inferior order. Arising out of this perception was the way in which 
colonial labor policy was designed and implemented along ethno-regional lines as certain 
jobs became the preserve of specific groups who were judged to have special attributes 
that were considered to be in harmony with the job108. As a matter of fact, recruitment 
and employment policies were heavily based on ethnic stereotypes. Northern tribes who 
were regarded to possess a reputation and attributes for martial skills109 were recruited in 
the army, police and prisons. They were also recruited to provide cheap labor in the tea 
and sugar plantations in central Uganda.110   
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However, at independence in 1962, Acholi and other northern tribes became key players 
in the socio-political arena of Uganda but barely four years after attainment of 
independence, ethnic sentiments came at the forefront of political power maneuvers 
leading to the Buganda crisis of 1966 in which the palace of Buganda’s King, Sir Edward 
Mutesa and the first president of Uganda was stormed by the army on the orders of 
Obote. The king fled into exile in Britain where he subsequently died. 
 
It should be realized that this skewed nature of labor policies and recruitment along 
ethnic lines was also practiced in other countries on the African continent. In Ghana for 
example, the military officer corps was largely drawn from the Ga and Ewe ethnic tribes 
during Nkrumah’s reign, in Rwanda the army was predominantly Hutu dominated while 
in Sierra Leone the ethnic Mende dominated the army111.  The resultant effect of this 
lopsidedness was uneven regional development, unequal distribution of state resources, 
coups and counter coups as groups purged one another in their struggle for ethnic 
domination and control of state power.  
 
It should be no surprise therefore that the northern Uganda ethnic tribes in general and 
the Acholi in particular have had deep feelings of mistrust and suspicion resulting from 
socio-economic and political deprivation of the northern region which has been 
exacerbated during the NRM regime. In the present context, regional disparity between 
south and north is perceived by people from the north as a deliberate government move to 
purge dissent and eliminate the political power base and capacity of the northerners to 
come back to power. Odong, a Local Councilor in Kitgum said that “what is happening in 
                                                  
111 Horowitz L. Donald, “Ethnic Groups in Conflict”, University of California Press, (2000) p.527-531 
62 
 
Acholiland today is not by coincidence, it is deliberate. Museveni and the NRM hate 
people from the north and especially we Acholis. We are treated as if we are enemies. 
You can see that there are two sets of Ugandans, the superior in the south and the inferior 
and impoverished in the north which is visible as soon as you cross Karuma Bridge”112.  
 
Feelings of marginalization were also expressed by a group of displace men in Gulu. 
They particularly talked of how the national army, the UPDF thinks that all Acholi 
people are corroborators of Kony, thus reflecting an ethnic dimension.113 Several other 
people spoken to talked of the army being of westerners who will never have a liking for 
the northern people. Expressions like “this army of westerners do not care whether we all 
the Acholis die or suffer because they think we are all rebel collaborators114” and “ending 
the war and our suffering has never been part of this governments business”115 were 
echoed by a group of men and women in Gulu and Pajule.  
 
State Building and Ethnicity: The Post-Colonial African context 
 
In post-colonial Africa, ethnicity has continued to be a major factor in determining the 
success or failure of a country and has manifested itself in a number of ways. First, 
political power control, access to and distribution of economic resources has largely 
remained in the hands of strong men whose rule is characterized by informal patriarch 
networks based on ethnic and regional lines. Whereas the post-independent rulers 
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inherited artificial states which were created by European colonial powers at the Berlin 
Conference, their bureaucratic authoritarianism, instrumentalized disorder116, patronage 
and greed for power has had adverse effects on state building, inter-ethnic relations, 
national integration, social economic development and stability. In actual fact ethnicity 
has gained momentum largely due to its manipulation and politicization by rulers in the 
struggle to maintain hegemonic control of state power and resources  
 
This in turn has shaped the scope of ethnic politics, and the particular character of state-
society relations to the extent that rulers have tended to ignore national integration of the 
diverse ethnic groups, but have instead undermined it by arbitrary and authoritarian use 
of state power to enrich themselves, allocate jobs to ethnic tribesmen, thus breaching the 
social contract of public trust. As aptly noted by Bruce, “the politics of political tribalism 
and moral ethnicity become linked to the ability of the ‘big men’ of ethnic communities 
holding positions in the state to obtain for the districts and regions a significant share of 
the large-scale collective benefits---as well as more individual rewards apportioned 
through the discrete personal contracts of the back verandah”117.  
 
The relationship between the state and citizenship is also an important dimension if the 
phenomenon of ethnic conflict especially on the African continent is to be understood. 
This is because the notion of citizenship is linked to the state, thus necessitating 
examining the structural and institutional linkage between it and the state on one hand 
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and its influence on inter and intra-ethnic relations and perceptions on the other. Instead 
of the state using citizenship positively as a tool for social mobilization, emancipation, 
sociopolitical cohesion and harmony, it has in most cases used it as a means to 
marginalize or exclude particular people from political participation and denying them 
certain rights and privileges, by questioning their ancestry and origin, which often makes 
the disadvantaged to express their discontent through conflicts and civil wars.  
 
Second, the issue of citizenship and its relationship with the state has had an influence in 
ethnic conflicts. The problem between citizenship and the state tends to lie in the 
definition of the concept and who is a real citizen in the real practical sense. This is 
because in the context of the state, there are two major categories of people, that is, 
citizens and non citizens or aliens. The two categories enjoy different rights and 
privileges and are not necessarily subject to the same rules and regulations. It is also 
worth noting that citizens of the state are subdivided into further categories of indigenous 
and non indigenous, immigrants and settlers.  
 
The word citizenship “derives from the root word city”118, and reflects the historical 
relationship between the individual and his city. The genesis of the concept is rooted in 
the medieval world when people lived in small urban-centred dwellings and within this 
context it referred to ‘free man of the city’. Linda defines it as “formal legal membership 
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in a political community”119, while Charles Tilly defines it from four angles; as a 
category, role, tie and identity; 
“As a category, citizenship designates a set of actors-citizens – distinguished by their 
shared privileged position vis-à-vis a particular state. As a tie, citizenship identifies an 
enforceable mutual relation between an actor and state agents. As a role, citizenship 
includes all of an actor’s relations to others that depend on the actor’s relation to a 
particular state. And as an identity, citizenship can refer to the experience and public 
representation of category, tie or role”120.  
 
It should be realized that citizenship is not a problem as people do belong to different 
citizenship categories and the fact that the idea of a state cannot be meaningful without 
citizenship. It only becomes a problem and source of conflict when it is politicized by 
politicians for their own selfish ends for example when citizenship rights and benefits are 
denied. Rather than use citizenship as a means and platform for equal rights and access to 
public goods and services by all the people, the state has often used it to divide and deny 
particular individuals access to these goods and services.  
 
Within this context, the state creates hierarchy of unequal citizenship with indigenous or 
native being ‘superior’ and top on the hierarchy, and ‘immigrants’ or ‘settlers’ taking the 
lowest position. In between these two are those whose origins and ancestry is 
questionable including dual citizenship. As noted by Said, the state “uses ethnic identity 
as the primary identity for state entitlements and social rights. It de-individualizes 
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citizenship and makes it more of a group phenomenon. As a result, in gaining access to 
state institutions, the individual does not relate to the state directly as a citizen, but relates 
to it as a member or representative of an ethnic group. The result is that the central state 
becomes an arena of ethnic contest with the more powerful ethnic groups excluding and 
submerging the lesser ones and denying their people the benefits of citizenship”121, which 
not only breeds sociopolitical discontent but also undermines ethnic cohesion and 
national integration. 
 
It should be realized that soon after independence, the role of ethnicity and ethnicisation 
of politics became central to African politics because the elites wanted to ‘enjoy’ the 
fruits of freedom of the limited resources to the maximum for their own benefit and this 
phenomena has continued unabated. This has led to intense competition for resources in 
which exclusion of others is easiest done by using rather fixed features of social 
stratification like ethnicity and citizenship. It should also be realized that politics is about 
the control of power and resources in a state and how this is managed or organized.  
 
Within this context is the fact that in a situation of power struggle in post-colonial Africa, 
the issue of who ‘enjoys’ or benefits from the resources of the state is determined by the 
decision of, ‘who belongs and who does not’. In such a situation, citizenship is used to 
marginalize rather than marshal the centripetal impulses of society to unite and build 
cohesion. Thus the tendency to instrumentalise citizenship as an identity, role or category 
to create unequal members of society creates feelings of disillusionment for the 
downtrodden and often leads to violence. Moreover, when it is used in conditions of 
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distrust, hatred and suspicion between parties like the case between the Acholi people and 
many in the southern-led NRM government, as the Acholis were referred to as 
‘Anyanyas’ from Sudan,  then it becomes a lethal weapon.        
 
Third, the literature on ethnicity and state-society discourse indicate that the legacy of 
patron-client relations based on ethnic solidarity has to a large extent continued unabated 
in post-colonial African states. In support of this argument, Bruce points out that “in post-
colonial Africa, the colonial combination of bureaucratic authoritarianism and clientalism 
has continued essentially unchanged, especially in the structure of rural control”122, and 
that  “ethnicity has been the fundamental context and idiom of class formation--”. In 
many countries in Africa, there is a common use of analogies and metaphors referring to 
politics as ‘eating’, feasting’ or ‘devouring’, literally meaning that once an individual gets 
into power, then the whole ethnic group from where he comes are automatically entitled 
to access the jobs, material benefits and all the opportunities and privileges of the state.  
 
Through this way, both the ruler and members of his ethnic group seek to assure 
themselves of continued hold and perpetuating the dominance of power at whatever cost 
even in the face of overt resentment and disapproval by other groups. Apparently this 
tends to be the case in the political arena of most African countries where ethnicity has 
been politicized and manipulated, resulting into political instability and chaos. The armed 
rebellions and civil wars that have affected many countries on the continent for example 
those in the Great Lakes Region such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, 
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Burundi, Uganda, including Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are largely linked to 
ethnic connotations. This reliance on support and loyalty from members of one’s ethnic 
group is not only symptomatic of institutional weaknesses and failure but is also 
reflective of the pervasive fear in African politics that, if you lack powerful patrons with 
a strong base in homeboys, then some other groups are likely to remove you from power.            
  
In addition to the authoritarian style of leadership, these rulers inherited weaknesses 
which were deeply rooted in tribal or ethnic affinity but instead of designing policies to 
correct these weaknesses, they made them worse. While one must avoid over-
generalizing as there are states which have been relatively peaceful and not engulfed by 
ethnic conflict, it is however worth noting that majority of the countries especially those 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have been prone to ethnic violence. The issue is not how 
governments and rulers have continued to practice the colonial legacy of divide and rule, 
ethnic politicization and fractionalization which has eroded the crystallization of national 
ethnic integration, but rather why they have decided to use the ethnic card that has 
brought about enormous human suffering and misery.  
 
Indeed as observed by Karugire, “personalities of those who governed after independence 
played a vital role in determining whether or not the inherited ethnic diversities could be 
coalesced or mitigated in order to create social peace and harmony”.123 To the extent that 
rulers continue to rely on ethnic politicization and the ‘favoured’ in-groups against the 
disadvantaged out-groups, ethnic conflict has continued to assume deadly violent and 
                                                  
123 Karugire S.R., “Roots of Political Instability in Uganda”, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, (2003) p. 4  
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dimensions stemming from inter-ethnic competition for economic resources and political 
power and there is nowhere else this has been so intense than on the African continent.  
 
Relative Deprivation (RD) and Ethnicity: 
Violence in many societies has been extremely brutal, endemic and linked to the interests 
and aspirations of the ruling classes, a phenomenon that has taken on a much more 
prominent role in academic and intellectual discourse with responsibility to develop 
theories in order to explain its causes and dynamics. That there has been pervasive 
resurgence of intra-state conflicts which have threatened to tear apart many countries 
around the world, but more especially in Africa is obvious enough. The consequences of 
these wars have been catastrophic. Many people have been killed, others maimed, 
property destroyed, provision of public goods and services disrupted, with burgeoning 
exodus of refugees fleeing their countries and yet others forcefully displaced from their 
villages to become IDPs, all of which have thrived in and exacerbated an environment of 
chaos and instability.  
 
Relative deprivation is one of the theories that have been advanced to explain the cause 
of ethnic violence. Its salience lies in the presumption that state actions promote inter-
group disharmony, rivalry and violence through ethnic manipulation and deprivation.  
This is because both concepts are shaped, nurtured and influenced by the state, which 
paradoxically becomes the core arena and contested terrain where ethnic violence takes 
place.  Within this nexus, the focus has been centred on establishing and explaining the 
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social causes of collective violence, what makes it focus on a political system and the 
societal conditions that affect the magnitude and form, including consequences.  
 
RD is defined as the “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations 
and their value capabilities”124. In other words, it is the suffering that a particular group 
of people unjustifiably undergoes as a result of being deprived of the goods and services 
which they are justifiably entitled to and which they think they can get and keep. Value 
expectation which are expressed in present and future terms are the goods and services 
which people think they are justifiably entitled to in relation to others in society. These 
include for example, food, shelter, health services, power values and economic 
development. Value capabilities on the other hand refer to the goods and conditions in 
life that people believe they can get and maintain through their skills and collective 
abilities.  
 
According to this theory therefore, if there is a mismatch between what people think they 
are justifiably entitled to and what they believe they should have got compared to others 
in society, then RD sets in and triggers discontent whereby frustration and anger act as 
the drive to violence. It therefore follows that if people feel discontented about the 
manner in which they are treated, for example suppression of political expression, 
repression or marginalization from access to and consumption of collective goods and 
services as compared to others, then the likelihood of precipitating feelings of RD will be 
high.  
                                                  
124 Gurr, Ted Robert. “Why Men Rebel”, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, (1970) p.24 
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What the theory suggests is that whereas men are biologically born with psychological 
traits of anger, it is an instinct that remains innate, only to be activated by stimuli such as 
frustration and anger. In other words, the occurrence of aggressive discourse presupposes 
the existence of frustration and anger. This basically, is the frustration-aggression theory 
which predisposes men to violent action. Indeed as he further points out, “aggressive 
responses tend to occur only when they are evoked by an external cue, that is, when the 
angered person sees an attackable object or person that he associates with the source of 
frustration” and that “--if frustration continues, aggression is likely to recur”125. 
 
Within this context therefore, in countries where particular sections of ethnic groups are 
marginalized and discriminated against and where their political views and participation 
is stifled, feelings of frustration and anger expressed in form of armed rebellion and civil 
wars should be understood in light of this theory. In support of the RD theory, Damet 
observes that some regimes “--prevent participation in policy and decision-making and 
try to control society by force and coercion. These conditions are likely to create an 
intense sense of injustice and deprivation among people; therefore the ascent of violent 
opposition and civil wars is more likely--”126.  
 
Horowitz argues that ethnic violence is an event with a cause and natural history whereby 
members of one ethnic group search out with considerable care and attack disliked 
members of the target group, often settling old scores in the process. He further points out 
                                                  
125 Ibid, p. 34 
126 Demet Yalcin Mousseau, “Democratising with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?, Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 38, No, 5, (2001) p. 550  
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that “like the willingness to die for a cause, the willingness to kill for a cause constitutes a 
kind of statement about the cause, the killer, the victim and the act of killing”127.  
Although he tends to stress hostile outburst which results from the confrontation that pit 
for example ‘protesters’ against ‘authorities’, which may manifest into different 
categories of violent phenomena, he however shares common assumptions of the basic 
characteristic of collective rationality of the participants in violence.  
 
In actual fact, he acknowledges the underlying proposition that people behave violently 
because they feel aggrieved and that the “discontent arising from the perception of 
relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective 
violence”128.  Other scholars have also contributed to the literature of ethnic violence and 
its causes. Although their explanation tends to come from different perspectives, they 
however commonly agree on the salience of RD. Thandika for example argues that in 
many developing countries, increased income inequality, growing poverty and 
informalisation of the economy have created social structures that are “politically 
dangerous”129, and have intensified the sense of RD.   
 
He further observes that the linkage between the state and the countryside is in such a 
way that governments interest has been to a large extent driven by the extraction of 
capital, thus increasing the potential for the marginalized youth to join rebel movements, 
events that have eventually precipitated into civil wars. While his argument captures 
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some reality about the causes of intra-state conflict, it does not explain why conflict has 
not occurred in some countries where income disparities and the level of poverty are high 
but yet there is no ethnic conflict and armed rebellions.     
 
RD is a potent source of resentment, aggression and conflict. The link between it and 
politics is based on the fact that it is political leaders who, as policy makers make 
decisions that affect the people being ruled. When the decisions of political leader affect 
a group of people in a negative manner for example by denying them goods and services 
and favorable conditions in life compared to other members in society, then RD sets in 
and triggers discontent whereby anger and frustration act as a drive to violence130.   In 
order therefore, to understand ethnic conflict in Africa it is important to examine how 
political power is exercised by political leaders to make decisions and policies which 
bring about RD and the reaction of the ruled who are affected by these decisions. There is 
no doubt therefore that in Africa, ethnic conflict is more often than not a human-made 
crisis generated from the policies and actions of political leaders. These policies which 
are made within the context of political processes often create feelings of deprivation, 
socio-political and economic discontent leading to ethno-political conflict131.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
130 Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, (1970) p.34 - 39 
131 Demet, Yalcin Mousseau, “Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?” Journal of 
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The Military and Ethnic Conflict  
The relationship between the military and ethnic conflict has become a major topic for 
research among scholars and independent analysts because of the way it influences and 
shapes sociopolitical systems, inter-group relations and the distribution of power among 
ethnic groups. This is not because the two are necessarily antagonistic, but rather the way 
the military is manipulated by rulers for their own selfish ends which make it a potent 
source of violent conflict. The primary role of the military is to provide security by 
guarding the country’s boarders and protect it from external aggression.  
 
Ayoob points out that in international relations literature, the concept of security is based 
on two major assumptions, first that the security threats of a state principally emanates 
from outside its borders and second, that “these threats are primarily, if not exclusively 
military in nature and usually need a military response if the security of the target state is 
to be preserved”132. Although this is realistic about the functions of the military in as far 
as peace and security is concerned, the role of the military has gone through 
transformation over the last decades and now include any action that protects the state 
and its institutions from any security threat that is in harmony with the law and policy133.  
 
Within this context, it is important that the composition of the men in uniform reflect the 
national character of the demographic composition of the country from which they are 
recruited, which they owe allegiance and a duty of care. Scholars writing about the 
                                                  
132 Ayoob Mohammed, “The Security Problematic of the Third World”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No, 2, (Jan 
1991) p. 261  
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military and ethnicity have mainly focused attention on understanding and explaining the 
dynamics of manipulation of the military on the basis of ethnicity, its role in triggering 
ethnic conflict or influencing its course, the conditions under which it manifests, 
including its durability and breakdown.  
 
The genesis of ethnically skewed armed forces can be traced to the colonial period when 
the recruitment in the forces became the preserve of specific groups who were considered 
to possess ‘unique’ attributes that included martial qualities134 or worrier traditions, tall in 
height and stamina. In other words, for one to be recruited in the armed forces, he had to 
be fierce, brave, bloodthirsty, tall, solid and strong, attributes that were based on ethnic 
stereotypes135. Consequently, the military became dominated by people from one ethnic 
group. This ethnic dominance continued into the post-independent countries and did not 
change much.  
 
It should also be realized that in the history of the military, ethnic stereotyping has been 
used in many parts of the world. Certain ethnic groups have been preferred over others by 
colonialists because of their perceived martial attributes. For example the Yao formed the 
main source of recruits in (Nyasaland) Malawi136, while in Nigeria between 1914 and 
1918 the Yoruba and Hausa137 provided over 80% of the men in uniform.  In Kenya, 
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colonial military recruitment was predominantly from the Kamba and Kikuyu138 ethnic 
groups while in India, the Lambadis and Karachas139 who were commonly referred to as 
“criminal castes” or “criminal tribesmen” were heavily recruited in the army.  
 
Horowitz makes an important observation which is that the military can be a resource and 
an object of ethnic conflict and gives several reasons in explanation of how this can 
happen. First, dominance of the military by members of one ethnic group is perceived as 
a big risk in the minds of disproportionately represented groups because of the monopoly 
of power at their expense. The point being emphasized is that if the military is not aligned 
with the national ethnic composition of the country from which it purports to spring and 
of the government to which it owes allegiance, then the potential to become a source of 
ethnic conflict is high140.  
 
This is because in such a situation, offices, recognition, allowances and welfare, 
opportunities and privileges will tend to be unevenly distributed in favour of the 
dominant group based on ethnic ties and loyalties, which may generate resentment and 
discontent among the disadvantaged and discriminated group and therefore a potential 
source of conflict. Moreover, because the balance of power is tilted in favour of the 
dominant ethnic group, the possibility of oppressing the minority cannot be overlooked. 
In addition, members of the ethnic groups disproportionately represented will develop 
feelings of ethnic strangers in an institution which, in the interest of serving a noble cause 
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they willingly subscribed to, but are segregated on ethnic sentiments from enjoying the 
same rights and privileges.       
 
Second, in many countries the recruiters tend to favour members of the groups already in 
service, implying that a certain ethnic group will at all times outnumber others especially 
given the fact that recruitment governs composition, thus sustaining ethnic imbalance and 
militarization. Indeed as further pointed out by Horowitz, “Once heavy recruitment of 
certain ethnic groups begins, it is likely to continue”. In such an environment, nepotism 
becomes the central principle and the basis for defining who should be recruited when, 
how and where including entitlements, with the objective of continuously reinforcing the 
dominance of the group in the army. Literature on the military indicate that because of 
lack of mechanism to redress this situation, which in actual fact is deliberate leads to 
formation of cliques and factions, with the discriminated who may desert the army to join 
rebel forces.  
 
 Third, promotions in the army tend to favour members of the dominant ethnic group 
because after all, those already in senior positions who make decisions often belong to 
the this group. Members of the groups that are disproportionately represented seldom do 
not have a voice and their views are either ignored or suppressed which aggravates 
discontent. It is not surprising therefore to find that in some countries, the top echelon of 
the army is made up of officers who belong to one ethnic group, in essence meaning that 
the control of the army is in the hands of a particular ethnic group, a factor that has 
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remained contentious as disadvantaged groups challenge the legitimacy and capacity of 
the state, sometimes resulting into bloody ethnic clashes.  
 
Moreover, the commanders are often appointed on the basis of ethnic affiliation and 
personal loyalty with little regard to educational qualifications, career excellence, or even 
military seniority. In tandem with the above phenomenon of dominance and aggravating 
it is the fact that one ethic group controls the monopoly of the use of force. This can be 
disastrous if such a force is deployed for example to subdue an internal rebellion waged 
by an ethnic group which is not well represented in the national army, since it may 
perpetuate and in actual fact exacerbate the conflict.  
 
Fourth, the military may become a source of ethnic conflict because of intervention in the 
politics of the country. George and Peter point out that the motives of military men or 
using military means to intervene in politics and take up power is normally based on 
several reasons and one of the major reasons advanced is primarily to remove a ‘bad’ 
regime or to correct the deficiencies of a civilian rule.141. The military men once in power 
quickly make a pronouncement to promise and reassure the people that they are not 
interested in permanent military rule but just to correct the mistakes of the overthrown 
leaders and then hand-over power to elected men of integrity who would govern the 
country.  
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This promise is not only made by professional military men but also by guerrilla leaders 
who, though without military training give themselves military ranks and continue to use 
military symbols after capturing power. Ironically, these military rulers do not keep their 
promise but instead give conditions and use manipulation to extend their entrenchment 
and stay in power. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of African leaders who came to 
power through armed struggle against colonialists sought to perpetuate themselves in 
power through ethnic and regional support base especially from individuals and clientele 
networks recruited from their home areas many of whom were officers in the armed 
struggle and now elevated to political positions 
 
The contemporary military regimes in Africa however, are taking on new forms. The 
leaders come to power through protracted ethnically formed rebel groups and perpetuate 
themselves in power by allowing some sort of democracy in order to legitimize their rule. 
But these leaders still behave in a manner similar to military leaders who come into 
power before them and if anything, become even worse. It is also worth noting that 
although almost every ‘big man’ or military regime claims that its rule will be temporary, 
they become entrenched as the years go by due in part to what they call ‘unfinished 
business’ and the problem of finding a successor. 
 
They further observe that failure by the military regime to solve the socio-political and 
economic problems which motivated and propelled it into power soon erodes its 
legitimacy to remain in power142. Consequently, relinquishing power can only take place 
through counter-coups or under guardian mechanism by the very regime. Unfortunately 
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the latter also faces a problem of finding acceptable successor, because even among those 
who led the rebellion that removed the previous regime tend to base their support and 
popularity on ethnic lineages mainly based on regional, tribe or family line, which 
ultimately erode the trust and goals for which the rebellion began and also cause ethnic 
resentment among the disadvantaged ethnic groups in the country.  
Overall however, we should not forget that first the military is one of the few institutions 
inherited after independence that was stable, confident and with hierarchy-based 
discipline and command. This was one of the ‘organized’ institutions established by 
colonialists as a watchdog to keep law and order by crashing any dissent that was handed 
over to the new rulers. Irrespective of its role and responsibilities which have changed 
overtime, one important feature to note is that successive rulers have reshaped and 
continue to change the configuration of the army to suit their personal political ambitions 
in the sense that they manipulate the ethnic composition to be dominated by their home 
boys. Secondly, in nation states, the privileged power of force is reserved for security 
forces.   
Conclusion: 
The chapter has demonstrated that ethnicity is one of the major motivation and driving 
factors in triggering civil wars. However, it has also shown that ethnicity itself is not the 
cause of the problem but rather a consequence. In other words, its manipulation and 
politicization by individuals especially politicians, that is, its use for mobilizing political 
support in the competition for access to and control of power and economic resources is 
what makes it a potent source of conflict.  This is because domination of the political 
arena by an ethnic group often results into inequitable distribution of political power and 
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public goods to members of other ethnic groups, a factor that is not only unfair but 
unjustified and discriminatory.  
 
Consequently, it creates feelings of relative deprivation among those ethnic groups that 
are denied access to the society’s opportunities and rewards which they think they are 
justifiably entitled to and which in turn creates discontent and resentment. It has also 
shown that ethnicity is an artificial construct that can be deconstructed. The concept was 
constructed during colonialism period with an objective of controlling and exploiting 
people in the colonized territories but has been perpetuated by post-colonial rulers as a 
strategy for retaining power at all costs. Arising out of this is the fact that in states where 
ethnicity is politicized, the state has not only remained weak but has also increased the 
potential for the marginalized sections of the population to challenge the legitimacy of 
the government, more often than not through armed insurgencies. 
 
In addition to the above, the military has been central to the problem of ethnic conflict. 
This is because state authorities often align with ethnic communities from which they 
come and perpetuate this nomenclature through recruiting preferences, deployment and 
promotions restricted to such ethnic groups who are considered politically reliable for the 
regimes survival. Ironically, such an army will find it difficult to resolve a political 
problem because it will be perceived as partisan. The point being emphasized is that in a 
scenario where such an army is deployed into a communally tense situation for example 
to subdue an armed insurgency, it will tend to exacerbate the conflict because it will be 
perceived as an army of repression and therefore an enemy rather than a neutral arbiter. 
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As such civil wars on the African continent should be understood from this context. 
Examining state reconstruction under the NRM and how it has used ethnicity in politics 
and its impact on ethnic and regional divisions as demonstrated by the civil war in 
northern Uganda is the subject of the next chapter.        
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CHAPTER THREE 
Emergence of NRA/M, State Reconstruction and International Relations 
Introduction 
Since Uganda got independence in 1962, it has been gripped by violence and conflict, 
save for a few years from 1962 to 1966. This violence has been detrimental to inter-
ethnic harmony, economic development, peace and stability. Ethnicity has been a central 
theme and organizing principle around which this violence take place. Successive 
governments have come into power through politicization of ethnicity in competition for 
political power and control of scarce resources. Because of ethnic-directed competition, 
the state was turned against the people and as a result, it suffered destruction and decline 
on three fronts namely, social, economic and political. Obote for example relied heavily 
on ethnic politicization between 1980 and 1985 in order to maintain a grip on power 
which led to stiff competition, political instability and economic decay. 
It is within this context that the NRA/M under Museveni waged a guerrilla war against 
the second Obote government claiming that elections were rigged, by mobilizing support 
through manipulation of ethnicity which intensified inter-group disharmony, mutual 
distrust and suspicion. But ethnicity cannot be taken for granted. This is because 
available evidence from scholarly research indicates that ethnicity is not the problem and 
source of conflict as it can be constructed and deconstructed. There is therefore need to 
understand how and why it has been used to foment ethnic conflict in Uganda. Following 
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the rise to power of NRA/M in 1986, it promised restoration of the economy, national 
ethnic integration and unity, the rule of law, peace and stability.  
It begun the reconstruction of the state based on restoration of trust in authority, reversing 
the image of the military and elimination of war. It introduced reforms which set the 
stage for political and economic recovery of which it received praise. It at the same time 
experienced armed rebellions and most notably the LRA insurgency in Acholiland since 
1987, which is the focus of this thesis. It should also be realized that while under the 
NRM leadership the central and south west parts have enjoyed relative peace and 
stability, the northern region and more specifically Acholiland has experienced civil war 
for over two decades.  
This section examines the formative years of NRA/M as a guerrilla movement and its 
link with ethnicity. It also examines how its policies and actions in the process of the 
reconstruction of the state after capturing power in 1986 to date triggered discontent and 
resentment which ultimately led to the rebellion in the north. Specifically, I will show 
that government’s policies towards the Acholi people account for the ethnic conflict that 
has endured in Acholiland. This is because the construction and nature of the state in 
Uganda tend to be intertwined with ethnic manipulation and politicization which creates 
unequal distribution of public resources and political power, thus fueling social 
discontent which often results into and exacerbate ethnic conflict.                
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The rise of NRA/M and Manipulation of Ethnicity (1982-1986): 
In order to understand the emergence of the conflict in Acholiland, it is important to 
consider factors that took place prior to and after the NRA/M captured power in 1986. 
Three factors that need to be taken into account and explained are first, the civil war that 
took place particularly in the central jungles of Luwero between 1982 and 1986, second, 
the overthrow of Obote II government on 27th July 1985 by Acholi military officers, and 
thirdly, the regime’s policies and politics that sought to ostracize the Acholi people. 
These events had significant influence on the politics of ethnic manipulation which has 
continued to fuel conflict in several areas of Uganda, but most notably the war in 
Acholiland.  
The war in Luwero Triangle in particular is important because ethno-regional factors 
played a pivotal role to the extent that the current armed confrontation between Acholi 
insurgents and the UPDF can be traced to this episode. In actual fact, the war was fought 
and perceived as a confrontation between ethnic northerners and the Bantu-speaking 
ethnic southerners. Museveni rallied support by invoking linguistic and ethnic affiliation 
to build his fighting force by pitting the north against the south. Indeed as pointed out by 
Otunnu, “the most striking characteristic of president Museveni’s early moves has been 
his manipulation of ethnic and linguistic factors for political reasons”143.  
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It is also worth noting that ethnicity in `post-independence Uganda has been used by one 
group against the other, a factor that has tended to make one group to dominate others 
and in the process, stirring up ethnic hostilities and conflict. This is because monopoly of 
political power and public resources, insubordination and control of other groups by 
intimidation and coercion often creates feelings of deprivation and resentment which 
become a tool for the leaders in the affected group to mobilize and fight what they 
consider as the source of the deprivation. In 1981 Museveni launched his guerrilla 
campaign against the second Obote government.  
Although the decision to go to the bush was based on allegation that the 1980 elections 
were rigged, even when this option is difficult to justify given the fact that the allegation 
could have been settled through non violent means, his pronouncements indicate an 
ethnic-driven motive. For example he presented the claim in ethnic terms and that is, “--
to remove a repugnant system of government based on an army dominated by 
northerners, especially the Acholi”144, thus casting the ‘problem’ in ethnic terms.   
The decision to launch this war in Luwero therefore was not by chance but just a strategic 
one. The reasoning that it has jungle terrain which is suitable for guerrilla campaign is not 
convincing enough as there are other areas in Uganda that have similar and perhaps better 
terrain that could have been used by the NRA. Something more than just terrain was 
therefore needed and that is ethnic manipulation in the sense that rivalry and hostilities 
could be invoked in a hostile environment against the Obote government, thus making 
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ethnic mobilization and recruitment much easier. The overriding factor therefore was that 
a particular ethnic group must be having memories of hatred against northerners that 
could easily be invoked.  
Luwero Triangle combined these characteristics and presented itself as the locus and 
epicenter of hatred where the armed campaign against northerners could be launched. 
The issue of ethnicity was thus not only used politically in deciding whom to target and 
attack, but also deciding the geographical location of where to launch the armed 
campaign. It was an area where entrenched hostility could be easily exploited. The civil 
war therefore signifies the extent to which political manipulation based on ethnic, 
religious and linguistic maneuvers are used in Ugandan politics to mobilize support for 
access and control of state power and economic resources.  
It is also worth noting that because in Africa there is lack of autonomy between the state 
and competing ethnic groups, the state becomes the prize for competition, the resource 
and contested arena over which ethnic groups fighting for its control takes place. The 
point being emphasized is that because individuals in the state define themselves in terms 
of ethnicity and pay allegiance to particular ethnic groups, the struggle for ownership of 
the state and its privileges becomes salient as ethnic groups try to answer the question, 
“to whom or which ethnic group does the state belong?”  
In a situation of this nature, the neutrality or autonomy of the state ceases to exist. 
Consequently, the state and its institutions become ethnicized and embroiled in patron 
clientalism networks that further entrench monopolization of economic resources and 
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political power by one ethnic group and creating and positioning “gatekeepers” in key 
positions of the state. This was the nature of the Obote II-led UPC government as it was 
composed entirely of UPC members, especially his ethnic homeboys who held key 
positions and controlled resources of the state. Furthermore, Obote relied on the military 
constituency that was not only predominantly Acholi-Langi hegemonic but also lacked 
discipline that is crucial in creating and maintaining cordial civil-military relations and 
the trust between the state and (ordinary) people in harmony.  
This is the context within which the NRA/M sprang using ethnicity as a basis for 
mobilization which has deepened the polarization of the north south-divide and generated 
intense ethnic conflict between itself and the people in the north, particularly the Acholi 
people. It should also be realized that this ethnic manipulation by the Museveni-led NRM 
government has inevitably affected other ethnic groups in other areas in the country, for 
example in Bunyore between the Banyoro and Bakiga. It is no wonder therefore that 
Museveni has tended to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors in as far as 
manipulation and politicization of ethnicity and militarization of politics is concerned. It 
cannot be a coincidence or by default that all the post-independence rulers of Uganda 
have taken this path in the leadership and management of state affairs, but rather by 
design.   
Ethnicity played a crucial role as a driver of the rise of the NRA/M right from its 
formation as a guerrilla movement in early 1980s. The initial fighters who started it and 
led by Museveni were predominantly southern Bantu-speakers from the Banyankole 
ethnic group. Four years after the capture of Kampala and after the force was transformed 
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into a national army the UPDF, and having been in power for twenty five years now, the 
ethnic dominancy has remained in the hands of the same ethnic group. The UPDF has 
had seven army commanders in the last 29 years and out of these, only one came outside 
the Banyankole ethnic group.  
Furthermore, to prove that ethnicity was a driver in the rise of NRA/M, the leaders of the 
rebellion designed what they called “The Ten Point Programme of the National 
Resistance Movement”, a policy document that would guide them once in power. It was a 
set of values and principles that were meant to form the basis of the fundamental change 
in Uganda’s governance and new political dispensation. Point number three on the list 
read as follows, “consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of 
sectarianism”. Sectarianism refers to all forms of religious, ethnic and gender 
chauvinism.  
After capturing power, Museveni used and continues to use ethnic-based sectarianism, 
the vice he vowed to eliminate. For example and as already mentioned, the UPDF 
continues to be dominated by people from the same ethnic group of Banyankole. The 
same applies to other government institutions where you find majority of the workers or 
officials in the top echelon are from the same ethnic group or part of the country, which 
makes these institutions look like ethnic camps. Examples of institutions dominated by 
people from one region or ethnic group by 2010 include the following; 
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Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets: 
           Names                                              Position Held 
1. James Kahoza……………………Chairman Board of Governors 
2. Joshua Mulera…………………….Director Procurement, Audit and 
Investigations 
3. Benson Turamye………………….Manager 
4. Marry Sozi………………………..Director Finance and Administration 
5. Fionah Kanyike…………………..Manager 
6. Asaph Mugisha……………………Human Resource Manager 
7. Etiang Joseph……………………..Internal Audit Manager 
8. Conelia Kakooza Sabiiti…………..Legal Compliance Director 
9. Milton Tumutegyereize……………Director Training and Capacity Building 
Uganda Investment Authority 
1. William Kalema……………………Board Chairman 
2. Maggie Kigozi……………………..Executive director 
3. Tom Buringuriza…………………..Deputy Executive Director 
4. Issa Mukasa……………………….Director Investment Promotion 
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5. Lawrence Byensi………………….Director Investment Facilitation 
6. Arthur Bwire Tukahirwa………….Director Industrial Parks Development 
7. Joel Byaruhanga…………………..Director Finance and Administration 
8. Barnabas Tumwesigye……………Director Lands Development Division 
Source; see the Independent Newspaper, ‘Regional distribution of top jobs in government 
bodies’, 26th January 2010 
It is not clear whether this configuration has changed but indications shows that the status 
quo has remained the same. It can therefore be argued that consolidation of national unity 
was included in the Ten Point Programme not because Museveni (and perhaps other 
leaders of the guerrilla movement) subscribed to national unity ethos, but rather for 
purposes of accessing and strengthening his hold on power and attract international and 
local recognition and support. He was therefore never interested in elimination of ethnic 
disharmony but rather take advantage of it. Indeed as pointed out by Omara-Otunu, 
Museveni’s five-year-long guerrilla campaign was underpinned by the “--appeal to ethnic 
and linguistic sentiments”145. 
Ironically, he constantly talks against ‘tribalism’ and sectarianism but has done little, if 
not nothing to stem the vice. In actual fact, people who have complained about 
manipulation and politicization of ethnicity by his government have ended up being 
punished instead. Within this context, it can be argued that the allegation that the 1980 
elections were rigged which formed the reason and basis for Museveni to start a guerrilla 
                                                  
145 Omara-Otunnu Amii, “Politics and the Military in Uganda 1890-1985”, Houndsmills and London, 
Macmillan (1987) p. 176 
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campaign against the Obote II government was mere deceit and politicking aimed at 
getting power for the sake of it through ethnic manipulation and politicization.                
Ethnic motive is aptly expressed in an interview with Drum Magazine in 1985 in which 
Museveni claimed that the ‘political mess’ in the country was a result of bad leadership 
of people from the north by saying; 
“The problem in Uganda is that the leadership has mainly been from the north. The 
southerners who are mainly Bantu have played a peripheral role all these years since 
independence in 1962. A lot of blood has been shed. We want genuine elections and we 
are sure that if these were held the best candidate would win. We are not against 
northerners as such, and if a popular man from Acholi or Lango or even Madi wins, he 
will have our mandate. What we cannot stomach is rigged elections, such as the one we 
had in 1980. We are still prepared to talk to Okello as a military leader on the future of 
our country but we are not going to talk out of weakness. In fact our forces are already 
inside Kampala and soon we may surprise the world”146.    
This statement indicates two main messages. First it gives an indication that even if the 
problem may have been political, the ethnic northerners were still to blame and not other 
people. It was not only diversionary but also deliberate. This is because if the blame had 
been put on the government as a whole, then the leadership which comprised of people 
from other parts of Uganda like Bunyoro, Busoga, Kigezi, would have been to blame. By 
                                                  
146 Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), “The Hidden War, The Forgotten People: The War in 
Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda”, (October 2003) p. 25-26; see also 
Zachary Lomo and Lucy Hovil, “Behind the Violence: The War in Northern Uganda”, Institute For 
Security Studies, Monograph Number 99, (2004) p. 19  
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singling out ethnic northerners, the intent was to create a negative picture of northerners 
in the minds of other groups especially the southerners which increased ethnic tensions 
and resentment.  
Second, it also indicates that even if the 1980 elections had been free and fair and won by 
a candidate from the north, Museveni and the NRA/M were not prepared to recognize 
him and supported his rule. In this way, ethnicity was used to ‘justify’ an individual’s 
aspirations to gain access to the highest political office in the land through regional and 
ethnic manipulation, by blaming a collective responsibility to a particular group of 
people.  It can also be interpreted to mean that after all, holding elections is not what 
matters but rather the military force at ones disposal.  
Third, in the current context of Uganda’s political elections, it could also mean that there 
is no problem going into the election process but as long as ‘I control the vote counting 
and announcing the winner’, because in this way the winning candidate will not 
necessarily be the genuine one but one who controls the instruments of force. This 
therefore exposes the politics of manipulation and the ‘strong man’ syndrome that has 
characterized Ugandan politics where an individual controls power by coercion, selective 
use of force and intimidation.      
This civil war therefore forms an important start point and basis for understanding why 
Acholiland has remained the locus of armed confrontation between the NRM and the 
LRA. It is intertwined with the NRM’s mobilization strategies that are based on appeal to 
ethnic and linguistic sentiments and the general trend in Uganda, whereby the guns rather 
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than elections are used to settle differences147. Because a person’s ethnic identity can be 
used as a tool for hatred or loyalty-inducing force, mobilization of support through 
manipulation of ethnicity rather than objective principles becomes the feasible alternative 
to the leader.  
This in turn allows the leader to portray the disliked target group as the source of 
suffering of other groups and therefore the ‘real’ problem. In this process, he intensifies 
the misperceptions and negative views of ethnic others and exploits the fragmentation of 
society in his favour. Indeed as aptly pointed out by Joraslav and Michael, “Because 
many groups were involved in atrocities against one another at some point in the past, 
memories of misbehavior- which tend to persist longer and cut deeper than memories of 
good relations, become a part of the ethnic lore”148.  
Viewed in this way, the inter-group disharmony and the civil war in Acholiland or 
perhaps put it in a better way, the north-south divide is a result of the politics of ‘divide 
and rule’ tactics by pitting one ethnic group against the other. As Muwonge says, 
“Museveni exploited the ethnic Bantu hatred against the northerners to recruit them into 
his guerrilla force many of whom were peasants and gave some of them guns while 
others were not and did not care whether they were killed as many did not get 
training”149.  
                                                  
147 Brett E. A. “Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics”, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No, 1, (1995) p. 142  
148 Joraslav Tir and Michael Jasinski, “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War: Targeting Ethnic 
Minorities”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No, 5, (October 2008) p. 644 
149 Interview with Muwonge, a primary school teacher, Luwero, December 2009  
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This observation of using ethnic hatred is also pointed out by this veteran soldier when he 
says, “--some NRA soldiers would be dressed in military uniform similar to that of 
UNLA soldiers and deployed to terrorize the village under the guise of UNLA soldiers 
after which a representative of the NRA/M would come and address people after the 
‘UNLA soldiers’ have disappeared and advise them to vacate their villages or join the 
NRA. It was also used as an initiation exercise for NRA recruits to gain courage but 
sometimes they could be deployed to conduct ambushes”150. This revelation is in line 
with that of Keitetsi, a former NRA child soldier now turned ambassador of goodwill to 
fight for the rights of children. In her autobiography, she gives insight into what 
happened in Luwero Triangle massacres during the NRA/M insurgent campaign between 
1982 and 1985. In one of her revelations, she recalls;  
“A month had passed since I left the training grounds. I was picked for a special 
assignment along with a few other children. I was excited because I would be seeing the 
action I had heard so much about from the other children—but it did not happen quite as 
I had been told. The sound (of the fighting) was terrifyingly loud and everything on the 
road seemed to splinter into pieces as rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) hit the trucks--
our side won and after the battle everybody run to the road and begun undressing the 
dead soldiers. Every one of us, except senior officers needed something to wear--my 
excitement turned into sadness when I saw the wounded enemy scattered around and 
crying for help, and suddenly it became hard for me to think of them as enemy--”151.  
 
 
                                                  
150 Interview with a veteran NRA soldier, Kampala, December 2009 
151 China Keitetsi, “Child Soldier: Fighting for my Life”, Bellevue, Jacana ( 2002) p. 97, Cited from Robert 
Lukwiya Ochola , MCCJ, “Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative in the Battle Field of Northern Uganda, An 
Example of an Integral, Inculturated and Ecumenical Approach to Pastoral Work in a War Situation”, (June 
2006) p. 32  
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She continues to narrate the NRA’s brutality and what happened to the captured UNLA 
enemy combatants as follows; 
“When we got back to our camp the prisoners were ordered to dig their own graves and 
some of our officers told us to spit in their eyes. The enemy was told that no bullets would 
be wasted on them. I could feel tears dropping in my heart while I watched the enemy 
being told how they were to be killed. “After you have dug your graves I will call for the 
best men who will hit you on your head with an akakumbi”- a short but heavy hoe. After 
the men had finished digging they were ordered to stand next to their graves. They were 
hit on the foreheads and on the back of their heads until they dropped into their graves 
and died”152.  
As the war escalated so did the rise of human casualties especially among the civilian 
population, many of the dead and maimed being women and children. It did not occur to 
the protagonists to have a negotiated settlement as each stuck to his guns. Counter 
accusations became the norm as Obote blamed the death of the people on the NRA/M 
guerrillas referring to them as bandits and assuring the nation that they would soon be 
wiped out. In fact in one of the public rallies, Obote told his listeners that Museveni’s 
NRA bandits were confined in a small area and that the Baganda were trouble causers 
who needed to behave themselves or else they would be taught a lesson153, thus 
indicating Uganda’s complex ethnic politics and crystallization of ethnicity.   
On his part, Museveni and his NRA/M accused Obote and UNLA forces of committing 
atrocities against men, women and children and destroying property. NRA forces 
concentrated on guerrilla tactics of ambush and hit and run most of the time. For every 
attack that was carried out by NRA, the government forces in response unleashed brutal 
                                                  
152 Ibid, p. 32 
153 Mutibwa Phares, “Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes”, Africa World Press, Inc. 
(1992) p.159 
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force to the people in the area leading to civilian deaths, which  was always blamed on 
UNLA soldiers. This gave The NRA/M more chance to increase recruitment by telling 
people that the enemy was the government of Obote and his Acholi soldiers.  
In the meantime, heavy ethnic mobilization and recruitment of the peasants meant heavy 
death toll. Whereas atrocities were blamed on the predominantly Acholi dominated 
UNLA, the question still remains as to whether it was only the guns of government forces 
killing and not those of the NRA. It is in this light that some politicians154 are demanding 
for an independent inquiry into the massacres of Luwero triangle and other areas where 
the fighting took place in order to know the truth despite continuous denial and resistance 
from some high ranking and influential NRM personnel. In the absence of an impartial 
independent inquiry, the Acholi may continue to be blamed and the truth of who 
committed these atrocities may perhaps never be known let alone bringing to justice the 
perpetrators. Ethnic reconciliation is likely to remain a far away dream in Uganda. 
Furthermore, information from senior personnel who participated in this war indicate that 
ethnic tendencies were a major motive and drive behind the NRA/M insurgent war 
against the northern-led government. In a recent revelation, Museveni’s bush war 
colleagues and senior NRA/M resistance struggle combatants stated that this war was 
against northerners;  
 
                                                  
154 The president of Uganda People’s Congress Party (UPC) Olala Otunnu insists that the NRA/M 
committed atrocities during the five year guerrilla war especially in Luwero despite their continuous denial 
and instead blaming the UPC government and has called for an inquiry in order to establish the truth. 
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“Museveni’s orientation to the liberation of Uganda was ethnic. Going to the bush in 
Luwero was intended to fight the northerners and that is why the alliance with Lule was 
made- to have Lule as a Muganda so that he would get support in Luwero to fight 
northerners--. The way the forces that took over Kampala treated the northerners 
demonstrated that. And so it has continued to be ethnic and the people in the north seem 
to see their persecution as being ethnic (Professor Dan W. Nabudere and Major (Rtd.) 
Rubaramira Ruranga155” 
There was also another dimension to the claim of liberation of Uganda by the leaders of 
NRA/M during the early 1980s. They claimed that liberation was necessary for the 
emancipation of Ugandans and more especially the disadvantaged peasantry south of 
Lake Kyoga that were being exploited by the elites who had ‘failed’ to serve the interests 
of the public, but instead only cared about their welfare, an appeal that had ethnic 
connotations. Even when there seemed to be a contradiction as the objective later 
changed to transforming Uganda from a ‘backward’ state to an industrialized one by 
creating a middle class, still the motive seemed to be aimed at promoting the interests of 
a particular group of people.  
Ironically, the very leadership seemed to be aware of the negative effects of ethnicity 
arising out of policies and actions of manipulative politicians, as Museveni writes, 
“Uganda and most other countries in Black Africa are still pre-industrial societies and 
they must be handled as such. Societies at this stage of development tend to have vertical 
polarizations based mainly on tribe and ethnicity”156.  In these circumstances, one might 
even argue that these strategies were used to attract support of a certain ethnic group who 
would form a dominant class. In his analysis of class and power in Africa, Sklar points 
                                                  
155 Diana Camack, “Big Men’, Governance and Development in Neo-patrimonial States”,  (2007) p.8 
156 Ronald Kassmir, “Reading Museveni: Structure, Agency and Pedagogy in Ugandan Politics”, Canadian 
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out that “the most common political device for dominant class consolidation in Africa has 
been authoritarian government”157, often through repression which inevitably creates an 
upsurge of widespread discontent and agitation against the regime that may be expressed 
through rebellion and civil wars.  
These ethnic and revenge tendencies which started and were amplified during NRA/M’s 
early days of the insurgent struggle have continued and largely explain the inter-ethnic 
tensions among the various ethnic groups in Uganda in general and the northern conflict 
in particular. Revenge tendencies in the case of the war in Acholiland makes sense as 
noted by Joraslav and Jasinski when they point out that “because many groups were 
involved in atrocities against one another at some point in the past, memories of 
misbehavior ---become part of ethnic lore”158.  That the NRA fought against Acholi-
dominated UNLA and continues to blame the Acholi for the atrocities during this period 
has meaning for revenge.  
It is also important to note that the fighters of NRA were mainly members of one ethnic 
group the Banyankole from places like Ankole and Kigezi in south western Uganda, 
together with Banyarwanda who settled in Luwero. However, other groups like the 
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) and Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU) 
were also formed along ethnic lines. All these groups mobilized and fought using 
ethnicity to mobilize fighters and support thus indicating the salient and complex role 
ethnicity plays in Uganda’s politics. It is therefore not surprising that the UNLA was also 
                                                  
157 Sklar L Richard, “The Nature of Class Domination in Africa”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol. 17, No, 4, (December 1979), p. 540-550 
158 Joraslav Tir and Jasinski Michael, “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War”, Journal of Conflict 
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built on the basis of ethnicity especially between the Acholi and Langi. The divisions and 
misunderstandings between these two were later to play in favour of the NRA. For 
instance, the Acholi complained about promotions which they said were favouring the 
Langi when instead it was them doing the donkey work of fighting at the frontlines and 
therefore dying in great numbers.  
It should also be realized that the regimes policies and ethnic politics sought to ostracize 
the ethnic groups in the north, particularly the Acholi people while it did not do the same 
to other people. First, the cordial and friendly relations between the guerrillas and 
ordinary people especially in the central and south was rarely exhibited in the north. As 
the victorious NRA troops advanced northwards, the nature and scale of hostility and 
brutality against ordinary people and suspected or real former UNLA soldiers became 
more militarist, aimed at punishing them rather than winning their hearts and minds.  
According to Odong, a social worker in Pabo,  
“The NRA instructed the local leaders in villages to write down the names of all the 
former soldiers including those who were in Amin’s Uganda Army (UA) in the 1970s 
without an explanation, which made people, not only fearful but suspicious of the intent. 
The lists were normally handed over to the local NRA commanders. In many cases the 
NRA would appear in a village unnoticed, surround it and conduct cordon and search 
under the guise of looking for guns and former soldiers. Those who were suspected of 
being former soldiers or having link with the rebels, or thought to have withheld 
‘important’ security information especially men, were often undressed and tied ‘three 
piece kandoya’ where ones hands are tied tightly behind his back to the extent that the 
chest protrudes forward and then forged or beaten in front of the family. It did not matter 
to them whether you are a head of the family or what age you are. It was total 
humiliation”159.  
                                                  
159 Interview with Odong, Gulu, 2009 
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Secondly, people were forcefully removed from their villages and made to live in squalid 
conditions in IDPs camps that were neither planned for nor protected from rebel attacks. 
This policy which was first implemented by the army in Acholiland purportedly to isolate 
civilians from rebel combatants was not aimed at protecting them but rather a disguise to 
punish them. Consequently, it had a profound impact on the Acholi social set up, as it led 
to the death of many people, family and cultural fibre broken and many people 
traumatized. It should be noted that whereas the central and southern parts of the country 
were affected by insurgency, irrespective of size and duration of insecurity, for example 
the Force Obote Back Again (FOBA) and the ADF which still operates in Kasese, people 
in the affected areas have never been forcefully taken to camps like in the north.  
One former NRA soldier said that in December 1987, the HSM/A fought a fierce battle 
with an NRA detachment at Pajule in former Kitgum district but now Pader in which 
many soldiers and rebels were killed and Museveni arrived the following day to assess 
the situation. During his address to the officers and men in which he issued new orders, 
the soldier quotes Museveni to have said that,  
“--from now onwards you should act decisively if we are to defeat these bandits. You 
should be similar to them by being light in order to move and act swiftly in pursuit after 
an attack and also before the attack. By this I mean you should only carry your great 
coat, raincoat, gun and at least three magazines full of ammunition and track them 
wherever they pass and go. You should also deny them food in the field by eating and 
uprooting what you can’t eat from the gardens, destroy the granaries and hunt them 
down like rats. We shall defeat them again like we did in Luwero”160.   
                                                  
160 This was said by a veteran soldier of NRA who belonged to a detachment of the 67th Battalion that was 
stationed at Pajule in 1986-87. He retired from the army in 1991    
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Orders of this nature from a leader of government clearly show that this was deliberate 
and consciously done to purge the Acholi people. It is part of a history of ethnic 
marginalization and repression that has tended to characterize Uganda’s political scene. 
In a situation of this nature, politics of retribution becomes an important factor in 
embedding violent use of ethnicity to exert control over specific ethnic groups considered 
a threat to the regime and purportedly to establish stability after conflict. 
NRA/M consolidation of strength and intensification of hostilities (1985-1986): 
Although by 1984 the NRA was exhausted161 and in actual fact sent emissaries to 
government seeking to negotiate for peace, the situation soon changed in its favour 
operationally on one hand but intensified ethnic hostilities on the other. The guerrilla 
campaign gained momentum and it stepped up its military attacks. This was brought 
about by a number of factors. First, the death of Oyite Ojok, the UNLA Chief of Staff in 
1983 increased the morale of the NRA while that of the UNLA plummeted. This is 
because Oyite Ojok’s professional leadership had ensured unity in the army and was 
effective in command including designing and directing counter-guerrilla operations 
against the NRA. To make matters worse, not only did the morale of UNLA go down but 
they also responded with excessive force especially in Luwero where much of the 
fighting was taking place and where a helicopter carrying him was brought down, 
resulting in heavy civilian casualty. Such acts increased NRA/M’s opportunities for 
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recruitment of the local people who were constantly reminded that the Acholi soldiers of 
Obote were the ones killing them.   
Second, Smith Opon Acak the new UNLA Chief of Staff who was appointed by Obote to 
replace Oyite Ojok, though fairly educated did not have the necessary leadership abilities 
and military stamina162 to command respect across the army like his predecessor. 
Besides, there were other officers who were senior to him who according to army 
establishment would have taken up that position. This brought about resentment, 
factionalism and discontent in the UNLA especially among the Acholi where the senior 
army officers to the chief of staff hailed from. This sparked growing unrest within the 
UNLA because of the perceptions that Obote was favouring the Langi at the expense of 
the Acholi by promoting and appointing them to high positions within the army. To the 
Acholi therefore, the appointment of Opon Acak meant that they were not only being 
sidelined, but could not have any of their senior officers in influential positions in the 
army.  Moreover, to make matters worse, the Acholi accused him of favoring his ethnic 
Langi officers and men and also of sending them to the frontlines to fight the NRA 
guerrillas163 thus resulting into many Acholis to die. All this played in the hands of 
NRA/M which stepped up its insurgent campaigns, strengthened its fighting capability 
through increased ethnic mobilization and recruitment and expanded the territories under 
their command.  
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In the meantime as the government army became weaker and weaker as a result of weak 
command, internal strife and Obote’s lineage to his ethnic tribe for advice and support, 
the morale and capacity of the army to fight the insurgency and defend the country was 
undermined. Because of this, the focus was diverted from counter-guerrilla operations to 
purging Acholi officers suspected of planning ‘subversive’ activities and also rounding 
up and detaining soldiers who were escaping from the frontline and were now terrorizing 
civilians. It was not only soldiers who were being rounded up and detained but also 
civilians especially the ethnic Bantu-speaking from central and south as they were 
suspected of collaborating with the NRA rebels.  
The UNLA carried our operations commonly known as “panda gari” meaning get into 
the car as suspects were ordered to jump into the trucks that were used to ferry them to 
detention centres. Ironically, Obote was now using ethnicity which was the main cause 
for his overthrow in 1972, moreover by the very institution he relied on and needed most 
to keep him in power. It is therefore not surprising that the NRA/M took advantage of 
these weaknesses and consolidated its war campaign and fighting strength. The biggest 
opportunity for NRA/M presented itself when discontent and factionalism in the UNLA 
reached all levels high and senior ethnic Acholi164 army officers organized a contingent 
of Acholi-dominated troops to overthrow Obote. 
 
 
                                                  
164 The coup against Obote was organized by Brigadier Bajlio Olala Okello an ethnic Acholi together with 
other Acholi officers 
105 
 
The Overthrow of Obote II Government, and manipulation of ethnicity (July 1985 
to January 1986): 
A contingent of Acholi troops led by one time loyal commanders Tito Okello Lutwa and 
Bajrio Okello overthrew Obote government on 27th July 1985. Ironically these officers 
had been close to Obote since the formation of the UNLA, the military wing of the 
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and in actual fact, threw their support behind 
him and the UPC. They controlled the military power which remained in the hands of the 
Luo-speaking northerners thus symbolizing perpetual continuation of the traditional 
colonial structure since independence.  
The officers who masterminded the coup said that one of the major reasons was to stop 
destruction and bloodshed in the country in order to create necessary conditions for 
peace, unity and development. In a press release which was issued four months after the 
coup, its leader Bajilio Olara Okello stated the motive as follows;  
“The main reasons for the action taken by the army of 27th July were; to stop bloodshed 
in the country; and to create conditions for viable peace, unity, development, and the 
observance and promotion of human rights. In fact the UNLA merely responded to the 
anguished voices of the people of this country who have suffered for too long at the hands 
of dictators and self-seeking politicians. I can assure you there were no other compelling 
reasons for the takeover apart from the ones I have just mentioned. (Press Release from 
Commander of Defence Forces, Lieutenant-General Bajilio Olara Okello, 11 November 
1985, Kampala”165.   
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Despite the above statement however, some scholars have pointed out that the Acholi 
people wanted power themselves166, while others have indicated that this was a 
continuation of the social political chaos, brutal and destructive vengeance167 against an 
ethnic group considered to have benefitted materially and politically at the expense of 
others which has tended to characterize Uganda since 1966, whereby force rather than 
negotiations is used to settle disputes. The reason thus has been interpreted from different 
perspectives but to a large extent seem to depend on who you talk to.  
Nevertheless, it is important to examine how ethnicity influenced and shaped it and the 
situational factors that contributed to it.  This is because deciding to fight is one thing but 
choosing the ideology, method of mobilization and whether to negotiate or continue 
fighting is yet another. In the case of the NRA, the option chosen was to continue fighting 
and the method of mobilization heavily relied on ethnicity. The Military Junta’s desire to 
bring about peace and reconciliation became futile and the search for peace continued to 
be elusive.  Whereas some armed groups that were also fighting the Obote government 
such as UFM, UNRF, FEDEMU and FUNA, agreed to join the Military Junta, the 
NRA/M vehemently refused.  
Museveni stated that he and the NRA/M could not join the Military Junta because of the 
atrocities committed by the Acholi soldiers in Luwero.  As a result, the bloodshed that the 
leaders of the coup had thought they could stop continued unabated. It is against this 
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background that, they initiated peace negotiations with the NRA/M. This appeared to be 
the only feasible and realistic option if the country was to return to order and stability. 
Apparently, Museveni did not seem to be interested in listening to the pleas for 
negotiations. Even when he finally agreed, he stated that the NRA/M was willing to take 
part in negotiations but that this was not going to be from the point of weakness. The 
insinuation of this is that it was going to be on its own terms.  
It is also apparently clear that the lack of interest in negotiations served to signal that 
first, the NRA/M was determined to push the northerners out of power and second, that  
the barrel of the gun rather than compromise and accommodation would determine the 
discourse of politics in Uganda168. Furthermore, joining the Okello government would 
mean working with the ‘bad’ people they were fighting against. Given the fact that in 
peace talks different entities bring different resources and therefore enabling new avenues 
for dialogue which generates mutually supportive and value-laden benefits and problem 
solving opportunities, the manner in which the NRA/M reacted to the idea suggest that it 
was not interested in the talks but rather to fight the Acholi and eliminate them from the 
political scene.  
Within this context, it seems clear that ethnic dislike and hatred was a salient reason for 
lack of interest in the talks as well as the motive for continued fighting. It can also be 
argued that ethnic hatred was the source of the Luwero atrocities and not the other way 
round. Indeed as observed by HURIPEC, the atrocities and skulls can be attributed to 
                                                  
168 Brett E. A. “Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics”, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No, 1, (March 1995) p. 129-152 
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“the initiation of a conflict in Luwero based on ethnic and religious divisions--”169, rather 
than the other way round. 
 The negotiations took place in Kenya’s capital of Nairobi and were chaired by the then 
Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi. However, the events that took place during the 
process demonstrated that ethnic sentiments were more apparent than unity in purpose, 
accommodation and reconciliation. These sentiments coupled with mutual distrust tended 
to undermine the need for a peaceful settlement. Far from acting with a common vision, 
the two parties pursued different agendas. Indeed as observed by Khadiagala, as talks 
proceeded, “--it became apparent that neither side was committed to a negotiated 
settlement, live alone even a cease-fire”170.  
For a bigger part of the process, bickering and counteraccusations tended to predominate. 
This observation is noted by Bethuel Kiplagat, who was then the permanent secretary in 
the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the mediator of the negotiation process when 
he points out that Museveni and the NRM were angry because they thought that the 
revolution which they had fought for years was being hijacked by the Okellos whom they 
accused of gross human rights violations. On one occasion, Museveni disappeared to 
Europe for three days, tabling new demands on his return. During negotiations, tempers 
would flare as Museveni denounced past regimes as “primitive” and “backward”.  
 
                                                  
169 Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), “The Hidden War: The Forgotten People, War in 
Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda”, (October 2003) p. 29 
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He further points out that,  
“They began the talks by hurling insults at each other and continued to do so throughout 
the proceedings. Museveni denounced the previous regimes in Uganda as “primitive” 
and “backward” He initially refused to negotiate with the military council delegation, 
dismissing them as ‘criminals’. He in turn was accused by the military council of 
delaying the negotiation process unnecessarily--. Once an agreement was reached on an 
agenda item, Museveni would change his position the following day, or put forward new 
demands on the same matter”171.   
It should also be realized that prior to the talks, the NRA/M made several conditions. 
These included one, “--that half the members of the military council be replaced by their 
representatives and that no other ruling authority should be established”172. Two, that the 
national army should be comprised of soldiers according to percentages from the fighting 
groups173.  Three, that both Museveni and General Okello should enjoy equal status on 
the military council.   
While the official understanding in the public domain was that these negotiations were 
progressing well, things were different on the battleground. They were different in the 
sense that although there was no overt fighting taking place, the NRA used this 
opportunity of ceasefire to reorganize and plan for a military assault that would depose 
the Acholi-led Military Junta. Indeed although the peace accord was signed on 17th 
December 1985 after four months of protracted peace talks- commonly dubbed ‘peace 
jokes’ especially in the guerrilla circles, the NRA/M dishonored the accord and launched 
fierce assault on the military junta and pushed it out of power on 25th January 1986.       
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In a country fractured by deep ethnic divisions dating back since colonial days, the act of 
dishonoring the peace gesture presented in the power sharing agreement was perceived as 
the greatest betrayal in the eyes of northerners to be ever committed by NRA/M and 
deepened further the ethnic divisions between the north and the south.  In the eyes of 
northerners therefore, NRA/M war was an indication of nothing else but power struggle 
aimed at removing northerners from power and a confrontation between non-Bantu 
speaking northerners and Bantu speaking southerners174. Accordingly therefore, 
NRA/M’s narrow ethnic power base and manipulation of ethnic and linguistic appeals to 
urge ethnic Bantu to rally around their ethnic affiliation was purely for political ends. 
 NRM’s Political Discourse and Emergence of Dissent and Conflict     
The emergence of dissent in Uganda since 1986 when NRA/M captured power has come 
from different areas and by different actors. Although this capture of power was 
welcomed with excitement, euphoria, hope and optimism for the restoration of 
democracy, security and economic prosperity by a wide cross section of Ugandans 
especially in the south, it was also met with fear, suspicion and mistrust especially by 
people in the north, retreating northern soldiers and the politicians dislodged from power 
because they suspected revenge from the incoming NRA/M forces. However, it is 
important to understand that despite the fact that the northern Uganda people mistrusted 
and suspected the NRA/M forces to carry out revenge against them, their reaction to the 
government forces as they advanced northwards was a wait and see.  
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Following its success in overrunning the capital city of Kampala, the NRA continued 
advancing and entered northern Uganda without any much resistance and took up 
positions in the region. Although some retreating UNLA soldiers continued fleeing and 
entered Sudan, some remained behind in their villages, removed their military uniforms 
and hid their guns. They had accepted and come to terms with NRA victory. The defeated 
combatants complied with the new governments call to surrender their arms and 
demobilize. Some of those who gave in their arms were registered and sent back home 
while others were reabsorbed into the NRA. However, others were sent to reorganization 
centres which were in western Uganda for example in Kiburara and the former Simba 
garrison near Mbarara town. It should also be realized that there was relative peace in 
northern Uganda in the first months up to April 1986 although stakes remained high 
because of tension and suspicion emanating from NRA’s language and songs that were 
perceived as provocative. Nevertheless, this peace did not last long and this was because 
of the following factors. 
First, the methods used by the NRA/M to consolidate power and bring northern Uganda 
under its control were considered suspicious and provocative by the defeated soldiers. In 
May 1986 for example, it ordered all former UNLA forces to report to the nearest 
barracks. This order was deeply suspicious as it reminded them of a similar order by 
Amin in 1972 in which many soldiers were killed, majority of them ethnic Acholis. In 
response to this order, some soldiers went underground while others escaped and joined 
their colleagues in Sudan. This order was based on a number of reasons but most 
importantly the NRA intelligence reports indicated that the defeated Acholi soldiers who 
escaped across the border into Sudan were organizing attack on its positions and that they 
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were collaborating with those inside Uganda who still had arms caches buried 
underground. Second, the NRA’s view was that these soldiers were a potential threat in 
the event of hostilities breaking out and therefore thought this preemptive move was 
necessary. Third, it wanted to take them to camps in the pacified areas of west and central 
Uganda in order to politicize them and prepare to deploy them should war erupt again as 
it was thin on the ground, besides being exhausted.  
In addition to these reasons was the general view of the Bantu-speaking people of the 
central and south Uganda that everybody in the north was a bad person. In other words, 
there was a general tendency of people in the south to regard people in the north 
negatively as looters and murderers which increased friction between the two parties. 
Arising out of this was the use of stereotypes and derogatory terms such as “Anyanya175” 
and “Killers” to describe them, insinuating that they were not Ugandans but Sudanese. To 
make matters worse, they were now removed from occupation that used to provide them 
and their families with economic support. This sociopolitical and economic deprivation 
increased a sense of insecurity and triggered discontent which the leaders of the rebellion 
capitalized on to mobilize.      
However, some people who were in NRA in northern Uganda in 1986 but now retired say 
the intelligence reports were poor and often concocted by Intelligence Officers (IOs) in 
order to get money for information gathering and operational allowances and that armed 
hostilities wouldn’t have erupted if NRA had shown good gesture of reconciliation and 
                                                  
175 Anyanya is a tribe in Southern Sudan which became notorious of its ability to kill many Sudan 
government soldiers during the early years of the first Sudanese civil war in the 1950s which was also 
known as Anyanya 1 rebellion    
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accommodation and not harassed the people as this one informant notes, “---people were 
arrested by the NRA, tied ‘kandoya’ or ‘three-piece’ and forced to confess that they had 
guns, beaten while their clothes were removed moreover in front of their families and 
sometimes the general public”176.  
Hellen, a social worker in Bungatira a suburb in the outskirts of Gulu town said about the 
conduct of NRA soldiers that; 
“--although there were good soldiers but these were few. Women and young girls were 
raped with impunity, goods taken by force and it was not easy to report the soldiers to 
their bosses because it was difficult to reach them leave alone tracing them to military 
detaches--. People feared to report because of reprisal and in cases where there was a 
chance to report, no action was taken and people perceived it as the official policy to 
protect their soldiers”177. 
Against this background of harassment and brutality was the NRM’s policy of no party 
politics. Parties were de-legitimized and restrictions imposed on all political party 
activities on claim that they are people-divisive and sectarian. But in the real sense this 
policy was aimed at shrinking the political arena in an environment where patronage, 
cronyism and corruption served to benefit only those who helped Museveni and his NRM 
to rise to power. Indeed as noted by Omara “--as non-Bantu speakers have been 
marginalized in the political processes of the country, smaller ethnic loyalties have begun 
to create fission among the Bantu speakers”178. No-party politics meant that politicians 
could not use the collective voice of the parties but were allowed the option of co-option 
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but even those co-opted who had divergent views from those of NRM were silenced by 
legal clauses and harassment so that they toe the line of NRA/M. 
All this worked to bring about socio-political discontent and increased voices of dissent. 
Consequently, NRM’s capacity and legitimacy increasingly came under question in the 
north. A combination of repression and human right abuses179 by the army such as rape, 
arbitrary arrests, detention and torture and killing of civilians, confiscation of livestock, 
humiliation and constricting the political space through a policy of no-party politics not 
only meant that the underlying grievances of marginalization could not be addressed but 
proved to majority of the northerners that indeed what they had been thinking and 
suspecting all along in their minds that the NRA/M was there to revenge for ‘massacres 
of Luwero’ was true.  
The unfolding tense situation was also made worse by the fact that the SPLA forces 
fighting the government of Sudan who were perceived as close allies of Museveni 
attacked the Acholi camps around Owiny Kibul along the Sudan Uganda border. It is 
against this background that the UPDA/M issued a statement which was aired on BBC in 
August 1986 calling for a return to elected government in Uganda180.  
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The Rise of insurgency in Acholiland: 
Although when exactly insurgency in Acholiland began is not clear as it depends on who 
you talk to, the attack on NRA positions on 20th August 1986 by UPDA from Sudan led 
by Brigadier Odong Latek,181 seems to have marked the beginning of the armed rebellion 
in Acholiland between the NRA and Acholi rebel forces. The debate as to when it 
commenced has been in much the same way as to what triggered it. Arguments about 
causes have raged from claims of people in northern Uganda wanting to regain the state 
power they lost182, to ethnic revenge183 and spontaneous response in a chaotic situation 
but which was fueled by NRA excesses.  
For example Bainomugisha and Tumushabe explain that “hundreds of former 
government army (UNLA) who feared reprisals from the victorious NRA fled to Sudan 
with their weapons”184. They were later attacked and routed by the SPLA/M in 
collaboration with the NRA forcing most of them to flee back to Uganda where they 
formed the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA). However, despite the different 
accounts by different people, the fact of the matter remains and that is, attacks against the 
NRA started shortly after it entered the north.  
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This was because of the manner in which it conducted operations which was 
characterized by killings, rape, humiliation, detention and torture. Moreover, this was not 
only meted on former soldiers but even the civilian population. For example Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch have documented gross human rights abuses 
committed by the government army in northern Uganda185. Because of these atrocities, 
many people were left with no option but rather forced to join insurgency. Indeed as 
pointed out by Brett, people like Charles Alai one time a Deputy Minister in the NRM 
government confirmed that the reason why he joined the rebels was because he was 
beaten by the NRA at his home. Several other people had been harassed and tortured. It is 
thus against this background that the UPDA was formed in August 1986. The leaders of 
the rebellion were able to mobilize support by capitalizing on the violation of the 
people’s rights. The young people including even those who may not have supported the 
uprising were forced to join the insurgency as the only way out.    
The most prominent leaders of the UPDA were Otema Alimadi former Prime Minister in 
Obote II government and Brigadier Odong Latek. Odong Latek is alleged to have fired 
the first bullet of the Northern Uganda rebellion on 20th August 1986. The UPDA’s 
grievances were four folds: first it accused the NRA/M of violating the Nairobi peace 
talks in 1985; second, the Acholi commanders and political wing of the UPDA blamed 
NRA fighters of Human rights Abuses termed ‘Tek Gungo’— the rape of Acholi men by 
NRA fighters during the early years of NRA operations in Northern Uganda; Third, 
promoting divisive and communist ideologies in Uganda.  
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During the initial stages of UPDA’s activities, this accusation helped the political wing 
based in London UK to lobby for support. Lastly, the NRA/M was accused of favoring 
and involving Rwandese in the political affairs of Uganda. Although it denied this 
accusation during the Nairobi peace talks, a few years later, in 1994, Rwandese forces 
based in Uganda attacked Rwanda and overthrew an established government there. The 
UPDA/M was however short lived and this was due to a number of reasons. The main 
ones being poor organizational skills, inadequate supplies and reinforcements, general 
lack of human resources to  manage the errant remnants of UNLA but the immediate 
failure of UPDA was loss of combatants resulting from factionalism between Acholi of 
Gulu and those coming from Kitgum and Pader.  
This was coupled with deaths of senior commanders between 1985 and 1987. Some of 
these commanders were killed by their own rank and files who had become highly 
opportunistic who lacked the required qualification and appropriate training. By august 
1987, UPDA was defeated at corner kilak when Colonel Eric Odwal and many 
combatants were killed. These losses led the UPDA to enter into peace negotiations with 
NRA/M, which was concluded in 1988. However, many of the insurgents rejected the 
deal and attacks on the NRA, infrastructure, including civilians continued unabated.   
The situations unfortunately rapidly worsened as the NRA/M’s military campaign 
continued thus dashing out any hopes for peace. A number of reasons have been 
attributed to the deterioration of the situation. First, the Gulu peace talks signed in 1988 
left several outstanding issues unresolved which ultimately caused the rebellion to 
continue. For example issues of unbalanced development between the north and the 
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south, social suffering of the northern people and sharing of political power were not 
discussed. As Ladit Ocaya points out; 
“The NRA/M was not interested in addressing the real issues that were responsible for 
starting the war. You could see that they were really interested in persuading the 
UPDA/M leadership especially the commanders to abandon fighting for the sake of it and 
not for the improvement of the lives of the general population. Exchanges of money and 
promises of material goods were used on individual people rather than addressing the 
causes for example marginalization and NRA abuses that were at the heart of the 
conflict. Moreover, the promise of stopping harassing people was mere pretense because 
even as the purported negotiations were going on, many people were continued to be 
tortured while others were killed. The Acholi feel hated and rejected by the Bantu-led 
government of Museveni”186. 
This observation was further supported by a Ugandan newspaper by describing the 
situation in northern Uganda that, “in some villages the situation is gloomy and 
desperate---. The approach of these (NRA) agents working in the new ‘war zone’ is more 
militarism than political. It seems to be more of a ‘conquering’ mission, of breaking 
‘their’ backs than of winning over the people’s hearts--. Therefore, unless there is change 
of attitude towards them by the powers that be, they do not see their salvation in the 
NRM but elsewhere”187. This situation exposed the ethnic manipulation and targeted 
attacks against those considered to pose a military challenge to the incumbent regime but 
also revenge that has witnessed a particular group of people to be considered as enemies. 
Both rebels and government forces were accused of committing atrocities188.  
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Second, the NRA/M accused UPDA officers integrated into the NRA of attempted coup 
plot. This led to a few former commanders being arrested or killed. Third, the UPDM/A 
political wing fell-out with the military wing which singed the Gulu Accord because the 
politicians were left out from the newly formed alliance between NRA/M and UPDA. 
Even if the politicians would have wanted to be party to the negotiations and therefore 
benefit from the deal, the leaders of the NRA/M were not prepared to accept them in a 
revolution they believed was a result of their own success which they fought for and 
achieved.  
Moreover, the socioeconomic and political problems the country was in were blamed on 
the leaders of the past regimes, a reference to these very politicians on the notion that 
they misled the soldiers. In short, NRA/M was not prepared to bring on board politicians 
it had just overthrown in the struggle for power that was now in its favour. Third, the 
majority of the UPDM members were young, less educated and were not satisfied with 
the outcomes of the peace talks because there was no assurance for benefiting in the deal.  
In addition to this, they were not represented in the talks. Moreover, the negotiations 
were conducted between the NRA/M government and a small group of the UPDA with 
majority of the members refusing to take part. To make matters worse, they were now 
targeted by the NRA because they were perceived to be hiding guns and therefore a 
potential source of another insurgency. They remained worried about the deteriorating 
human rights issues, the way they were being witch hunted and victimized, including 
negative ethnic stereotyping. To these young people, life had ceased to have meaning.  
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The struggle for power based on ethnic and religious lines in which force rather than 
accommodation became the means through which people from one region sought to 
assert their authority alienated and pushed to the periphery a section of people from 
another region to the extent that they were ready to use the same force and violence in an 
attempt to get that which they had been deprived. Indeed as noted by Lamwaka, “in 
Africa, those who have captured state power through guerrilla warfare have tended to 
over-glamorize their achievements, sending the wrong signal to the young people that 
“the gun is mightier”189. The demise of the UPDA thus did not mean the end of 
insurgency in Acholiland but rather a step in the metamorphosing situation that would see 
another armed group emerge, that of Holy Spirit Army/Movement (HSA/M).    
The HSA/M emerged in the late 1986 and was led by Alice Lakwena, a simple woman 
born in a peasant Christian family in Gulu district.  Lakwena is a Luo term which means 
a messenger of God or a disciple of Christ. After coming on stage, she quickly informed 
and promised her followers that she had been sent by God to rid Uganda in general and 
Acholiland in particular of the bad leaders and therefore bring peace and prosperity to all 
people. She used the bible teaching and local cultural traditions to gather local support. 
Her ecumenical idiom and cultural appeal strategy worked in her favour and gave her a 
following.  
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Her message was a mixture of the need to cleanse the Acholi people of the evil spirit and 
to get back the power which was snatched from them by the NRA.   In short her strategy 
used a combination of Christian theories, cultural and moral regeneration dogma to defeat 
the enemy. She became notorious for her ability to mobilize elites, professional and 
young Acholi and langi into her fighting force. The movement rapidly became popular 
among the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups for two major reasons: first it claimed to 
purify Acholi and Lango land from the demise of evil that led their forces and 
government to be defeated by the weak and under dogs from “Loka nam” across the Nile.  
Second, the youths who had disapproved the deal between the UPDA and NRA and who 
were now vulnerable to the NRA operations were attracted to join this movement as the 
only option for their survival. Even when they were not militarily trained, politically and 
ideologically well organized to face the powerful government force, they had no choice 
but to join rebellion. To make matters worse, they were not well armed as few were 
supplied with old rifles while many carried stones and sticks. This is the fighting force 
that confronted the NRA in which many of its fighters were decimated with ferocious fire 
power. It should be realized however, that despite being killed in large numbers the HSA 
fighters relentlessly confronted the NRA in what they perceived as a war of noble cause 
because of collective despair, unjustified abuse of their human rights, anger and 
humiliation.  
Arising out of the heavy toll of human cost in terms of death and injury especially 
because of the crude and often ‘poor’ tactics used, several people described the leadership 
of the HSA/M from different perspectives. For example Museveni described Lakwena as 
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“a poor girl with psychiatric problem”190, while tabloids in the Western countries 
described her and her followers as desperate people possessed with witchcraft, and yet 
others describing her as a ‘former prostitute’, Ugandan witch, and ‘a voodoo priestess”.  
While resorting to force in the manner the HSA/M did may seem difficult to explain and 
therefore tend to justify the stereotypes used to describe Lakwena and her followers, 
understanding the conflict in Acholiland in terms of myth and witchcraft does not only 
result in missing the point, but also ignores the deep ethnic, regional, political, and 
cultural underpinnings of the conflict. It should also be realized that although the two 
parties, the HSA/M and the NRA/M differed in terms of for example organization, tactics 
and articulation of the sociopolitical and economic problems that were facing the country, 
what they both had in common was ethnic appeal.  
That the poorly-armed ethnic group combined witchcraft and religion and fought and 
held out against a well-armed and superior government army for over a year before 
getting defeated means a lot in terms of ethnic conflict and politics of hatred. It tends to 
disapprove the perception of the latter group as irrational and primitive and this being the 
case it means that there must be a plausible and logical explanation. Moreover, much as 
the aggrieved Acholi people could have resorted to the use of non-violent means to 
express their discontent, the government also could have avoided the conflict by handling 
the sensitivities of the situation through designing policies that could peacefully address 
the underlying causes.  
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The fact that this did not happen shows not only the extent to which force is perceived 
and used as the preferred option to settle political differences but also how it is used by 
one group to dominate others and how ethnic loyalties is critical in the discourse of 
Ugandan politics. As Achelam, a teacher in Kitgum said, “The NRA did not want to 
listen to the views of the Acholi people regarding how guns and other military equipment 
could be collected and how to get cooperation from the local people. To them every 
Acholi was an ‘adui’- enemy and therefore everybody had to be handled harshly in order 
to show them that they were no longer in power and that they the NRA were entitled and 
had capacity to use force in any way they wanted”191.   
This observation tends to make sense especially if we consider Brett’s assertion when he 
says that “victorious regimes are tempted to assert their authority by punishing and 
humiliating the vanquished. Yet coercion is an uncertain basis for political authority, 
since violence creates potential enemies who will comply only while they believe that 
resistance is impossible as Ugandan history has shown”192. This then brings us to 
examine the significance of the rebellion led by Lakwena in terms of ethnic politicization 
and relative deprivation. The significance is fourfold.  
First, the determination to confront a well-armed superior army using old rifles, sticks 
and stones to a large extent indicates the desperate and magnitude of the threat that was 
facing a particular group of people. It was an attempt to resist the repression of the state. 
As the saying goes that ‘desperate or unique situations may require desperate or unique 
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measures’, the Acholi people had to use any means available to them however 
inappropriate or ineffective those means may have seemed to be.  
Second, the large numbers of the Acholi people that she was able to mobilize to take up 
arms against the NRA/M government indicate the extent of the feeling and existence of 
collective deprivation suffered. The Acholi people were not only forcefully pushed out of 
power but were also frustrated in their attempt to have their grievances listened to. 
Moreover the UPDA/NRA talks did not bring everybody on board and therefore did not 
cater for the interests of all the parties. The rebellion was therefore a result of frustration-
induced anger. Indeed as pointed out by Gurr, “the occurrence of civil violence 
presupposes the existence of relative deprivation among substantial members of 
individuals in a society”193.   
Third, since the system did not provide non-violent channels such as political debate, 
negotiations, arbitration and round table talks through which the Acholi could express 
their grievances, the only option left to them tended to be rebellion through mobilizing 
ethnic membership. In such a situation where the political space is constricted and 
monopolized and where a particular ethnic group feels alienated from participation by 
another ethnic group moreover using violence, the potential for counter violence 
organized and staged by the group that feels deprived and frustrated is very high.  
Fourth, since the deposed military junta was predominantly Acholi, and since they were 
accused of committing atrocities in Luwero, the view among the NRA/M and their 
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followers was that every Acholi was a bad person which in actual sense portrayed 
collective criminalization. In effect, this was politicization and manipulation of ethnicity. 
The fact that the UNLA was dominated by the Acholi does not necessarily mean that they 
may have been the only ones who committed atrocities. In addition to this, the allegation 
presents a one-sided story albeit a distorted one as in the war situation there are at least 
two opposing parties.  
Moreover by employing the army and trying to use military force to solve a political 
problem amounted to militarization of politics. Although Lakwena and her HSA/M was 
defeated near the town of Jinja in eastern Uganda in late 1988, the underlying structural 
causes of Acholi grievances remained unsolved and her ecumenical appeal and the spirit 
to fight continued on, although this time under a different rebel name and leadership, that 
of LRA/M under Joseph Kony. 
Kony a relative of Lakwena who claims to have inherited her spirit after her defeat, 
continued with the war by bringing together the fighters of the HSA/M that scattered after 
its defeat under his command. However, it should be realized that prior to the defeat of 
HSA, he already had his own force which, although insignificant but was one of those 
fighting the NRA/M government. He changed the name of his rebel movement first from 
Uganda People’s Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA) to Uganda Christian Democratic 
Army (UCDA) and finally in 1991, to the LRA a name it has retained to date.  
The LRA and its tactics, methods of operation, human rights abuses, transformation and 
its behaviour during and after peace negotiations have been written on extensively in 
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intellectual and academia publications, civil rights organizations reports, and special 
reports for example the United States Congressional Reports. In particular, atrocities such 
as the brutal murder, mutilation and summary execution of non-combatants, extortion, 
torching of homesteads, abduction of young boys and girls to be used as killing machines, 
‘human mules’ for transportation of goods, sex slaves and concubines respectively have 
been extensively documented.  
To facilitate the understanding of the LRA war and its relationship with ethnicity, I will 
therefore focus my analysis on examining the ethno-political manipulation, politicization 
of the conflict and state repression against the Acholi people by the NRM regime, factors 
that have tended to prolong as well as escalate the conflict. Such analysis is crucial in 
order to appreciate the nexus of the conflict in rational terms and to shift our intellectual 
paradigm beyond the stereotypes that have been used to describe it for example as 
religious fanatics, terrorists, lumpens, negative forces, murderers194, killers, biological 
substances, criminals and people possessed by witchcraft.  
First, the perception of NRM and its supporters especially the Bantu speaking people 
towards the Acholi people has been such that they are a cultural hotbed of rebellion and 
murderers who committed atrocities in the south during the time they were in power. This 
perception to a large extent explains the acts of vengeance and humiliation by the UPDF. 
There is no doubt that NRA’s track record of discipline was good and far exceeded that 
of previous armies for example the UA and UNLA which were unpopular and in fact 
                                                  
194 Ben Ochola Latigo, “Acholi, Victims of the Northern War and Isolation”, Kacoke Madit, (April 1997) p. 
2 http://www.km-net.org.uk/conferences/KM97/papers_pdf/victims.pdf   
127 
 
resented by the public. The NRA demonstrated that it was pro-people especially in the 
south and this explains its success in cooperating with the people in the war zones there.  
Unfortunately, its track record in the north did not match that of the south especially in as 
far as its relationship with the civilian population was concerned. Ethnic retaliation 
motivated by bad past relations led soldiers to agitate violently against the Acholi people. 
This adversely affected its civil-military relations. It should be noted that during the Juba 
peace negotiations between the LRA and government of Uganda, the LRA team 
demanded that the NRM government stop using abusive language and “demeaning 
attitude designed to insult and demonise our people as an ethnic group and to sow seeds 
of hatred and disunity in the country”195. While some acts of violence may have been 
ignored, one major incident that triggered confrontation was the NRA’s 35th Battalion 
killing of innocent civilians in Namukora, Kitgum district in late 1986. This was followed 
by other incidents for example the Buchoro massacre where suspects detained in 
underground pit that was used as prison died of suffocation. These were not isolated 
incidents carried out by errant soldiers but were based and driven by negative perceptions 
that characterized the Amin and Obote regimes which pitted northerners against 
southerners but which crystallized more during the 1982-86 civil war.  
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In such a situation where certain groups of people hold negative views about others, then 
this will influence the way they treat those they perceive negatively as ‘internal 
outsiders’196 but yet from within the national boundaries. Although the earlier insurgent 
groups such as the UPDA and HAS were now defeated, continuation of the war by the 
LRA led to perceiving the Acholi people in the minds of southerners that these were 
people determined to cause trouble and therefore intensified the negative perceptions and 
stereotyping. In an army that is dominated by one ethnic group, this can be disastrous 
especially if it is deployed to subdue an insurrection dominated by members of the 
disliked group. It can also result in the deterioration of discipline within the army. 
This is supported by Acker when he aptly notes that, “--the report of the Porter 
Commission is revealing in its conclusion that there is a deep-seated indiscipline 
throughout the UPDF which requires further investigation and a full review of the 
capability, discipline and honesty of officers”197. But negative perception and stereotype 
is not a one-sided phenomenon. The belief among the northerners in general and the 
Acholi people in particular that the NRA/M is a Bantu government who have traumatized 
them for over two decades, have destroyed their source of survival and family fabric and 
therefore have no sympathy at all for them, makes them perceive the NRM government 
and its supporters as their enemy. Within this context, it is worth noting that ethnic 
stereotyping which often creates ethnic hierarchies and feelings of resentment and 
exclusion was not a preserve of the southerners under Museveni, but also the Acholi 
helped perpetuate the ideology by seeing the NRM as a force of Bantu speakers, and 
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therefore demonstrates how complex the relationship between ethnicity, power and 
conflict is.  
This interpretation of course seems to be based on ethno-regional sentiments and leaves 
out Kony who has exacted untold death and devastation on his own people by using 
brutal and horrific methods of punishment to any person perceived to be or in actual fact 
collaborating with government. Efforts by the government to resolve the conflict and 
improve its image and legitimacy remain tainted by this perception. Moreover, although 
it has shown that it is willing to listen as demonstrated by the peace negotiations, its 
policies and actions have continued to rely heavily on military option as a means to solve 
a political problem.  
It has also continued to send mixed signals of continuous blame and desire to end the 
rebellion but with little trust in peace initiatives. On the other side, the LRA remain 
unpredictable and adamant that the NRM is the problem and that as long as it continues 
to harbor ill feelings against the Acholi people there will be no peace in Acholiland. The 
two sides appear to behave the same by trying to project a negative image of their 
opponent in the minds of the people they supposedly purport to or represent through 
counter accusations and blame.  
The result of this is loss of confidence in government by the Acholi people who have 
suffered the brunt of the war and who want to see its conclusive end through peaceful 
means. These misperceptions indicate how ethnicity is used by different groups against 
one another in Uganda which results in inter-group disharmony and escalation of tension 
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resulting into conflict. For example, former army commander James Kazini is quoted to 
have said that, “if anything it is local Acholi soldiers causing the problems. It’s the 
cultural background of the people here. They are very violent. It is genetic”198.  
Second, inequality in development and its resultant effect of unequal access to 
opportunities for group emancipation and self-advancement has remained a crucial 
contributory factor to ethnic conflict in Uganda. Whereas the root cause of this can be 
traced to the colonial period whereby the policy of ‘compartmentalization’ of the 
protectorate meant that different areas were designated for specific purposes, the post 
independence Ugandan rulers never cared to address this imbalance. If anything, they 
nurtured it and in fact exacerbated it. Basic colonial infrastructure for example roads, 
schools, and hospitals were concentrated in the south a phenomena that has not changed 
much and which gives perceptions of relative deprivation among northern ethnic groups.  
Twenty four years of NRM’s rule makes it the longest government in power of all the 
governments that have ruled Uganda since independence. There is no doubt that its early 
reforms through the International Monitory Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) 
sponsored structural adjustment programmes reversed the economic decay, political 
quagmire and provided an environment conducive for development. Indeed this led to 
marked progress in development in social, economic and political aspects of the country. 
For example Obwona contends that Uganda has done a remarkable job in attracting 
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which has accelerated the country’s development 
especially in agriculture, forestry, fishing, manufacturing, construction and services199.  
He further notes that the banking and insurance industry have witnessed marked 
improvement and growth which has led to improvement in the socioeconomic lives of 
Ugandans. Although his argument is that foreign investment increases productivity and 
which increase is not completely appropriated by the investor, and that therefore other 
groups will have a share and thus benefit directly from the proceeds of this investment, 
the persistent increase in poverty has given rise to intense debate about the impact of this 
FDI. Furthermore, even if there has been progress in addressing the problem of poverty, 
there is unevenness in how the benefits are being shared. Levels of poverty in Uganda 
remain far higher and have fallen less rapidly in the northern and eastern regions of the 
country200.    
That the country has experienced growth and development in areas such as reconstruction 
of roads, health facilities and schools which has witnessed an increase in primary and 
secondary enrolment of students, reduction of poverty and general improvement of 
security and welfare under the NRM is no doubt. However it should be realized that this 
development has taken place in the central and south western parts of the country 
collectively referred to as the south and has not been extended to the north. Indeed as 
noted by Carson, “Development that has taken place in the south has not been 
experienced in the north. In fact social conditions and personal security have worsened in 
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a number of northern communities”201. Barkan makes the same observation by pointing 
out that although Uganda’s annual rate of economic growth was impressive from 1988 
through 1995 and having remained above 5%, the “figures suggest that Uganda’s 
economic “miracle” has benefited some ethnic groups far more than others, a fact that 
sows the seeds of potential conflict along ethno-regional lines”202.      
This situation is also observed by Tindifa when he points out that contrary to the World 
Bank statistics showing that poverty in Uganda dropped from 56% in 1992 to 35% in 
2000, it is not clear what growth rate Uganda has registered because there are conflicting 
statistical figures and says that, 
“Over the years, NRM has committed many policies, programs and projects to ending 
poverty. If only half of them delivered, some beggars in this country would be 
millionaires---.Towards the end of 1987, NRM launched the ERPs. By 1992, it was 
evident this program which included structural adjustment was responsible for a new 
wave of poverty. The program for alleviation of poverty and Social Cost of Adjustment 
(PAPSCA) followed by a multiplicity of policies and programs all targeting poverty, have 
since been launched. It is important to stress that there are two kinds of poor people in 
Uganda. There are those who are poor because they have never been rich and those who 
are poor because of the policies of the NRM, starting with the economic reform programs 
and other ill-conceived policies--”203.        
Arising out of this situation is the fact that many northerners dislike the NRM because 
they think it has deliberately ignored the horrible social and economic conditions that 
affect their communities. This perception of inequality in development and unequal 
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treatment has led to the calls for secession of northern Uganda from Uganda and to form 
a Nile Republic. For example in agitating for secession, Mao is quoted to have said that, 
“we are either full citizens, equal to others or non-citizens”204.       
In addition to the above, one of the major aspects of the movement ‘democracy’ upon 
assent to power in 1986 was the promise of establishing a ‘broad-based’ government 
where Ugandans from different ethnic groups and backgrounds were to be co-opted into 
political, economic and military in order to reflect a national character, ethnic integration 
and legitimacy of the NRM. It was a mechanism through which the wounds of the past 
would be healed in the sense that every Ugandan would be brought on board in order to 
forge unity that has eluded past regimes, resulting into interethnic tensions and conflict. 
However, twenty four years down the road, NRM’s performance and track record of 
building national consensus can be described as ambiguous at best and sectarian at worst.  
Third, equal representation in the armed forces is a crucial factor for ethnic groups to 
have equal status, cohesion and feeling of belonging to an institution. Of major 
importance in this respect is the composition of officer corps and the offices they hold 
measured by ethno-regional distribution, ranks and power in the decision-making bodies 
of the army.  Prior to 1986, the top echelon was made up of officer corps from the north. 
In 1986 this equation changed and the army became a western-led Bantu-speaking. This 
development served to simultaneously ethnicise the army which now became 
predominantly western, thus legitimizing the instrumental nexus of ethnicity and 
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resuscitating to the surface of political discourse the already severe cultural and ethnic 
divide between the north and the south.  
It is against this background that the negotiating team of the LRA in Juba talks demanded 
that the national army reflect a national character by saying that, “the present army does 
not reflect a national character. It is ethnic, partisan and pledges its loyalty to president 
Museveni personally and not to the nation. We demand its total disbandment so that--
recruitment is done taking into account regional balance and integration of those in the 
LRA and other armed opposition”205.  As a result of this, a clause regarding proportional 
representation in the armed forces and other security agencies was included in the 
Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the government of Uganda and the 
LRA/M206.    
Although some soldiers of the defeated UNLA and former fighting groups were 
integrated in the UPDF, the overall composition remained heavily biased in favour of the 
Bantu-speaking ethnic group. For example the top echelon of the UPDF is predominantly 
made up of officers from the Banyankole ethnic group while the northerners are 
underrepresented. Furthermore, a close examination of this category shows that majority 
of the officers come from a small Bahima sub-group of the Banyankole ethnic group207. 
For example, out of 23 senior army positions from Commander-in-chief to Division 
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Commanders, the north hold only 2, the east has none, while the west and central have 17 
and four respectively208.    
Indeed as this MP says, “the army and other security organs are in the hands of one ethnic 
group, the Banyankole and everybody in Uganda knows this. The few officers from other 
regions for example Acholi, Arua, and Teso are there to make the UPDF look as if there 
is representivity. They do not have a voice or influence. Their ranks and position are 
more symbolic than wielding authority”209. Moreover, the soldiers of the LRA who 
denounced rebellion under the Amnesty Act and were integrated in the UPDF remained 
insignificant in terms of promotion, position in the army and further training.  Senior 
officers like Brigadier Sam Banya and Sam Kolo have neither been promoted nor is their 
position in the army clear.  
For example Kolo, the former LRA chief spokesman who surrendered to the UPDF in 
February 2005 is now the NRM vice-chairman for the veterans’ league in Nwoya district. 
This may not only indicate in the minds of northerners in general and Acholi in particular 
that even if they denounced rebellion and are integrated in the army they will not have 
any influence but also inability to fulfill the aspirations of what they were fighting for. 
The war against the LRA therefore reflects how the ethnic factor has been a major factor 
both in defining the challenge against the NRM as well as shaping Ugandan security 
forces. As a matter of fact, “Museveni saw not just the LRA, but the Acholi as the enemy; 
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LRA was only the armed wing of resistance”210, thus casting the political rivalry in ethnic 
terms.   
Fourth, the belief that the war can be brought to an end by military force led to it being 
politicized, that is, its use for purposes of mobilizing support in a political context where 
Acholi political identity came to be inextricably tied to the wrong deeds of the northern-
led military junta and by the NRM projecting it in the minds of Ugandans especially 
southerners that these “abatemu”211 (the killers) were trying to come back to power.  In 
this way, the leadership of the NRM uses the war in the north as a strategy for 
maintaining a political constituency by telling the bulk of its support who are in the south 
that if it was not because of its capacity to fight the rebels, the people from the north 
would come back.  
Within this context, Museveni presents himself as the ‘protector’ the bridge between the 
north and the south and that if this bridge is removed he will no longer be relevant to the 
south. This shows that the use of force and ethnicity has remained a centrifugal force and 
largely defines political participation in Uganda, which has not only served to heighten 
suspicion and mistrust among ethnic groups but also makes political engagement a zero-
sum phenomenon. The war in Acholiland has become a key campaign issue for Museveni 
and his ruling NRM especially at political rallies. For example he often tells his listeners 
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that the war is now over and the opposition “have no lies” to tell the voters, yet the fact of 
the matter is that the war has not really ended; it is only the theatre that has shifted212.  
That the UPDF continues to pursue and fight the LRA in far away territories from the 
Ugandan border for example in Central African Republic (CAR)213 since it entered the 
country in early 2009 is testimony to the continued reliance on military force rather than 
peaceful means to resolve the problem. It should be noted that the military option has 
failed to defeat the LRA. Indeed as pointed out by Egeland, “Twenty years of LRA terror 
should have taught us that there is no pure military solution. That was tried repeatedly in 
the years before the Juba peace effort”214, and failed. A number of military offensives 
conducted by the UPDF and aimed at destroying the LRA have not only ended in failure 
but also led to increased attacks on civilians more than ever before.  
These offensives include for example, Operation North in 1991, Operation Iron Fist in 
2002 and Operation Lightening Thunder in 2008 all of which failed to achieve their 
objective of destroying the LRA. The objective has since then shifted and seems to be 
aimed at weakening the LRA and destroying its command structure, which also 
inevitably seem to be failing as it has increased its brutal retaliatory attacks on civilians in 
CAR, DRC and parts of southern Sudan. Although the years from 1986 to 2006 and 
onwards marked a progressive decline of the Acholi as a political force, their identity and 
resolve to have an impact and influence on Uganda’s politics did not diminish. Instead 
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their identity became galvanized and strengthened by feelings of betrayal, oppression and 
resentment at the prospect of continuing to be marginalized and deprived of their basic 
rights by a regime whose actions they perceived to be motivated and driven by ethnic 
revenge and humiliation.  
Despite continuation of hostilities between the two sides, the Acholi clergy through the 
ARLPI continues to urge the NRM government to resume peace talks with the LRA. In a 
petition to the United States of America government, the religious leaders argue that they 
have spent a significant time dealing with the LRA conflict and therefore have a greater 
understanding of its implications in the Great Lakes Region215. In addition to this, that the 
Acholis who suffered the brunt of the war, many of them former IDPs are willing to 
forgive the perpetrators including Kony as Achan who does not know the fate of her two 
sons that were kidnapped in 1995 says,  
“We know the LRA killed our people and destroyed our families but so did the 
government soldiers. We also know that we Acholis have been targeted by the NRM 
because we are disliked by Museveni. Continuing to fight Kony will not bring peace and 
will not solve the problems we are facing for example we do not know whether some of 
our sons and daughters are dead or alive. All that we want is forgiveness so that the war 
can end, our people come home and we enjoy long-lasting peace”216, indicating not only 
how ordinary Acholis think they have been attacked on the basis of ethnicity but also the 
ineffectiveness of force to end the war.   
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Conclusion: 
This chapter has demonstrated that ethnicity in Uganda has been a major theme around 
which mobilization for political support and access to public resources has been 
conducted. It has also shown that mobilization for support based on ethno-regional, 
religious and linguistic appeal lies at the heart of ethnic conflict in Uganda since 
independence in 1962. Post-independence Ugandan rulers have used ethnicity to pit one 
group against the other which creates feelings of relative deprivation and resentment, 
feeding into frustration and anger thus making the potential to resort to violence by the 
ethnic group suffering deprivation to be high.  
This is because in such a situation exercise of power is based on ethnic affiliation leading 
to one ethnic group dominating others. On the other hand, distribution of scarce resources 
and access to public goods is made in such a way that they disproportionately benefit 
members of the ruling ethnic group through patron-clientalism that is directed by 
selective access to state offices and favours. Because of this ethnic domination and as 
economic survival and social emancipation of particular ethnic groups become 
increasingly difficult to realize, violence directed at incumbent regimes gradually take 
shape. 
 The disliked ethnic group that is deposed from power then becomes the target of attack 
and reprisal because on one hand, it is blamed for the wrongs that took place during the 
period it was in power, as well as being perceived to have benefitted at the expense of 
others on the other hand. In addition to this, because the two parties were at one time 
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involved in a war, the hostilities and bad blood memories which tend to remain 
submerged and persist longer are often exploited by the rulers of the ethnic group in 
power to exact revenge and retribution against the members of the deposed ethnic group.    
The conflict in Acholiland reflects this scenario. After deposing the Acholi-led Military 
Junta in February 1986, the NRA/M’s policies towards the northerners in general and the 
Acholi in particular especially in as far as military operations and ‘pacification’ of 
Acholiland was concerned, aroused their ethnic consciousness and belief that they were 
not only relegated to secondary citizens but also considered ‘genetically’ violent. They 
were also explicitly accused of being rebellious as well as collaborating with the rebels 
and supporting the uprising. In the words of a UPDF officer, “their military and political 
capability had to be destroyed”217.  
The chapter has thus shown that the violent ethnic conflict between the LRA and the 
NRM government is clearly indicative of how ethnicity has assumed greater salience in 
the competition for economic resources and political power. As Berman218 points out, 
ethnicity in modern Africa is derived from and profoundly influenced by the forces of 
colonialism, which assigned roles and identity to different ethnic groups, an argument 
supported by Nederveen219. Though this being the case, the NRM has not transcended the 
regional, religious and ethnic legacy and maneuvers of the colonial and post-colonial 
dispensation, but has rather entrenched and intensified them.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Regional Dynamics, Social and Power relations under the NRM rule: The Northern 
Question 
Introduction 
Ethnic conflict wreaks havoc and cause enormous suffering to the people in areas where 
it takes place. To understand the actions of the rebels, the nature of the violence and how 
it is ethnically-directed, we must understand not only the contextual and social relations 
that produce their leaders but also the actions and responses of the state. That the NRA/M 
pursues negotiations and the military solution as a means of ending the northern conflict, 
but prefers the latter is obvious enough. However, the military strategy has proved that it 
is unlikely ever to defeat the LRA. It has instead led to the relocation of the theatre of war 
outside the Ugandan territory, more violence, continuous distrust and suspicion and thus 
making the possibility of achieving national reconciliation between the north and the 
south not only difficult but unlikely.  
On the other hand, although the LRA’s desire for genuine negotiations appears minimal, 
the government’s track record shows that it has rarely acted in good faith in its efforts to 
address the northern grievances. The argument is that ‘violence begets violence’ since 
failure or inability to resolve the underlying causes is likely to continue generating ethnic 
resentment that will make the conflict to endure. The reaction of the international 
community is also of salience in order to understand the predicament of the people in 
northern Uganda in general and the Acholi in particular. This chapter examines the 
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international and state response to the insurgency in the north and how this has impacted 
on the ethnicity and regional ramifications of the LRA. It also presents the perceptions of 
different people but especially the Acholi, who have been the victims of the war and its 
impact on their lives. 
State response to the insurgency in the north: The military strategy and escalation 
of ethnic hostilities (1987-1991) 
When the LRA/M emerged in northern Uganda in 1986, the NRA/M appeared not to be 
bothered about its consequences and implications on the fragile security situation in the 
area and its impact on the geo-political dynamics in the region and beyond.  It was 
perceived as another act of banditry of the Acholi people that was not different from the 
previous ones. In actual fact it was taken to be an internal matter that had to be solved by 
Uganda under the domestic law and mechanisms. The initial response was therefore a 
military one in which more NRA soldiers were mobilized and deployed in northern 
Uganda and especially in Acholiland.  
This was mainly because of Museveni’s strong belief in the use of force to solve political 
problems and conviction that a guerrilla force devoid of support from the population 
cannot survive. As such it can be argued that Museveni never thought of and entertained 
the idea of negotiations. Indeed as pointed out by Branch,  
“Museveni’s conviction of the NRA’s political impeccability and the rebels’ bankruptcy, 
both proven in Luwero, led him to announce that because no guerrilla group without 
support from the population can survive, the NRA would necessarily and quickly defeat 
the UPDA. Therefore, negotiations were also out of question. A deputy minister of local 
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government, Kahinda Otafire, asked rhetorically in 1986, “--who are those people, what 
are they fighting for and what are we going to discuss with them?”220    
But this was self defeating because experience should have taught him that he covertly 
and overtly negotiated with those he denigrated and castigated as political criminals 
without any agenda. In his mind, the NRA would defeat the LRA.     
Since it had defeated the previous rebel groups of UPDA/M and HSA/M mainly through 
military force, although it entered into negotiations with the UPDA, it can be argued that 
the NRA was sure of military victory over the LRA although this is debatable. However, 
there are two dimensions of the strategy of force that have to be taken into account 
because they intensified and influenced ethnic hostilities, suspicion and distrust between 
the Acholi and the NRM government. First, the NRA was predominantly made up of the 
Banyankole ethnic group from the south, which not long ago had forcefully driven the 
Acholi people out of power and had also defeated two Acholi rebel groups in which 
many people died. Continuous fighting would mean more misery and suffering.  
Second, this tended to erode any prospects for peaceful settlement of their grievances 
because the NRA/M did not have a credible track record of negotiations. Memories of 
‘betrayal’ at the Nairobi peace talks of 1985 and failure to bring every member of 
UPDA/M on board during the 1988 peace negotiations were still fresh in their minds. 
Their fears were increased by the fact that the military officers of the former rebel UPDA 
who were integrated into the NRA after signing the peace agreement were soon after 
arrested and charged with treason. Some of these officers died in prison, others 
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disappeared mysteriously while yet others for example Major Mike Kilama was shot and 
killed by the NRA while reportedly trying to escape221.  
Soon after the war started, the NRA used scorched-earth methods during operations 
against the rebels for example “kandoya” or “three piece” a method in which the victims 
arms are tied behind his back together with the feet thus tightly exposing the chest and 
made to roll like a ball during operations, which restricts the flow of blood and which 
often led to death. Other gross abuses for example rape, arbitrary arrests, plunder and 
confiscation of livestock were also committed. The news of these abuses and 
mistreatment traveled first and reached many Acholis and reminded them of the same 
situation during the war with UPDA and HSA. In these circumstances, even those who 
may not have supported the rebellion because the LRA seemed devoid of an articulate 
political agenda had no choice.  
It is under this context that it enjoyed the support of the local community at the start of its 
armed campaign, which support seemed to emanate from the perception that the NRA 
was revenging against them and therefore it was necessary to fight it222. But such support 
for the rebellion only served to make them vulnerable because the NRM tended to 
perceive it in terms of collective guilt. With the attack by the NRA growing, the Acholi 
people became isolated and alienated from government, moreover whose duty is to 
provide security to the people. This did not only increase the discontent against the 
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government but also escalated the war to the neighboring districts of Acholiland for 
example Lango and Teso.  
The military strategy previously thought to be a quick solution was to be proved wrong as 
the war intensified. What was seen as a localized insurgency that would be defeated in a 
short time became protracted. After ten years of fighting from 1987 to 1996, it became 
increasingly clear that the war was going to take longer. According to ‘Ladit’ Omona, 
“right from the war with the UPDA to HSA the Acholi people looked at the war as 
between the westerners versus northerners and you could see it from the way the army 
was behaving because they never cared about the thousands of people who were dying. In 
almost all cases whenever the fighting took place, there were few prisoners of war. The 
whole Acholi community was bleeding”223.   
Although the military strategy became a disaster in terms of increasing casualty numbers 
especially civilians, it continued unabated. This catastrophic nature was even 
acknowledged by Egland when he said that “I cannot find any other part of the world that 
is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda which is getting so little attention”, and 
described it as “the world’s worst humanitarian disaster and the least known”224. In the 
meantime the government was faced with the challenge of convincing the Acholi people 
that they should not support the rebels because this would deny them an important 
constituency and support base and therefore weaken their fighting capability. One of the 
methods devised by government was to create Para-military local defence units within the 
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community known as ‘Home guards’ and ‘Arrow Brigades’. Although overtime more 
than five thousand pro-government militias were recruited and armed with guns, many 
remained armed with whatever they could use including bows and arrows, spears, 
machetes and axes.  
In some cases they were instructed to use drums and whistles to make noise once they 
cited the rebels as a way of quick communication and alerting the NRA in order to make 
a quick response. Ironically this did not improve the security situation as the army would 
always arrive at the scene long after the rebels have committed atrocities and left. As 
pointed out by Rodriguez, “What puzzles me is that for so many months all you hear 
from the military is that they are winning the war, scoring many victories, making 
progress, but why is that progress not translating into improvement of security of people 
on the ground? There is no single road that is safe here and the abductions are 
continuing”225.  
On the other hand, what we see here is the dimension of manipulation of ethnicity come 
into play, but in this case turning the Acholis against fellow Acholis. The point being 
emphasized is that although the intention of this local defence mechanism was to make 
the people defend themselves against the LRA attacks, it was in actual sense pitting the 
poorly armed Acholi civilians against the rebels who in most cases were better armed 
than them. This manipulation of ethnicity proved successful for the NRA in the sense that 
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it made the Acholi people fight the LRA in what was seen as a shift in loyalty from the 
LRA to NRA, which enabled the latter to fight the rebels from two fronts, the civilian 
population and the government side. But it can also be argued that rather than 
government defending the victims of the war, it instead used these very victims to defend 
themselves thus demonstrating that it had failed in its constitutional duty of defending the 
people.  
However, this infuriated Kony and the people had to pay a heavy price as he considered it 
as a betrayal, moreover from his own people, a behaviour that was unacceptable. The 
result was that the rebels turned their wrath against their own people. In a situation of this 
kind, the people got inextricably entangled and caught up in the war between the 
government and its methods on one hand and the LRA and its retribution on the other. 
The army would for example instruct people to leave the villages and go to trading 
centres in order to isolate the rebels so that it can fight them easily, warning that anybody 
remaining behind would be treated as a rebel, but the rebels also often gave similar 
threats and instructions to people to move back and deep into the villages and bushes.  
As this old man says,  
“We were woken up one morning by government soldiers who had surrounded our 
village and started beating us accusing us that we were rebel collaborators. They 
ordered us to move and stay together at a nearby school which was deserted and never to 
go back to the village saying they would give us protection. Two days later the rebels 
came and threatened to kill us and instructed us to run to the bush and never to listen to 
the government soldiers. They took six boys and girls with them”226.  
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In addition to this, some people who were given arms by government were former rebels 
who surrendered and returned home. They used the guns to score differences with rivals 
which increased insecurity in the region. This made the situation complex as it increased 
the rate of death and it was difficult to know the killers and bring them to justice. 
Although vetting and screening exercises were conducted before handing out guns, they 
were not watertight as criminals easily surmounted them. Many disappeared with the 
guns while others hid them and claimed they were lost during the LRA attacks.  
Information received from one interviewee in Gulu and a former combatant of the LRA 
revealed that many guns remain accessible while others are still buried underground in 
Acholiland to date. Asked why this is so he said, 
“A gun is very useful. It can protect you and it can be a source of living by giving you 
what you want but you must be extremely careful. During the war many guns were buried 
underground. For me I don’t have one but I know friends of mine who buried them and I 
suspect they use them because they look better off yet they don’t work anywhere to earn 
money. This situation of poverty can force you to do anything. Also many of my friends 
believe war is likely erupt anytime again because Museveni cannot be trusted and should 
this happen people will find it easier to join with their guns. This is because during the 
war if you came with you gun you would be treated well and become an officer”227.  
Despite the disarmament efforts, local leaders and security personnel believe many of 
those who received guns disappeared with them and are using them to commit crimes. 
The spate of killings is worrisome as many former IDPs who returned home had to flee 
their villages because of gunmen who attack them a factor that makes them scared 
thinking the LRA is back228. In 2005, the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) 
appointed a team to educate communities about the misuse of fire arms. During the 
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exercise, it was discovered that there were a lot of illegal arms in the region. Many of 
these were in the hands of the former LRA fighters as many buried them in case they 
needed them again. It was further reported that some of them were even buried in coffins 
in order to protect them from rusting229.        
Paradoxically, the government remained skeptical that the people had stopped supporting 
the LRA. In fact the NRA commanders and government officials accused them of being 
double dealers by giving the rebels logistical support in terms of food, money, sanctuary 
and also information while purporting to be fighting them. In support of this allegation, 
Betty Akech the minister of state for security and herself an Acholi said that, 
“There are people who are benefiting from the war; shopkeepers, drug dealers, 
transporters and several others. We also know that there are children who give up 
rebellion and come back home but there are instances where their families send them 
back. There was a girl who came back with about three million Uganda shillings and 
said she was tired of the war”230.  
In her message of ‘dwong paco’- return home to the rebels, and in one of her visits to the 
Pagak IDPs camp in Gulu district, she said that there were collaborators living in the 
camps within the rest of the innocent people and that the LRA was coming in the area 
and hidden by members of the community until about 6.00 pm when they would open 
fire231.  Although it is difficult to tell whether the people thought this accusation even 
from one of their own was made in good faith and honestly or whether they took it 
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seriously, it apparently became evident that it generated bad blood within the community 
especially from those whose children were abducted to know that some members of their 
ethnic group with whom they were staying were responsible for these horrendous acts 
and suffering. This added another dimension of ethnic hostility by transforming it into a 
conflict among the Acholi themselves. 
The “Operation North”, brutality and escalation of the conflict, (Mach 1991 
onwards): 
In March 1991 the UPDF launched a military offensive codenamed ‘Operation North’ 
under the command of General Tinyefuza who was dubbed “Swarzcopf of the north” 
because of his ruthlessness. The objective of this offensive was to defeat the LRA by 
destroying its bases once and for all. Although it had a considerable impact on the rebels 
by weakening their fighting capability, the manner in which it was conducted generated 
resentment against the army and the government. Rather than employing confidence 
building measures such as treating ordinary people humanely which would have brought 
them to the side of government, the manner in which they were treated demonstrated that 
Uganda was a country divided between the north and the south. His ruthless brutality 
conduct of the operation failed to differentiate between the rebels and the ordinary 
people, a factor that alienated many civilians from the NRM government in general and 
NRA in particular.   
In fact if anything, it served to remind the people in the north that the past wounds were 
not about to heal and that reconciliation with the NRM government was still a far dream. 
Movement of people to the north was cut off at Karuma Bridge save for those coming out 
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of the region, but even these were subjected to rigorous thorough search and scrutiny by 
the security forces. An information black-out was also imposed on the region. Karuma 
Bridge is situated along the River Nile and symbolically represents a geographical 
location separating the northern from southern Uganda. During the offensive, blanket 
cordon and search operations were carried out with an objective of identifying the rebels. 
In some cases people were herded into stadiums and open grounds purportedly to identify 
rebel collaborators.  
Reports emanating from this operation indicated that there were arbitrary arrests, 
detention, torture and humiliation. In many instances, people had to stay for long hours 
and sometimes days waiting for clearance from military authorities, moreover in an 
environment without food, water, shelter or sanitation. Despite widespread outcry from 
civil society organizations about this situation, government neither expressed apology nor 
distanced itself from the brutal methods employed. This is not to suggest that it was the 
official policy or that it may have endorsed the torture and brutal conduct of the army, but 
in the absence of practical steps to stop arbitrary detention and torture and hold those 
responsible to account, it can be argued that it approved the way the operation was 
conducted and the subsequent treatment of the people of the north. Moreover, in an 
attempt to respond to the these allegations, the army spokesman said that whatever 
Tinyefuza did was not on his own but under the command of his superiors including the 
Commander-in-chief, the president himself thus totally indicating that Museveni was 
aware of what was taking place 
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This situation coupled with the previous conduct of the NRA from 1986 when it entered 
northern Uganda and launched operations in which many northerners were arbitrarily 
arrested and tortured which led to death and destruction of property, deepened the anger 
and feelings of hatred by the northern ethnic groups, in particular the Acholi against the 
southerners, especially the Banyankole, the tribe of Museveni thus exacerbating the 
north-south divide. As Opodo says,  
“People did not like the rebels because of the atrocities they were committing and were 
ready to assist the army with information about the LRA if it had conducted the operation 
in a humanitarian manner. But because of the dehumanizing methods used such as 
torture and beatings, they hated it. They perceived the brutality meted on them as 
deliberate because of their ethnicity given the fact that they were northerners. My simsim 
(sesame) worth five million Uganda shillings was destroyed by rain after soldiers after 
spilling it on the ground by soldiers on claim that they were searching for hidden guns. 
For the first time, I proved that we northerners belong to a different Uganda and are 
hated by the NRM”232.   
Prominent politicians like Otema Alimadi were ordered to leave the northern region 
within 48 hours, failure of which they would be arrested and charged with sabotaging the 
operation.   This operation which was commonly referred to as “operation simsim”233 
because of the notoriety of soldiers to destroy this staple food also witnessed the arrest 
and torture of Ogenga Latigo, Omara Atubo, and Zachary Olum, politicians hailing from 
the north who happened to be in the region  and who were later flown to Kampala to be 
tried on treason charges. They later won the case through court. In the eyes of the 
northerners and particularly the Acholi people, this was not only an act of disrespect for 
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their elders who were also their leaders, but also a deliberate humiliation that indicated to 
them that nobody was safe, hence widening the north-south divide.  
In relation to this mistreatment, Atubo, is quoted to have said that,   
“We were arrested and beaten badly in 1991 before Tinyefuza because he had convinced 
Museveni that we were sabotaging the war (military operation) in the north. But what we 
really disagreed with was the scorched-earth method that Tinyefuza and government 
were using against our people in the north. This was very absurd”234.   
Questions as to why the army did not pursue and defeat the rebels towards the end of this 
offensive when they appeared significantly weakened and when it had the chance to do so 
remain an issue among the Acholi especially in as far as there is repeated accusation that 
the NRM prefers continuation of the war in order to project them as rebellious and also to 
continue cracking down on those challenging its legitimacy because of the failure or 
inability to address the socioeconomic and political imbalance between the north and the 
south. As long as the underlying structural causes of the conflict are not addressed, this 
perception among the ethnic groups in the north in general and the Acholi in particular is 
likely to continue generating discontent and frustration, thus making them to feel 
besieged by the post-1986 politics of heaping collective blame and guilt for all the 
historical wrongs upon them which will continue fueling ethnic hatred235.   
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Critics of the NRM government point at a number of reasons for the failure of the 
military offensives against the LRA. First, they argue that economic interests rather than 
strategic operational weaknesses account for the failure. Within this reasoning, they argue 
that the commanders’ interest is in continuous access of operational allowances236 rather 
than ending the war. This means that if they end the war, they will not be able to get this 
money. Second, they argue that the war provides a convenient justification for the non-
transparent defence expenditure237 which is used for patronage purposes. Consequently, 
the government is more comfortable with a low-level intensity conflict rather than ending 
it.   
Following the failure of this offensive to achieve its objective of destroying the LRA, the 
rebels retreated and crossed into Sudan, thus adding an international dimension to the 
conflict. Arising out of this retreat, Acholiland experienced a period of relative calm for 
almost two years. However, towards the end of 1993, the rebels made a violent come 
back directing their attacks on soft targets especially the civilian population, killing, 
maiming and abducting many of them. They also attacked civilian vehicles on roads, 
relief and military convoys. In 1997 for example, the rebels hacked to death over 412 
men, women and children in Lokung and Palabek areas in north western Kitgum district, 
forcing thousands to flee their villages238.  
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The Amnesty Act 2000, denunciation of rebellion and exposure to violence:  
Faced with increasing pressure from the civil society organizations to encourage and 
persuade the rebels to denounce rebellion, the government in January 2000 passed the 
Amnesty Act. An Amnesty Commission was established and its members were appointed 
in June 2000. Under this Act which was extended to all fighting groups, rebels who laid 
down arms and surrendered to government would be forgiven of their wrongdoing during 
the rebellion. In addition to this, “amnesty packages” comprising of cash and resettlement 
implements such as iron sheets, seeds, hoes, machetes, etc would be handed out to assist 
returnees to resettle back into the communities. Following the enactment of this 
legislation, many rebels responded positively and opted to give up fighting. In fact by 
2004, over 5,000 fighters applied for amnesty by denounced rebellion and decided to 
come out of the bush239. Many of these fighters reported to district authorities or 
surrendered to the UPDF and were allowed to rejoin their communities without going 
through the amnesty Comission or formally being given amnesty. 
However the Act did not cover the leadership of the LRA. Government refused to extend 
the Amnesty to Kony and his top lieutenants on claim that they mislead their followers 
and that they were therefore responsible for the atrocities committed, for which they had 
to be held accountable. Consequently, rather than curtail the violence, it instead 
exacerbated it. Critics of government point at a number of factors which led to increased 
violence. First, they point at the manner in which it was conducted. Their argument is that 
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whereas the use of the local media the Mega FM radio station to explain the Amnesty Act 
through the local Acholi language may not have been a problem, it explicitly encouraged 
defection from the LRA. Under this move, fighters who surrendered were called in to 
appeal and persuade their colleagues they left behind. This infuriated the leadership of the 
LRA who not only instructed their fighters not to listen to the radio but also threatened to 
punish severely anybody suspected of trying to surrender to government. It thus put many 
people in the line of fire by the rebels. 
Second, the ‘special treatment’ accorded to the LRA returnees after surrendering make 
ordinary people resentful especially because of the financial and material benefits they 
receive from government. The argument is that by providing them with material Amnesty 
package government is perceived as if it is rewarding people who committed atrocities. In 
addition to this, although they are members of one ethnic group and whether or not the 
atrocities committed were inadvertently or under duress, they still carry the tag of 
perpetrators until cleansing rituals are performed and forgiven by the victims. As Ladit 
Obwoya says, 
“While the law helped to entice many rebels to come out of the bush, at the same time it 
created resentment among the people who suffered at the hands of these returnees. 
Ironically it appeared as if the perpetrators were being reworded. The material things the 
government gave them were not accessible by other people and this did not please them. 
Moreover many of them were known by their victims within the community with whom 
they had lived together in the same villages and whose children were abducted or had 
witnessed friends or members of their families killed by these very people. So, whereas 
people wanted to forgive in the interest of society and in order to bring the war to an end, 
the preferential treatment accorded to returnees brought emotions to the surface in many 
instances and sometimes led to hostile outbursts and stigmatization by the victims. Many 
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were threatened with revenge and had to relocate in towns and trading centres. They thus 
faced threat from both, Kony and the victims”240. 
But such complaints of injustice were not only made by the victims but even among the 
rebel combatants especially the lower echelon. This is because of the way government 
treated commanders as compared to other combatants. As a result of this, returnees “--
frequently complained of the injustices meted out by proponents of the ‘culture of 
forgiveness’, citing government-sponsored preferential treatment given to demobilized 
senior commanders in contrast to the stigma and poverty faced by returning former 
wives, foot-soldiers and other formerly-abducted persons”241.        
The threat which included death was also extended to all those who responded to the 
appeal and defected. From the year 2000 onwards, the rebels intensified attacks in all 
areas of Acholiland and extended into neighboring districts as a retaliation against the 
Amnesty law and to punish those who defected as well as to discourage those intending 
to do so by showing what would happen to them and their families. A series of attacks 
were carried out in which many people were brutally killed. Many of these incidents have 
been documented by international and local humanitarian organizations, but suffice to 
mention few examples here. Human Rights Watch and UNICEF for example reported 
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that between June 2002 and May 2003, over 8,400 children were abducted by the LRA, a 
sharp rise from 2001242.  
These series of attacks continued relentlessly. In June 2003, dozens of people were killed 
using clubs in Lira district and 40 children abducted. On 17th May 2004 the LRA attacked 
Pagak IDPs camp 18 kilometres north of Gulu town and killed dozens of people, burnt 
down houses and abducted others and forced them to carry the food and other items 
looted from the camp. On 16th May 2004 the rebels attacked Lukodi camp located 12 
kilometres away from Gulu town, killed 49 people, burnt down the houses and forced 
thousands to flee. Some of the abducted people especially mothers were killed by 
smashing their heads with blunt objects and their bodies left along the route simply 
because their children were making noise. 
The “Operation Iron Fist” and Intensification of hostilities (March to September 
2002): 
In March 2002, the UPDF launched a military offensive codenamed Operation Iron Fist 
(OIF) aimed at destroying the LRA bases in Sudan with the consent of the Sudan 
government. The UPDF declared that this time around it was prepared to defeat Kony 
and that the LRA would be history. General Kazini, the Division Commander based in 
Gulu is quoted to have promised that “if he couldn’t deliver LRA Joseph Kony’s head by 
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December, he would quit”243 the army. But this was not the first time such promises were 
being made. They had been made before, deadlines set and the LRA declared a foregone 
case only to be proved wrong as the rebels would emerge with more brutality than before. 
The offensive which was supposed to last three months (March to May 2002) according 
to the protocol signed between the Sudan government and the GoU was extended for 
another three months (June to September 2002)244.  Many young Acholi boys, former 
abducted persons and men were forcefully recruited by the UPDF and deployed in the 
front lines as field guides, reconnaissance scouts as well as fighters which led many of 
them to be killed, a factor that angered the Acholi people as they perceived the 
government to be sacrificing their people.   
It is therefore not surprising that in the wake of this offensive, the LRA re-entered 
northern Uganda, split into smaller groups that made it difficult for the UPDF to hunt 
down and conducted violent brutal attacks against civilians especially in the IDPs camps 
despite the UPDF’s claim that it had destroyed its fighting capability and was therefore 
winning the war. In actual fact the offensive failed to achieve its stated objective of 
destroying the rebels, ending the attacks on civilians as well as rescuing the abducted 
children. It should also be realized that the failure of the military solution is not only that 
it failed to end the war but rather entrenched the war and cleavages with each failed 
offensive. In short, it led to hardened attitudes, more abductions, deaths and miming and 
destruction of property, the brunt of which was directed at and borne by the Acholi 
ordinary people. .               
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For example on 5th August 2002 the rebels attacked the Acholi-pii IDPs camp and killed 
over 60 people245, wounded many others and forced thousands of Madi and the Dinka 
ethnic groups who had fled from Sudan because of the escalation of fighting between the 
SPLA and the Sudan government and settled in camps close to the Sudan-Uganda border 
as well as inside Uganda to flee and scatter. The escalation of the conflict and brutal 
attacks against Acholi civilian continued unabated and in actual fact increased both in 
magnitude and speed. Horrific graphic pictures of people with noses and limbs cut off, 
decomposing bodies of men and women burnt in their huts and in other cases, pictures 
showing cooking pots with human parts sent shock waves around the world. Kony had 
turned against the very people he said he was fighting for.  
Whereas an attempt to give reasons as to why the LRA brutally attacked its very people 
who not only comprised its principal support constituency, but perhaps even potential 
future support has been made by some researchers and political observers, there is still 
need for more probing as Kony’s behaviour really defeats conventional wisdom and 
reasoning. Within this context, it is important to ask the following questions. First, 
besides some Acholis changing sides and ‘supporting’ the government while others were 
given arms and joined in the fight against the rebels which seems to have infuriated 
Kony, what is that can explain the scale of the LRA’s brutality against its own (Acholi) 
people? In other words, what is it that can account for the radicalization of the LRA 
during the long-lasting conflict?  Has the movement metamorphosed over the years into 
something different from the original LRA?  Has this metamorphosis or change, if at all 
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any, made brutality against everyone in Uganda and the region acceptable and legitimate 
in the internal LRA psychology and dynamics?  
These and perhaps other questions are likely to continue posing a challenge to anyone 
wishing to study and understand the behaviour and motives of the leaders of the LRA in 
as far as obsession with the killing, especially of its own people is concerned. One thing 
that seems to be clear is that Kony was and continues to be infuriated by the lack of 
support of his own people whom he thinks abandoned him when he needed them most, 
coupled with the condemnation of his actions by the Acholi elders, especially the killing 
of innocent people and abduction of children to be used as sex slaves and killing 
machines.   
Various reasons have been put forward by the UPDF as to why this offensive did not 
achieve its objective despite the huge and superior military arsenal, logistical support 
including manpower at its disposal. The reasons range from for example claims that the 
government of Sudan gives sanctuary and logistical support to the LRA, bad roads thus 
hampering effective movement of the army, lack of morale and confidence, to 
underfunding of the defence budget and corruption in the army. However, while these 
reasons have been widely written about in the lacuna about the war between the LRA and 
the Uganda government, one factor that seems to have attracted little attention is that of 
ethnicity in the UPDF and auxiliary paramilitary forces.  
Moreover, the argument that the army lacked confidence and morale does not gain 
credence especially given the fact that the Commander-in-chief who is the president has 
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been physically involved in overseeing these operations. In fact during this operation, 
“Museveni was encamped in Gulu and then Soroti in order to oversee the operation 
himself”246. Despite his presence and the UPDF’s concerted effort, the war escalated into 
the neighboring districts of Teso in the east and Karamoja in north eastern Uganda 
displacing over 240,000 people247. It is therefore important to probe more deeply into the 
dynamics of ethnicity and how it has been used to influence and shape the configuration 
of the UPDF and its role in triggering conflict or influencing its course and its impact on 
dissident-military relations.  
The argument I am trying to present here is that failure or inability to address ethnic 
imbalance in the composition of the security forces especially the army, often motivates 
the dominant ethnic group to think of the army and the state as exclusively in its 
ownership and this has a negative impact on internal cohesion, command, civil-military 
relations and success in countering aggression in multi-ethnic societies. The dire 
consequences of this impact manifest both at the strategic planning and execution level. 
This ethnic imbalance often creates the tendency to deny the weaker ethnic groups to 
have an equal say in the security matters of the country.  
Their ideas, suggestions and advice are often ignored no matter what strategic salience 
they may bring on board in trying to solve a nascent security situation, as the nervous 
commanders of the dominant ethnic group define their role and responsibility in terms of 
protecting the central government which they are ethnically aligned to by destroying their 
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opponents at all costs. This creates inter-ethnic distrust and hostility as the 
underrepresented ethnic groups feel not only alienated and insecure but also vulnerable 
because of their ethnic minority in the army. The is even made worse in a situation where 
some members of the underrepresented ethnic groups in the army belong to the ethnic 
group of the dissidents fighting against government and especially if such a force is sent 
to subdue this ethnic rebellion. Indeed as pointed out by Enloe, “when such an armed 
force is sent into an ethnic conflict, it will be seen by both the central elite and communal 
dissidents to be not merely a neutral actor; it will be recognized as a reflection of the 
current ethnic-political stratification”248.  
But this ethnic configuration is not only characteristic of the government armies but also 
often extends to the rebels alike. However, although the ethnic factor tends to play out in 
almost similar ways in the sense that the war between both parties is characterized by 
ethnic mobilization, an important factor to ameliorate it lies in making concessions that 
addresses the ethnic imbalance in the military as well as demonstrating guarantees to the 
communal dissidents that their grievances will be genuinely addressed. In a situation 
where the state is ethnically polarized and where each antagonistic group comprises of 
substantial members249 of an ethnic group, then ethnic conflict is likely to be severe and 
compromise difficult to reach. Apparently this seems to be the case between the LRA and 
the UPDF  
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As aptly observed by Enloe, “The ethnic imbalances in the state militaries and police 
forces of multi-ethnic countries rarely catch the eyes of outsiders trying to analyze and 
offer solutions to communal conflicts. Journalists and social scientists focus instead on 
political parties and interest groups”250.  Unfortunately for the UPDF the domination by 
soldiers from the Bantu ethnic group coupled with other factors proved counterproductive 
in stemming hostilities between the north and the south. Because of increased civilian and 
military casualties, and in the face of increased pressure from humanitarian agencies and 
civil society organizations to end the war, the government sought other strategies that 
would improve the situation but maintain the use of force.  
Consequently, a force had to be mobilized from amongst the Acholi community to 
supplement the army in fighting the LRA. Moreover, the fact that there was presence of 
substantial numbers of Acholi people with knowledge in military skills made this option 
feasible even if it may not have been desirable. These included retrenched soldiers and 
policemen including former fighters of Alice Lakwena’s HSA/M and UPDA who 
surrendered or had earlier deserted and returned back home. In addition to the numbers 
and experience in military skills, other factors such as knowledge of territory, customs, 
local language and tactics used by the rebels would give the UPDF a fighting edge over 
the rebels.  
But such a project has its challenges and risks if it is not well sought out and managed. 
The risks include domination of the AF by one ethnic group, infiltration and double 
dealing especially by collaborating with the rebels, lack of discipline, refusing to take 
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orders, the tendency to loot and to use the guns against the very population they are 
supposed to guard including melting away and joining the rebels. Despite these risks, the 
NRM went ahead with establishing AFs. After all, they were to be under the command 
and control of the UPDF, while the political control would be exercised through 
politically reliable cadres. Consequently in military radio messages in 1989, Museveni 
announced that the AFs in reference to the LDUs were part of the reserve force251.  The 
political strategy was to ethnicize252 the war by recruiting amongst the local population in 
areas where the insurgency was operating and by pitting ethnic groups especially the 
Langi and Iteseo against the Acholi.        
The Auxiliary forces and ethnic conflict:  
The UPDF Act 2005 defines “Auxiliary Forces” (AFs) as Home guards, Local Defence 
Forces (LDFs) and Vigilantes253. They are also categorized under the reserve forces 
under Article 17(2) of the same Act254. They are men and women with military 
experience, (although not necessarily in some cases) who are mobilized to assist in 
security matters in their locality but more especially in grave situations for example 
during protracted guerrilla war, natural disasters like floods and earthquakes255 where 
their presence and efforts are considered vital to supplement other forces in order to avert 
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a catastrophe. Members of AFs have often been used to augment and support the regular 
forces in many countries around the world in the war against the insurgent forces.    
In Uganda AFs became an important locus for security in many areas of the country that 
suffered insecurity because of attacks by rebel forces that sprang up after 1986 to 
challenge the NRM government and more especially in the Acholiland where majority of 
the UNLA soldiers of the deposed Obote II government and Military Junta hailed from. 
Although they played an important role in fighting the insurgency, they at the same time 
became part of the ethnic conflict, armed violence and in fact intensified it. It should also 
be realized that in situations where the AFs have been used to fight counter insurgency, 
one of the problems that rarely catch the eyes of researchers and observers trying to 
analyze and suggest solutions to the conflict is that of ethnicity and politicization of these 
very forces which often exacerbates the conflict.  
Whereas the main objective of government for establishing AFs militias among the very 
population from whom the rebels emerge and operate is to decrease the burden of the 
army and also to deny the rebels of the local support, this strategy if not well applied may 
create humanitarian crisis or backfire even when in the long run the rebels may seem to 
be defeated. A combination of selective recruitment based on alignment with government 
ideology, harsh treatment by the army, poor facilitation and deployment in war often 
without remuneration moreover where they are fighting against their own community 
defeats the very purpose for which the AFs were created and alienates an important group 
whose support is badly needed.  
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 It is not surprising therefore that in such a situation, members of the AFs who are often 
impoverished tend to use the arms for their own survival or collaborate with the rebels or 
even sometimes join them. This complicates the situation as the loyalty of the members 
of the AFs is divided between the rebels because they belong to the same ethnic group 
and who they may provide covert support on one hand and also government in order to 
avoid its reprisal by pretending they do not support the rebels on the other hand.  But this 
behaviour is often a result of government’s policies and actions towards members of the 
AF and the ethnic community from whom they are recruited rather than collective 
aggression or ethnic warrior traits.   
As such the AFs have often been a challenge to state authorities seeking to use them 
during and after the insurgency. The challenge firstly, is in the lack of trust by 
government a factor that largely explains the half hearted support towards the AFs. 
Because of this, they were rarely armed with weapons superior to or matching those of 
the rebels or similar to army’s.  This meant that in the event of an attack by the rebels, 
members of the poorly armed AF became vulnerable256 to the rebel’s fire power, a factor 
that explains the many casualties among them whenever there was such an engagement. 
According to Ogik,  
“Many of my fellow Acholis were killed by Kony rebels not because they were not brave 
and didn’t know how to fight but because we did not have good guns. Many of the guns 
frequently malfunctioned because of mechanical problems while others got stuck because 
of the rough conditions as we lacked basic maintenance items. In many cases the rebels 
moved and attacked in smaller numbers which we could have effectively engaged but 
because of the problems I have mentioned, people would just run away. Many of those 
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who staged a serious fight ended up being killed.  In one such incident in November 1995 
after four of my colleagues at a detachment near Custom Corner in Gulu were killed, a 
senior officer from the UPDF Fourth division headquarters visited us. When my 
commander explained that the cause of death was because we had bad guns and 
requested him to provide us with better ones, he said that he was not going to do it 
because we were not trusted as we would give them to rebels. He went ahead to explain 
by giving examples but we knew they were fabricated. Overtime, many abandoned their 
posts or simply joined the rebels because the perception was that we were killing and 
being killed by our fellow Acholis. The NRM was using Acholi against Acholi”257.  
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the AFs did well in a number of cases by successfully 
fighting off the rebels and effectively protecting the lives of many civilians that would 
have been killed. But this often came at a cost. Response from the UPDF as a rapid back-
up would come late and in most cases never came at all. This often made it easier for the 
rebels to overrun the few armed militias and in many cases led to the death of civilians. 
Because of the increased incidents of this nature, people felt neglected by the UPDF 
which was responsible for their security and the local militias felt they were being used as 
scapegoats because of their ethnicity. In cases where the army recognized and accepted 
its weakness, though rarely it would blame and punish the junior officers leaving the 
senior ones who in the ordinary circumstances should have been responsible for the 
security lax under their areas of jurisdiction.  
In September 2003, Corporal Pimundu, a UPDF soldier was charged with cowardice and 
sentenced to death by firing squad. His offence was that he failed to respond to 
information from a civilian that the LRA had attacked Agasi village near his place of 
duty and that the death of eight civilians were attributed to his (in)action. Although 
Pimundu pleaded not guilty saying that the location of attack was outside his area of 
                                                  
257 Interview with Ogik, a former member of the LDU, Gulu November 2009 
169 
 
jurisdiction, the court pronounced that its decision was final and that there was no 
appeal258.  In reaction to this incident and the sentence, many people said it was because 
Pimundu was an ethnic northerner and that’s why he was executed. It was perceived in 
ethnic terms in the same manner like those who had been killed in torturous 
circumstances. In the absence of similar treatment in other incidents that took place 
before and after this one, questions of why Pimundu will continue to be asked thus 
raising ethnic sentiments.  
By mid 2003, over two thousand veterans were mobilized by the NRM government to 
fight against the LRA in Acholiland. Similar forces were also mobilized in Lango and 
Teso where the war escalated to but under different names and leadership. For example in 
Lango they were called ‘Amuka’ which means Rhino because of the strength of the rhino, 
in Teso they were called ‘Bow and Arrow’ boys, while in Adjumani they were called 
‘Cock’ brigades. By early 2004, the combined number of the militias in Acholiland, Teso 
and Lango were over ten thousand. This number continued growing despite opposition by 
northern politicians who argued that this act was not only unconstitutional but also was 
not going to improve the situation but rather make it worse as it would result into more 
bloodshed, robberies, inter-ethnic strife and revenge killings.  
Their views towards the conflict and its resolution remain strongly premised in the 
philosophy of peaceful settlement, reflected in their continuous efforts in urging 
government to pursue dialogue with the LRA, a view strongly supported by the civic and 
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religious leaders259.  Indeed, rather than galvanizing the militias and the various ethnic 
groups to have a common focus and objective of fighting against the rebels, creation of 
militias led to inter-ethnic hostilities and rivalry as each blamed the other of insurgency. 
In other words, the formation of local militias created bad blood among the different 
ethnic groups. For example, the Iteso and Langi people perceived the Acholi as trouble 
causers because they started the rebellion. As such they often blamed and attributed the 
death of their members on the Acholis.  
This perception generated resentment and often led to anger making the Acholis living in 
areas affected by the LRA insurgency subject of attack  in a sort of ethnic cleansing albeit 
at a low scale. The phenomenon exposed how ethnic groups in Uganda have been made 
enemies of one another by the actions of the state or individuals in the state. People who 
had lived together in harmony as friends and good neighbours despite their ethnic 
differences suddenly turned enemies of one another. Cases of people lynched by mob 
justice in spontaneous rage because of being Acholi or speaking a dialect similar to 
Acholi and therefore presumed to be associated with the LRA were reported in Lango, 
Adjumani and Teso.  
Although such incidents were known to the political leaders, they were rarely condemned 
and little was done by way of practical measures to stop them such as conducting 
sensitization campaign and punishment of perpetrators. Indeed as pointed out by 
Rukooko, 
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“It would appear that this killing would have continued, had the Acholi Religious Leaders 
led by the Archbishop of Gulu, John Baptist Odama, not gone to Lira to plead for the life 
of the innocent Acholi. In comparison, although the president camped in both war-
affected areas of Lango and Soroti, he never condemned anything against this ethnic 
killing of innocent Acholi. Instead he thanked both the Iteso and Acholi for rejecting the 
rebellion--”260 and kept quiet about these brutal murders, a responsibility which as a head 
of state should have been the spearhead and the first person to condemn them.  
Although the ethnic killings stopped around 2005 following the defeat of the LRA in 
Teso and Lango, it apparently appears the hostilities did not disappear altogether. The 
danger is that they are likely to be resuscitated to the surface should political instability 
take place in Uganda in future. Indeed as this trader in Kampala says, “the Acholi are 
very bad people. They killed our people and destroyed our houses during the war. My 
two brothers who were in arrow brigade were killed by these people. We know that they 
still want to wage another war, but this time we shall teach them a lesson they will never 
forget. For me I shall never forget and forgive them for what they did and I am sure many 
of our people think the same”261.   
This shows that whereas the war seems to have ended, the seeds of hatred were sown by 
its dynamics and ethnic tension though submerged but still endures. Moreover this 
tension and hatred is often kept alive by the ruler through continuous appeal and 
mobilization for support from these militias who become recipients of the patrimonial 
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clientele network by promising them groceries and making them believe that their social 
economic wellbeing can never be improved until their opponents are eliminated. So, 
while this hardens the ethnic disharmony, at the same time it serves to entrench the rulers 
grip on power by using these militias during elections to harass the opposition and 
reminding them that the incumbent is the only one who can guarantee their security 
needs.  
In such a situation, the potential for a return to ethnic conflict remain high. Indeed as 
pointed out by the United States, “it is equally important that the government reinvigorate 
its efforts to promote national unity and reconciliation. Divisions and upheavals 
surrounding the 18th February 2011 elections could undermine the country’s unity and 
potentially its stability”262.  Another factor in the ethnicisation of the local militias was 
the manner in which the government mobilized, recruited, trained and armed them. While 
according to the official recruitment process, a candidate to be recruited must; be 
eighteen years and above, be in good health, possess a minimum of senior four certificate 
and also should have a recommendation from the local councilor (LC), this criteria was 
rarely followed.  
In actual fact, there was official and unofficial recruitment263. Much of the recruitment 
was done in the latter process. In the unofficial process, potential recruits would be sent 
by the ‘trusted’ LCs and movement cadres to the UPDF for enrolment. Even if the reason 
behind this move was that the individuals recommending the recruits had to know them 
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well in order to avoid taking up ‘wrong’ people, such a process could neither guarantee 
that the right people be the ones recruited nor did the government appear interested in 
official criteria apart from NRM philosophy of military ideology. In short, the process 
lacked accountability and transparency. Consequently, school boys and girls, former 
rebels, criminals and children were absorbed in the LDUs. Whereas recruits consented 
because of different reasons, many joined because of impoverishment. Others were lured 
to joined on promise of promotion and good jobs while yet for those whose parents were 
killed, they were told that they would revenge against the killers, despite the fact that 
many of them could not tell who the killers were and therefore who to revenge against. 
Indeed as Ocaya says,  
“I was in primary five in 2000 when my parents were killed. My younger brother and I 
were persuaded by the NRA commander to go to their barracks in Kitgum so that we 
could get food. He took us to the barracks and gave us food and told us that some bad 
Acholis were the ones who killed our parents. He also convinced us to learn how to use 
the gun so that we could kill those who killed them. He took us to train as local defence 
force in the barracks. My young brother died while in training in the same year because 
of harsh treatment and lack of food. Some of my friends escaped because of bad 
treatment. After one month I also escaped. Although up to now I cannot tell who killed my 
parents, but I know that the NRA took advantage because of the situation and our age to 
fight the LRA just as Kony was doing”264.   
The recruitment of young people into the (local defence) forces is acknowledged by a 
retired UPDF officer but denies it was not the policy of the NRM and says, “Although 
these young people did a good job, it was never the policy of UPDF to recruit them. 
Recruitment process was the responsibility of the ministry of Internal Affairs in 
conjunction with the LCs and chiefs in the respective communities. Our work as to train, 
provide them with arms and sometimes guide them in their operations.  They were also 
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paid by our pay masters although their money was from a different budget”265. This kind 
of mobilization though augmented the army’s efforts in fighting the rebels it also led to 
the death of many militias of the LDF. It can also be argued that it amounted to 
indoctrination as young people do not have a mature mind to make independent informed 
decisions and therefore easy to manipulate. The same argument also goes for 
impoverished people. Under this context, the NRM ethnicized and politicized the LRA 
war and the LDUs through the leadership of loyal NRM district cadres who intimidate 
and harass the opposition and individuals along ethnic and regional lines, a role they 
continue to play to date. 
International response to the war in northern Uganda: 
Until the late 1990s, the war in northern Uganda and its impact on the people in the area 
were rarely known by the outside world. However, following the efforts of Egeland to 
create awareness, the humanitarian crisis created by this war attracted attention of the 
international community. Commenting on this war he said, “It is mind boggling that the 
UN, its member states, and the whole donor community could be sitting in Kampala for 
18 years and not look over their shoulders to see that massacres of the worst kind were 
taking place”266. Although the international community expressed concern, it remained to 
a large extent in rhetoric than practical efforts to find a solution through peaceful means.  
International organizations such as the UN and the EU condemned the insurgency and 
called for an end to hostilities. For example, the EU passed a resolution and called for 
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constructive engagement of the parties involved in order to resolve the conflict amicably. 
However the resolution did not indicate how constructive engagement would be carried 
out. In the meantime, the NRM government continued to project the war as a local affair 
and that it was managing it effectively whereas in actual fact the involvement of Sudan 
and its transformation into proxy appeared to be making it complex.  
Although most countries condemned the LRA and promised to do whatever they could to 
stop the shedding of blood, it apparently seemed that they implicitly did not want to 
intervene and in actual fact were not prepared to get directly involved in an ‘African 
problem’ that required an ‘African solution’. Indeed as Moller observes, the problem with 
the belief by African rulers in the philosophy of “African solutions for African problems” 
is that it “--all too conveniently lets the west off the hook”.267 It can also be argued that 
they tended to look at this conflict as one of those dotted on the African continent. But 
the more the Acholi people perceived the international community as standing by during 
the critical situation when they needed help most, the more they felt isolated and 
excluded from the family of the international community which not only increased their 
despair and frustration, but also increased ethnic hostilities. 
In 2001 the UN Security Council sent a mission to Africa. The delegation visited several 
countries including Uganda and held discussions with heads of states and government, 
representatives of civil society and religious leaders among others. On 25th 2001, they 
met Museveni in Kampala who, during the discussion attributed the problems in the 
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region to the international community by saying that, “the problem in the wider region 
had been accumulating over the decades and were compounded because of lack of 
attention by the international community”268.  Ironically, no mention was made about the 
LRA war even when it was as disastrous as the war in D. R. Congo and perhaps even 
more in terms of the human casualties and atrocities committed which were documented 
by International human rights organizations for example Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, including local organizations.  
Until 2003, the civil society and the Acholi people remained puzzled as to why no 
international pressure for example internationally sponsored and monitored negotiations 
or sanctions were imposed on those violating international conventions on human and 
civil rights.  Within this context, one of the common questions that kept on being asked 
by the Acholi people was why the war was allowed to go on for such a long time without 
attracting concern and intervention of the international community. For as long as the war 
continued, the ethnic groups in the north in general and the Acholi people in particular 
viewed themselves not only treated as “outsiders” in relation to the southern Bantu ethnic 
groups, but also as rebel collaborators while at the same time suffering sustained brutal 
attacks by the LRA which considered them as traitors who betrayed the cause and 
supported the government.  
In this situation, they became victims of both parties the government soldiers and the 
rebels alike. Gross human rights abuses for example rape, kidnappings, torture, killings, 
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mutilation of limbs and destruction of property continued unabated and led to severe 
impoverishment of the Acholi people. Consequently, they felt abandoned by the 
international community and seemed to give up hopes for peace, justice and 
reconciliation. Such feelings seemed not only to stem from isolation, marginalization and 
benign neglect, but also from what many people in the north perceived as Museveni’s 
manipulation of the international community. This perception of neglect and desperation 
was echoed by Bishop Ochola when he said that, “we are dying at the roots. Unless the 
world sees, we have no future”269. Acholi leaders called for outside pressure and 
intervention especially from the U.N. to protect the civilians and requested for the crisis 
in northern Uganda to be considered at the United Nations level.   
In 2004, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1539270 in which it condemned 
recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties to armed conflict, killing and maiming of 
children, rape and other sexual violence and called upon parties to abide by international 
obligations. In the same year, the US Congress passed the ‘Northern Uganda Crisis 
Response Act’271, the first American bill to regarding the LRA war in northern Uganda. 
The Act stressed among other things, to work with the government of Uganda and the 
international community to provide resources to meet the relief of the war affected areas, 
and to work with the government and the international community to ensure compliance 
with the international human rights conventions.  
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The Act was also part of a wider project on the African continent in which the United 
States would help Africa organize an “African Crisis Response Force” composed of 
selected African units that it would help train, equip and fund. As pointed out by Wierner, 
“for the United States helping Africans develop a capability to avoid or solve their 
regions security problems has re-emerged recently as an important strategic goal that led 
to the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)”272. This is because according to the 
American congress, persistent conflicts, formation of failed or lawless states does not 
only result in humanitarian disasters but also has the potential to affect international 
politics. Although this did not appear to significantly change the situation on the ground 
as hostilities continued, the pressure generated marked the beginning of a process that 
would witness the government of Uganda and the LRA come to a negotiating table.  
Despite these efforts however, the Acholi people remain skeptical and suspicious about 
America’s intentions especially given the fact that since the 1980s, Museveni has enjoyed 
a “special relationship” with senior US policymakers epitomized during the Clinton and 
Bush administrations, moreover when he is a key player in the conflict. Soon after 
coming into power in 1986, the American leadership described him as one of the “New-
Breed” of African leaders and quickly established friendship with him despite the fact 
that he acquired leadership illegitimately and his legitimacy faced challenge by armed 
groups in which government soldiers committed atrocities. As such, the US policy tended 
to focus on economic development and HIV/AIDS rather than human rights and 
governance credentials of the NRA/M leadership. 
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In the same year, the U.S. Secretary of State advised the government of Uganda to enter 
into negotiations with the LRA without stipulating what would be done if this advice was 
ignored. Indeed as pointed out by Lynch, “neither Rice nor her questioners seemed to 
believe that there was anything inappropriate about a representative of the U.S. 
government pressuring a sovereign government to respond in a particular way to a 
guerrilla war”273. That the U.S. administration had earlier cut off military aid to Uganda 
in a move aimed at punishing it because of its intervention in the war in Congo in the late 
1990s but was reluctant or unwilling to do the same about the northern war was perceived 
by the Acholi people as double standards.     
In July 2003, Bush visited Uganda and discussed with Museveni on a range of issues but 
concentrated his focus on HIV/AIDS and less on the war in northern Uganda. In fact he 
told him that, “your country, as you noted, is strategically located in the heart of Africa. 
And therefore you are drawn into a lot of disputes. And you have done an excellent job of 
using your prestige and your position to help resolve those disputes”274. With increased 
international support for the peace initiative from countries for example the UK, Italy, 
Belgium, Germany, Ireland Sweden and Canada, the prospects for negotiation gradually 
took shape and with it the hope for peace and stability in northern Uganda, and perhaps 
including parts of southern Sudan, D.R. C. and CAR ravaged by the LRA. In order to 
facilitate the process, confidence building measures for example cease fire, cessation of 
hostile media and propaganda campaign between the protagonists had to be implemented.  
                                                  
273 Edward A. Lynch, “Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No, 1, (Winter 2006) p, 
108 
274 Ibid, p. 114 
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Peace talks between the Uganda government and the LRA started in July 2006 and took 
place in the Southern Sudan capital of Juba. Although the two sides appeared far apart 
when the talks began as they seemed to pursue different agendas which threatened to 
derail the process, the efforts of the chief mediator together with that of the distinguished 
and experienced members of the international community kept the process moving 
forward. During the process, representatives of the belligerent parties threatened to 
abandon the talks by walking out although they would later come back. In fact the 
Ugandan delegation was the first to threaten a walk-out and to return home on the first 
day of the talks claiming it was infuriated by what it considered belligerent and 
irresponsible remarks by the rebel delegation275.   
In addition to participation in the Juba Peace process and continuous appeal to the 
warring parties to resolve the conflict through peaceful means, the international 
community donated humanitarian relief support and financial assistance to the Uganda 
government in order to meet the relief and development needs of the communities 
affected by the war. In 2007 for example, the UK in support of the peace process 
allocated aid to the Uganda government to the tune of 70 million pounds. In the same 
year, Canada contributed $2.5 million276 towards stabilization and peace building projects 
in northern Uganda.  
                                                  
275 Joanna Quinn. “Getting to Peace? Negotiating with the LRA in Northern Uganda”, Human Rights 
Review, Vol. 10, No, 1, (2008) p. 9-10 
276 See Relief Web, “Canada calls on Ugandan parties to maintain commitment to Juba peace talks and 
announces $2.5 million towards peace efforts; http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/RMOI-
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Speaking about the peace negotiations, Peter MacKay Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister 
stated that “the current peace process represent the best opportunity in two decades to 
build a lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict in northern Uganda. This opportunity 
must not be lost, since a return to hostilities would be tragic for the people of Uganda and 
other areas affected by the hostilities--”277.    
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the strategy preferred by the GOU in a bid to resolve 
the LRA war was and continues to be a military one. In this endeavor, military offensives 
codenamed ‘Operation North’ and ‘Operation Iron Fist’ whose objective was to destroy 
the LRA once and for all were carried out in 1991 and 2002 respectively. However, these 
operations miserably failed to achieve the intended objective, but instead increased the 
hostilities, escalated and exacerbated the war. The rebels carried out more brutal attacks 
especially against civilians in the wake of these operations, at an unprecedented scale that 
had not been experienced before.  
It has also demonstrated that the GOU formed and armed local militias within the 
community to fight against the LRA. Although this seemed to provide security for the 
local communities to some extent, it however proved to be disastrous as the rebels 
exacted more brutal attacks to a constituency they regarded as their own. It has also 
shown that the NRM regime presented the war as a domestic affair, saying that it was 
effectively handling it, which made it not to attract the international attention, concern 
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and intervention. In actual fact,  the war remained hidden from the international 
community for a long time, which not only created feelings of isolation, marginalization 
and benign neglect, but also what many Acholi people perceived as Museveni’s 
manipulation of the international community. As the war continued unabated, its 
consequences on the human and economic capital in Acholiland worsened and created 
humanitarian disaster. The next chapter examines the impact of the war on Acholi people 
and its implications for peace and stability in Acholiland.         
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CHAPTER FIVE  
The Impact of the LRA War on Acholi people and its implications for Peace and 
Stability in Acholi Sub-region 
Introduction 
The LRA war has had an impact on the people in different areas where it took place but 
more especially on the Acholi where it emerged and where Acholiland became the 
epicentre and main battleground for about two decades. As a result, people suffered on 
several fronts; social, political, economic and humanitarian to the extent that large 
numbers of orphans, high rates of crime and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, illiteracy and 
poverty illustrate this tragedy. A society that had been peaceful was engulfed in violence 
that led to humanitarian crisis the consequences of which are likely to be felt for several 
decades to come. The biggest impact upon which many other social and economic 
problems seem to have radiated from was the creation of IDPs camps into which many 
people were forced to live.  
Within this context, the role of the NRM government, its militarism, ethnicisation and 
politicisation of the conflict generated much anger that fuelled it and led to its escalation. 
Consequently, the war had dire consequences on the Acholi people in several ways. For 
example it led to many people being killed and others abducted, property and 
infrastructure destroyed, deterioration of human rights, a fall in literacy levels and school 
enrolment, increase in poverty, disease and malnutrition, including tremendous damage 
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to the family and cultural fibre. This chapter examines the impact of the LRA war on the 
Acholi people and its implications for peace and stability in Acholiland.   
Emergence of IDPs Camps and the Humanitarian Consequences: 
One of the main social impacts of the war was the displacement of people from their 
homes and villages into the IDPs camps. This phenomenon led many people to vacate 
their homes against their will. According to the UPDF the directive was a strategy 
designed to isolate the population from the rebels and therefore making it easier to track 
them down.  The decision to create camps was officially announced by Museveni278 in 
September 1996 during a meeting with members of parliament in which he told them that 
the army had decided to remove people from villages and put them in places where it 
would provide them better protection but which would also enable it to effectively fight 
the rebels. 
Although majority of the people have left these camps and gone back to their villages as a 
result of the silence of the gun since 2006, the security situation in Acholiland remains 
fragile especially given the fact that neither the rebels have been totally defeated nor has 
a comprehensive peace agreement been signed between the LRA and the Uganda 
government. The war has had tremendous impact on the Acholi people with deteriorating 
and far reaching consequences on their socioeconomic and political life which they 
attribute to both the LRA and the NRM government.    
                                                  
278 See “Let My People Go”, an assessment carried out by the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative 
and the Justice and Peace Commission of Gulu Archdiocese, (  July 2001) p. 8-9 
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Poverty and Food Insecurity: 
From the economic perspective, the two-decade war has left the Acholi people more 
impoverished than ever before. The region has faced serious food insecurity since the 
insurgency war began in 1986. Acholiland is predominantly an agricultural area largely 
depending on subsistence cultivation. By September 2005, “only 22% of households in 
Acholiland had access to land of any kind”279. This meant that majority of the people 
could not access and use their land for food cultivation and farming. Although majority 
of the displaced persons have left camps and gone back to their villages, many of them 
are still living in abject poverty because of opportunity costs from lost agricultural 
production, inadequate or lack of agricultural implements and lost labour productivity 
because of deaths and ill health.  
Many Acholis point at economic deprivation as one of the major causes of the poverty 
they live in today which has undermined their ability to provide their families with the 
basic necessities. Political analysts and observers of the northern situation have pointed 
out that this may lead to further instability if not addressed. It is also important to note 
that before the war started in Acholiland in 1986, the Acholi people who are generally 
agriculturalists280 tilled the land which provided them with a source of living. In addition 
to this, they practiced mixed farming but also engaged in other activities such as fishing 
especially along the River Nile and art craft by making for example carpets and baskets 
                                                  
279 Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), “Counting the Cost: Twenty 
Years of War in Northern Uganda”, (March 2006), p. 17-18, Retrieved from; 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/csopnu_nuganda.pdf     
280 Charles Onencan, “The Beauty of Acholiland before the Conflict”,  
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made from papyrus reeds. They also engage in carpentry and woodworks, cotton ginning, 
bee keeping and hunting.  
The communal land tenure system enabled them to cultivate enough food during the 
rainy season for home consumption and kept the surplus in family granaries which are 
used as storage facilities to take them through difficult times for example the dry season. 
The hard working qualities of the Acholi people thus ensured food security which made 
individual core families to be self-sufficient and prosperous as well as supporting the 
extended families. Famine and handouts of food was never heard of. Their economic 
power comprised of livestock such as goats, sheep, and cows in addition to growing crops 
for example sorghum, beans, millet, cassava, simsim (sesame) and pea nuts. They also 
grew tobacco, cotton and kept chicken and piggery281.  
Other crops include mangoes, oranges, avocadoes, papaws, passion fruits and vegetables 
which they use as food often grown on small-scale peasantry holdings but with high 
yields. These also provide a source of income in form of money used to buy essential 
items for example sugar, salt, medicine, clothes, as well as pay school fees for their 
children. However, because of the war, farming became very difficult and what was in 
the gardens was destroyed by the rebels and the UPDF. Livestock too was eaten up by 
parties in the conflict. Consequently, the economic base and lifeline was destroyed. Two 
decades of war thus undermined the agricultural potential and put at risk the community’s 
prospects for food sustainability and income generation. 
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 Today, northern Uganda is the poorest region282 in Uganda with 64.8% of people living 
below the poverty line283. Living below the poverty line means anybody who depends on 
less than a dollar (about Uganda shillings 2,300) a day284 compared to 35% for the rest of 
the country. Northern Uganda also has the highest poverty gap at 23.5% while the 
western region has the lowest at 4.52%, making the northern people to fall in the category 
of the most vulnerable people in Uganda285. The war compounded impoverishment of the 
Acholi people to the extent that an ordinary person cannot afford to buy a goat which 
costs about Uganda shillings 30, 000 ($13) in order to perform cleansing rituals and as a 
result, the Acholi people have requested government and NGOs to support them with 
goats and chicken in order to perform traditional rituals286.  
According to Ladit Omona,  
“Life in Acholiland today is worse than it has ever been before in terms of poverty and 
all this is due to the war which many Acholis blame on the LRA but also mainly on the 
NRM government and doubt whether the situation will ever improve as long as Museveni 
remains in power. Many people lost property and after fifteen years of living in camps 
means that they have to start from scratch as they go home. Moreover others have failed 
to occupy the lands they used to live on before because of the land wrangles that came 
about because of this war and as such cannot access farmlands. Although the community 
leaders and courts are playing a big role in solving these wrangles, the household 
demands are so huge that many people are unable to access even the basic necessities in 
life such as medicine, or clothes. While we are working hard and hope that we shall at 
                                                  
282 John A. Okidi and Gloria K. Mugambe, “An Overview of Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in 
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some time in future stabilise and live decent life, at the moment many Acholis have been 
reduced to paupers and feel as if they are strangers in their own country where the north 
is living in abject poverty and the south in prosperity287.”    
One of the factors that have tended to exacerbate poverty in Acholiland is the loss of an 
important asset that is, livestock and especially cattle288. Before the war, three out of five 
families in Acholiland owned at least cattle on top of goats and sheep289. Data from 
veterinary experts before the war in 1985, estimated the cattle population in Acholiland to 
be about three hundred thousand290. Ten years later less than 2% of the pre-war cattle 
remained. This depletion continued to the extent that two decades of the war nearly 
decimated the cattle in Acholiland291. The ones that survived are those that were kept 
near urban centres or military bases, areas that were relatively secure than deep in the 
villages. However, one crucial negative aspect of the depletion of this asset was severe 
loss of social and financial capital which the communities would use as a cushion in 
times of hardship for example during loss of a family member, financial crisis and 
drought.  
Moreover, the Karimojong rustlers took advantage of the chaotic situation created by the 
war and carried out systematic raids of cattle on a scale that had never been experienced 
by the Acholis before.  In the words of an elder from Pongdwong,  
                                                  
287 Interview with Ladit Omona, Gulu October 2009  
288 See, “War as Normal: The Impact of Violence on the Lives of Displaced Communities in Pader  
District, Northern Uganda”, Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 5, (June 2002) p.6-7  
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“The Karamojong came in large numbers during the war and took all our cattle. Many of 
them put on military uniform and carried guns similar to that of the UPDF and it was 
difficult to identify them except when they spoke their language. They were as free as fish 
in the water. To our surprise, they could raid cattle from villages near the UPDF bases 
moreover during broad day light. The UPDF rarely responded to counter these raids and 
in situations where they did, cattle was either never recovered or they just ate what was 
recovered. This made many people to believe that the NRM government colluded with the 
rustlers to decimate cattle as part of the punishment against the Acholi people or 
masqueraded as Karimojong. This perception has not disappeared from people’s minds 
till to date”292.  
Besides being a social capital and household welfare asset, the salience of cattle among 
the Acholi and the implications of its absence are important factors that necessitate 
deeper understanding because of the roles it plays in the community’s wellfare. First, the 
Acholi short-horned oxen cows are important assets in subsistence farming as they pull 
oxen-ploughs during tilling of the land. Second, cows are used in traditional customary 
practices for example during marriage ceremonies where they are paid as bride price or 
exchanged as gifts between two parties of the bride’s and bride groom’s families. Third, 
cows are used in cultural rituals for example compensation in settling disputes between 
rival parties, cleansing as well as acting as symbols of social prestige.  
The absence of this important asset coupled with widespread perception among the 
Acholi people that the UPDF colluded with and sometimes disguised as Karamojong 
rustlers to steal their cows is likely to make reconciliation with NRM government to take 
a long time. The Acholi people were dismayed by lack of confrontation between the 
UPDF and the rustlers during these raids, a phenomenon they believe was deliberate and 
thus posing the question as to why it was allowed to take place, to which convincing 
answers seem hard to find. Indeed as pointed out by Gersony, 
                                                  
292 Interview with OLweny, Kitgum, November 2009 
190 
 
 “The disappearance of the Police tracking force which in the past had restricted 
Karimajong raiders to sporadic incidents along the Kitgum eastern border contributed to 
the lawless environment in which these raids occurred. The Acholi people except its 
active insurgents were disarmed. That there was no reported confrontation in Acholi 
between the cattle raiders and the police, military or other government authorities, led 
the local population to believe that they were tolerating the plundering, which later 
occurred in the same magnitude in other districts. The attitude of most Acholi ranges 
from deep suspicion to absolute conviction that that lawlessness of this magnitude could 
not have occurred if it had not been instigated - or at least approved, at the highest level 
of government”293.      
Komakech from Koc Goma in south western Gulu recalls a period between 1980 and 
1985 when the Acholiland was vibrant with livestock and says,  
“Everywhere you looked was full of cattle and the farmers were reaping good income 
after selling them to abattoirs in Gulu and others to traders coming from as far as Sudan 
and Kampala. Even government farms such as Aswa ranch were well stocked with cattle 
which was a pride to the region and where students would study farming skills. My family 
was sustained by cows as i would get milk for home consumption and sold the surplus for 
money to buy essentials for the family. At the beginning of every term i sold a cow and 
raised school fees for my children. But all this is now gone. My sons keep asking me 
when we shall get back our cows so that they can go back to school while the orphans i 
am looking after have grown up thinking milk is provided by World Food Programme 
(WFP). It is very demoralising and frustrating when as a parent you cannot provide for 
your children”294.    
Following the relative peace from 2006, the NRM government in cooperation with local 
NGOs and international development partners responded to the challenge of poverty in 
order to help the afflicted population improve their social and economic welfare. A 
number of initiatives and programmes were launched. For example in October 2007, the 
Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for northern Uganda was commissioned 
and its implementation begun in July 2008295. Other programmes such as Plan for 
Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) 
                                                  
293 Gersony Robert, “The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field-based Assessment of the Civil 
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294 Interview with Komakech, Kitgum November 2009 
295 See Peace Recovery and Development Plan for northern Uganda, 
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and Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme (NURP) aimed at economic revival of 
the north were also launched.  
However, although there has been improvement in some areas for example in providing 
soft loans and agricultural implements to individuals and groups, these programmes have 
generally had little success in the sense that their impact in alleviating poverty has been 
insignificant. The main problem is largely because they have been marred with 
corruption296, politicisation and mismanagement to the extent that only few people have 
been able to access them.    
Members of Parliament (MPs) especially from north have complained that the money 
meant for recovery and development programs has been misused. In 2006, Betty Aol 
Achan, the Gulu District woman MP pointed out that corruption was hampering 
development programs for the north and in particular mentioned NURP and NUSAF. In 
2009, Museveni suspended297 the programme on reasons of corruption although it was 
later resumed. Government has tried to restock northern Uganda with vital economic 
asset, cows and especially the oxen heifers298 but very few have benefited from this effort 
thus making majority to view it with scepticism and saying it is not interested in helping 
them. A farmer in Acholibur Kitgum said that,  
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“--the Acholi people are hard working but now they are the poorest. We used to have 
cattle, goats, sheep, oxen ploughs and chicken but today we have become paupers. Many 
families cannot afford to buy even the basic necessities like salt and paraffin and all this 
is because of the UPDF who looted all of our animals together with the Karimojong 
cattle rustlers. How can we trust this government?299”  
Another man concurs with him and says, 
“I lost my entire forty heads of cattle to UPDF in 1996 and i have not received anything 
untill today despite repeated promises by government. I have lost interest in the matter 
because i know the NRM government is not interested in helping the Acholi people 
because they think we are linked to Kony and therefore anti-government”300.   
Although on the face of it there seem to be booming business in retail merchandising, 
‘boda-boda301’ transportation, construction sites, and food vending in urban towns like 
Gulu and Kitgum, many people still experience severe problems in meeting family and 
school requirements for their children including extended family of relatives and 
dependants, many of whom lost their bread winners during the war. The situation is bad 
especially as you move away from towns and it is not uncommon to see men and women 
engaged in selling for example mangoes, roasted maize, and wild fruits by the roadside. 
Many women have resorted to making local brew ‘kwete’ and ‘lira-lira’ for survival. 
According to a local councillor in Pabo,  
“The main problem with the NRM government is that it seems to be interested in getting 
votes from the people in the coming 2011 presidential elections and because of this, they 
have tended to politicise every programme that is intended to help the people in northern 
Uganda. In the process they deviate from the focus and objective of empowering the 
people as money is swindled through corruption”302.  
This observation is also noted in a study carried out in Pader district in which it is pointed 
out that there has been “--limited support from government of Uganda in form of 
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301 ‘Boda-boda’ is a local term referring to the business of transporting people and their property often on 
bicycles or motorcycles at a fee. The term finds its origin along the border between Uganda and Kenya 
where this business first started by transporting people across the common border.   
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agricultural tools”303 and households receive little practical assistance when they move 
out of camps. Although there are some cases of individuals and families who have been 
able to make progress in terms of recovery through for example farming or trading, these 
are still very few. Majority of the people have not been able to access land for farming 
and opportunities for employment because these opportunities rarely exist, but also 
largely due to lack of skills. In the meantime, as fighting between the LRA and the UPDF 
continues in the Central African Republic (CAR) and as the 2011 presidential elections 
draw nearer, coupled with the Acholi grievances that remain unresolved, many Acholis 
are sceptical about the ability and willingness of the NRM government to fulfil its 
responsibility of promoting socioeconomic development in order to alleviate the biting 
poverty.  
In such a situation, it can therefore be concluded that if the NRM government does not 
ensure that development gains enjoyed elsewhere in the country reach the north or if it 
does not demonstrate seriousness and commitment on promises of addressing the 
grievances arising out of the marginalisation of northern Uganda in general and 
Acholiland in particular, then this will perpetuate the deep mistrust and resentment 
between the people in the north and those in the south. It will also exacerbate the north 
south divide, which will continue to pose significant challenges to long-term peace and 
recovery, thus negatively affecting sustainable political stability in the region.  
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Some MPs especially from north have complained that the money meant for recovery and 
development programs has been misused. In 2006, Betty Aol Achan, the Gulu District 
woman MP pointed out that corruption was hampering development programs for the 
north and in particular motioned NURP and NUSAF. In 2009, Museveni suspended304 the 
programme on reasons of corruption although it was later resumed. Government has tried 
to restock northern Uganda with vital economic asset, cows and especially the oxen 
heifers305 but very few have benefited from this effort thus making majority to view it 
with scepticism and saying it is not interested in helping them.  
The impact of the war is still expressed by many people who say that they have little faith 
in government programmes. This is not because they think that it does not have capacity 
but because they perceive it as a Bantu government which does not care about them thus 
indicating a regional and ethnic dimension. They think these programmes are only meant 
to hoodwink the international community to believe that the NRM government is 
addressing the socioeconomic problems of the northern region. Moreover, to compound 
the problem, the people in the north and particularly the Acholi have voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition in all the successive presidential elections 
since 1996, making them believe they are being punished for this voting behaviour.  
Indeed as this farmer in Acholibur says, 
“The Acholi people are hard working but now they are the poorest. We used to have 
cattle, goats, sheep, chicken, and oxen cows to plough the land but today we have become 
paupers. Many families cannot afford to buy even the basic necessities like salt and 
paraffin and all this is because of the UPDF who looted all of our animals together with 
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the Karimojong rustlers. How can we be sure that even those who have received cows 
from the NRM government cannot be taken away by the same government at sometime in 
future because we do not vote for it and when the president says that people will be 
rewarded according to the way they vote? How can we then trust this government?306”  
Although on the face of it there seem to be booming business in retail merchandising, 
‘boda-boda307’ transportation, construction sites, and food vending in urban towns like 
Gulu and Kitgum, many people are still unable to meet family and school requirements 
for their children including extended family of relatives and dependants, many of whom 
lost their bread winners during the war. The situation is particularly disturbing especially 
as you move away from towns and it is not uncommon to see men and women engaged in 
selling for example mangoes, roasted maize, and wild fruits by the roadside. Many 
women have resorted to making local brew ‘kwete’ and ‘lira-lira’308 for survival.  
According to a local councillor in Pabo, “the main problem with the NRM government is 
that it seems to be interested in getting votes from the people in the 2011 presidential 
elections and because of this, they have tended to politicise every programme that is 
intended to help the people in northern Uganda. In the process they have lost focus of the 
objective of empowering the people and money is swindled through corruption”309. 
Indeed as noted in a study that was carried out in Pader district, there has been “--limited 
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support from the government of Uganda in the form of agricultural tools”310 and 
households receive little practical assistance when they move out of camps.   
Although there are some cases of individuals and families who have been able to make 
progress in terms of recovery through for example farming or trading, these are still very 
few. Majority of the people have not been able to access government support. In the 
meantime, as fighting between the LRA and the UPDF continues in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) and as the 2011 presidential elections draw nearer, coupled with the 
Acholi grievances that remain unresolved, many Acholis are sceptical about the ability 
and willingness of the NRM government to fulfil its responsibility of promoting 
socioeconomic development in order to alleviate the biting poverty. If the government 
does not ensure that development gains enjoyed elsewhere in the country reach the north 
or if it backtracks on its promises of addressing the marginalisation grievances as many 
Acholis perceive it, then this will perpetuate the deep mistrust characterised by the north 
south divide, which will continue to pose significant challenges to long-term peace and 
recovery, thus negatively affecting sustainable political stability in the region.   
Education: 
The war has adversely affected schools, students and teachers in Acholiland. Many 
schools were destroyed during the war and others badly damaged. Scholastic materials 
such as books and furniture were destroyed. Education has been impacted on in several 
ways; First, many school buildings and compounds were occupied by the rebels and 
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government soldiers alike. For example the NRA used to put up detachments in or near 
schools many of which were located along the main roads of trading centres. Soldiers in 
these detachments used furniture as firewood and also destroyed other properties such as 
books.  
According to Opoka, a primary teacher in Kitgum, 
“The NRA put up a detachment in Acholi-bur trading centre along the road from Lira to 
Kitgum in 1986 and occupied buildings in the centre including the school. Although they 
would vacate it for other places as they fought the rebels, they would reoccupy it again 
after sometime. This was the case in many instances with other schools and trading 
centres as the army moved around Acholiland conducting operations against the rebels. 
During their stay in the school, soldiers used furniture as firewood and also broke into 
stores and scattered books and whatever was there. This did not happen to this school 
alone but also to other schools. The LRA also would sometimes occupy schools and 
destroy property but generally the NRA did more damage than the rebels. Moreover, 
whenever the NRA or the LRA vacated the school, some rogue people would come and 
vandalize whatever was left be it iron sheets, windows or doors. Whatever was left was 
also destroyed by rain or termites”311. 
Second, many teachers had to flee the war situation and sought refuge in towns like Gulu 
and Kitgum where it was relatively safe. Many others left and went as far as Kampala, 
the capital city of Uganda while others relocated to other districts in the country where 
the working conditions were better including guaranteed security. Many of these teachers 
have not returned to Acholiland even when there is no longer any fighting taking place. 
In effect this led to a brain drain as the best teachers left the area, with skills that are 
likely to take a long time to replace. For example there is serious scarcity of teachers in 
disciplines like mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, agriculture, information 
technology, accounts and economics312.  
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Killings, Miming and Destruction of Schools: 
In addition to the above, many teachers and students were killed and schools destroyed 
during the war. For example between 1986 and 1998, in Gulu district alone, out of 123 
primary schools, 75 were destroyed, 250 teachers out of 1,041 were killed while 3,384 
out of 51,979 school children were abducted and 843 killed313.  This did not only severely 
disrupt the educational programme but also led to displacement of many schools in 
Acholiland making student attendance and teaching difficult. Moreover many of the 
schools relocated to other areas were heavily congested and lacked basic teaching 
materials and facilities.  
As several schools for example ten relocated in a ‘secure’ location and merged at a host 
school which constituted what was referred to as a “learning centre”, many students came 
together under one umbrella and formed a ‘mega-school’ or ‘mega-class’ whereby a 
primary two class constituted all the students of that grade from the five schools forming 
one class. In such situations where schools and ‘classrooms’ are overcrowded, the 
environment is not conducive to learning and the teacher will find it difficult to manage 
all the students. This is because whereas the national average ratio of teacher/student is at 
about 1:65 in Acholiland it is about 1:150314. The teacher/student ratio is defined as the 
average number of full time study students per full time working teacher. Research has 
shown that pupils in smaller classes have better reading skills than those in larger classes. 
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This is because in the smaller sized classes, the teacher individualises more and uses the 
instructional material in a more flexible manner315.    
It is also worth noting that several schools that were destroyed have not been 
reconstructed or have been moved away from their original location. Consequently 
students and teachers in the north in general and Acholiland in particular walk as many as 
twenty five kilometres to get a school and many schools have experienced shrinking 
numbers as the drop-out level increases. While by 2008 the national drop-out rate for 
primary schools in Uganda was about 17% for boys and 35% for girls, in northern 
Uganda it was 54% for boys and 69% for girls316. Also in the same year, the national 
examination results released by UNEB for primary and secondary levels exposed the 
extent of the education deficit in northern Uganda. For example although the national 
performance at Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) was generally poor, most schools in 
Acholiland did not have a student passing in Division One thus demonstrating the 
magnitude and extent of the regional inequality in education access, quality and 
performance.   
The education sector has been so badly affected to the extent that in some areas students 
lack classroom facilities and study in open space under trees.  
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Primary school students in Gulu studying under a tree; source  
 http://ugandansatheart.wordpress.com/2010/06/08/education-system-in-uganda-is-
dividing-ugandans  
These students lack facilities like laboratories for science subjects, libraries, dormitories, 
including sanitation facilities such as toilets, clean water and food. Being in the open 
space also means that they are exposed to the weather conditions which directly affect 
their attention and cognitive ability. The conditions of sunshine, wind, coldness and rain 
affects them and makes learning as well as teaching difficult. Ironically, these students 
have to sit the same examination from Uganda National Examination Board (UNEB) like 
other students in schools that are well developed, facilitated and equipped with for 
201 
 
example teachers and students resource centres, electricity and running water, moreover 
in a security guaranteed environment. In addition to the above, there are high rates of 
teacher absenteeism because teachers lack motivation, and often have to travel long 
distances to school. It is not rare to find students and teachers walking to school at 10.Am 
when at this time, most students in other parts of the country are most likely in their 
fourth or even fifth lesson.  
The war also severely impacted on the school children especially in as far as their health 
is concerned because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Because of the policy of the LRA to 
boost their fighting forces with child soldiers, many children who were at school 
including those who had attained school-going age but were not yet at school were 
abducted to serve as child soldiers and sex slaves to its commanders. This was mainly 
because children can easily be indoctrinated and the fact that they could not easily find 
their way back to their homes even if they wanted to escape. Consequently many students 
were abducted from primary and secondary schools. Young girls were sexually abused 
and often raped while others were forcefully married. This abuse was not only committed 
by the rebels but also the government forces. Consequently, many were infected with 
HIV/AIDS to the extent that many died while others could not continue with school and 
therefore dropped out. According to Beatrice, the challenge of the disease has ruined her 
future, 
“I was in primary one in 1997 when my parents were killed and my two elder brothers 
and sisters were abducted from school by the rebels. I was then taken by my aunt with 
whom i stayed in Kitgum and she put me back to school. But i had to live school after she 
died in 2006 because of HIV/AIDS. One of my abducted sisters managed to escape and 
come back with a child but she too and her child are infected with AIDS and are too 
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weak. I am the one looking after them. She told me she does not know where the others 
are and fears they might have died in the bush”317.         
Beatrice is one of thousands of students in Acholiland especially girls that have dropped 
out of school due to AIDS-related circumstances whether direct or indirect. This also 
means that the future generation of the Acholi people has been affected in the sense that 
many students who would have for example become leaders, professionals and 
technocrats and whose skills would have probably contributed to the development of 
Uganda in general and Acholiland in particular have been lost. The impact of the war on 
education is also echoed by Adong, a health worker in Patong when she says, 
“Many students especially the girls have not gone back to school. This is because of a 
number of reasons. First, many of them are now mothers because they were either raped 
or married by rebels or government soldiers. Many are also infected with HIV/AIDS. 
Second, they are now looking after their children or family orphans and have therefore 
taken the responsibility of family care because there are no older people to look after 
them. Third, Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT), provision of anti-retroviral drugs 
and general health care are all limited and the situation is acute in the villages. 
Moreover, majority of the rape survivors are still traumatised, sensitisation is largely 
inadequate and health services and staff in schools remain largely absent”318.  
Arising out of all the above is the fact that the northern Uganda in general and Acholiland 
in particular has the highest percentages of people with no education in the country with 
males and females at 17 % and 35 % according to demographic surveys319. 
Physical and mental health: 
The health problem in Acoliland has been written on widely by other scholars, 
independent analysts and researchers. Hence issues concerned with how the health 
system was affected by the war, health education and management will not be dealt with 
here. Rather what is presented is an analysis of the current situation and how it is 
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impacting on the lives of the Acholi people in the context of the need for healthy society 
for sustainable peace and development. To begin with, health facilities in terms of 
hospitals and dispensaries are inadequate for the population and even the few that are 
available, people have to travel long distances in order to reach a hospital. For example 
Achan a widow from Lacekocot, Pader district says  
“I have to travel over 40 kilometres to Lacor hospital in Gulu in order to get medicine for 
my son who suffers from a kidney problem. In 2005 he was arrested by the UPDF 
soldiers on allegation that he was a rebel collaborator and was detained at a detachment 
before being transferred to Kitgum. He said that during interrogation they were routinely 
beaten and kicked by soldiers. He was released after six months but when he came home 
he was complaining of severe pain in his lower abdomen. He was diagnosed with a 
kidney problem in early 2006 and since then i have to take him to hospital. Sometimes we 
travel by car but when we don’t have money as is the case in most cases we have to walk. 
Sometimes we don’t go for check up as we lack transport money.  Sometimes we sleep 
there for two days or more until we get treatment”320.  
The problem of having to travel long distances is not being encountered by Achan alone 
but also many other people in Acholiland. St Mary’s Hospital Lacor commonly known as 
Lacor hospital is one of the few referral hospitals in Acholiland located 6 kilometres from 
the town of Gulu on the Sudan road. Although it is relatively supplied with medicine and 
has qualified staff, “--we are overstretched with the number of patients”321, says James a 
medical officer at the hospital. According to him, the problem is caused by inadequate 
health facilities in Acholiland, thus making the few available to be congested. He further 
says that because there is scarcity of medicine and sometimes absolute lack of it, patients 
have to travel long distances to look for medicine.  
The problem is compounded by lack of qualified medical personnel especially at 
community health centres. In addition to this, not many Ugandan health workers like to 
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work in the north because of poor infrastructure and uncertainty about their personal 
security. Most returnees who are opening up their fields and readjusting for a new life 
after leaving the IDPs camps say that one of the problems they are facing is lack of 
medical treatment. Peter, a medical officer who prior to the war in 1985 owned a drugs 
outlet in Opit village had to relocate to Gulu town after the war started in 1986 and says 
he cannot go back because of security reasons. Besides security, he says that “people are 
so poor that you can no longer sustain the same business even if you are good hearted and 
feel you should help people with medical service”322.  
Achelam a Local Councillor in Pajule says “there are few qualified medical personnel to 
the extent that you have to walk long distances in order to get one. Even in cases where 
you are able to get one, most prescribed medicine is not available nearby, in which case 
the only option is to refer you to a hospital like Kalong which is far away. Most people 
have resorted to traditional medicine and witchcraft, but this cannot treat most disease 
and lives that would have been saved end up being lost”323. According to him, because of 
inadequate health practitioners and medicine, coupled with health education which is 
largely absent, most people attribute illnesses to the evil spirit (cen) leading them to seek 
treatment from witchdoctors but which worsens the situation in many cases.   
Indeed as noted in a study that was carried out in 2009, “lack of drugs at health centres in 
return areas, the lack of water and hygiene services and household decisions not to seek 
health care because of the distance to better equipped centres have contributed to higher 
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mortality rates in return areas including transit sites--”324. Today, northern Uganda region 
has the highest rate of HIV/AIDS compared to other regions in the country. It is also 
worth noting that the disease increased by five percent from 10.9% in 2008/2009 to 
12.9% in 2009/2010325. Although the increase is attributed to a number of factors for 
example commercial sex, inconsistent use of condoms, multiple sex partners, sex for 
survival, alcohol abuse before sex, mother to child transmission and poverty, Achiro an 
HIV positive woman and resident of Pece suburb says soldiers and poverty are the most 
causes of the disease in Gulu. Many women and young girls have resorted to sex trade 
just for survival. This observation is also noted by the paramount chief (king) of the 
Acholi people (Rwot) David Acana II when he says that the alarming HIV/AIDS rates 
and its impact on the Acholi people are a serious worry to him.  
This is because the disease is taking a heavy toll on his people. Commenting about the 
plight of his people, Acana says “it had never been in our tradition for adults to survive 
on handouts, but this war has turned my people into beggars. There is so much poverty 
and disease”326. He further points out that at the peak of the war, the soldiers were the 
only people with cash and there is no doubt that they used it to seduce the unprivileged 
ones into reckless sexual activities leading to the spread of HIV/AIDS. This phenomenon 
puts a stain on Uganda, a country once hailed as a success story for its pragmatic policies 
in tackling HIV/AIDS.  
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Vulnerable groups in northern Uganda in general and Acholiland in particular who 
include children, young girls, commercial workers and women account for 79.8% of the 
infection327. The story of Nakasi, a mother of 12 children who was raped 16 times328 
purportedly by the UPDF during the war and infected with HIV/AIDS, which resulted 
into her being thrown out of her marital home after her husband learnt of the infection is 
one of the many cases that demonstrate the magnitude of the infection and the extent of 
abuse and vulnerability especially of the women during the war. According to Odong a 
community elder in Kafata village in Kitgum “HIV/AIDS has seriously impacted on the 
Acholi community and has undermined the family fabric to the extent that many families 
have broken up, many people have died and the stigma associated with the disease is 
high”329.   
One other problem that is having huge impact on the Acholi people is the mental stress 
and depression, a phenomenon that is likely to affect the victims of the war for years and 
perhaps decades to come. During the war, many people were exposed to extreme 
violence which they either participated in or witnessed. As a result, many people in 
Acholiland are still traumatised and suffer from Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an 
emotional illness that develops as a result of a terribly frightening and life-threatening 
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condition330. A Study conducted by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine in conjunction with Gulu University established that more than half of the 
study population (54%) displayed symptoms of PTSD while more than two thirds (67%) 
showed signs of depression.  
The study further established that three quarters of those questioned said that they had 
witnessed or experienced murder of a family member, friend or relative, while more than 
half said that they had been kidnapped, raped or sexually abused. In terms of magnitude, 
intensity and gravity of the situation, it is pointed out that these levels are among the 
highest recorded globally and in fact, far higher than those recorded for displaced groups 
in other conflict areas such as Afghanistan and Croatia331 although in another study it is 
indicated that majority of the male youth- both abducted and non-abducted have 
relatively low levels of emotional distress332.  
It was further revealed that for example out of 1200 patients examined by medical 
professionals in Amuru and Gulu districts in 2006, 54 percent were found to be suffering 
from PTSD while 67 percent were found to have depression.  At the mental health unit of 
Lachor Hospital in Gulu, over 9600 cases of mental-related illnesses were reported in 
2006, while at the African Centre for the Rehabilitation of Torture Victims in Gulu town, 
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over 1500 cases were recorded in 2007333. These cases included epilepsy, depression, 
alcohol and drugs abuse, insomnia, paranoia, acute psychotic disorders, and chronic 
psychosis. Many of these cases were triggered by violence while those that were already 
present were made worse. Common symptoms of mental disorder include sleeplessness, 
avoiding socialising, easily agitated, aggressiveness, nightmares and depression.      
However, the worst trauma affecting the Acholi people is a strange and mysterious 
disease refered to as the ‘nodding disease’ because it is characterized by head nodding. 
The disease was identified more that nine years ago in Kitgum district and is also 
characterized by epileptic seizures, severe weight loss, cognitive mental retardation, 
neurological deterioration, oozing saliva, uncontrolled bouls and urine, and blurred vision 
among others. It commonly attacks children between the ages of 1 – 20 years but 
according to Musinguzi, a medical practitioner, “one cannot rule out older people 
suffering the same disease in future”. Although the number of people affected is 
estimated to be about three thousand with more than one thousand dead, the actual figure 
is believed to be much higher than this. The NRM government has remained 
conspicuously silent despite pleas from civil society organizations and Acholi legislators 
to declare the area a disaster zone and respond expeditiously to the victims. Although the 
causes of the disease remain unknown, some theories point at black flies carrying 
parasitic worms, drinking conterminated water, to dietry problems. However, some 
sources intimated to this researcher that the UPDF used banned (poisonous) explosives 
during the war against the LRA which exposed people to toxic chemicals. Whatever the 
cause may be, the disease has wrecked havoc to the Acholi people and the trauma and 
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death are likely to continue for several decades. Nevertheless, despite the concerted effort 
and measures taken by the medical personnel to treat the huge numbers of patients 
affected, PTSD is still prevalent in Acholiland and is affecting the daily lives and 
psychological wellbeing of many people especially the youth who were abducted by the 
LRA and many of whom were forced to commit brutal acts for example murder, torching 
homesteads with people inside and cutting off people’s limbs.  Opira of Pece Ward in 
Gulu municipality says,  
“My son who is now 16 years old and who was abducted by the LRA in 1998 and stayed 
with them for three years before escaping gets nightmares and makes screaming noise in 
the night saying people want to kill him or that he is frightened by the ghost of his friends 
who were killed in the bush. He also sometimes prefers solitary life and does not mix 
freely with his peers. I understand his problem because sometimes when he is making 
noise i wake up only to realise that i was also dreaming about his younger brother crying 
shortly before he was hit on the head with a pounding mortar and died instantly”334.    
The same condition was expressed by Opira, a student of Layibi secondary school by 
saying that,  
“The terrifying situation that you go through cannot easily go away from you even when 
you try to fight it out of your mind. Although I can say that I have improved as i can now 
mix freely with friends because of counselling from the church, I still get nightmares. I 
often dream that I am in a war situation with gunshots all around me and people dying. 
Sometimes I get panic attacks as if something bad is about to happen to me and I feel 
frightened and want to be left alone. It is affecting my studies because when I get these 
attacks I loose concentration”335. 
Apparently it appears this condition is not affecting Opira alone but also others especially 
those like him who were abducted and exposed to violence although they prefer not to 
talk about it. Children were often ordered to commit brutal acts for example killing their 
friends or family members. This was intended to remove fear from them as well as to 
stop them from nursing any ideas of going back home. Indeed when asked whether he 
knows others who may be going through the same condition like him he said that some of 
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his friends tell him they experience the same condition but prefer to keep quiet because 
they don’t want to be associated with Kony in order to avoid name-calling or just in case 
they can be revenged against336.  This is further alluded to by Ojara who said that “if you 
are identified as having had a link with Kony, people will perceive you to have cen (evil 
spirit) and will not want to associate with you”. Indeed as pointed out by Gulu district 
NGO Forum, “returnees are often accused of having cen which is another form of social 
rejection from the community. --they are also socially ostracised through resentment 
which is illustrated in various ways”. Many of the returnees are blamed for the abducted 
children who have either been reported dead or have not been able to return home and 
“often there is tremendous anger as to why their children were not lucky enough to come 
home”337.  
The Erosion of Acholi Culture and Values: 
The devastating impact of the war has also affected the culture and values cherished by 
the Acholi people. As such it has to a large extent eroded the customs and ways of living 
which is the very basis and foundation of the Achol culture in a number of ways. First, 
the Acholi culture is such that the elders are treated with dignity and respect irrespective 
of whether they are family members or not. Men, women and children recognise this fact 
and place elders in a category of their own. This is because elders command wisdom and 
are also part of a system and framework of custodians of the Acholi culture who pass it 
on from generation to generation.  
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As such they are the fulcrum of unity and guidance and symbolise the peace and 
tranquillity upon which the traditional Acholi family set-up revolves. However, because 
of the war, respect for the elders has been affected to the extent that their function and 
role in society has been seriously undermined. For example children no longer respect 
them and in some cases even abuse them openly. In a situation of this nature, children 
cannot grow up upright with good manners. As a social worker commented,  
“Many of the children growing up in Acholiland today are not disciplined. They do not 
listen and respect the elders as well as their parents. They do things that we know they 
may not have done if it was not because of the war. For example many do smoke and 
drink alcohol which they have learnt from their friends in camps and towns. A group of 
children threw stones at an elder when he advised them not to play in the road because 
they can get accident. It is very sad indeed”338.   
Second, vices such as prostitution, elopement and adultery have led to the breaking up of 
many families resulting in single parenthood and problems of bringing up children who 
are the future generation of the Achoi community. Because people were herded into 
camps, thousands of families were forced to live together in crowded conditions. Inability 
to access their fields to grow or even harvest the crops they left behind led to acute food 
shortage. The UPDF warned that whoever goes back to the village would be treated as a 
rebel. Many who risked their lives and went back in search of food were shot at and 
killed while others were critically wounded.  
To make matters worse, men who are bread winners could not get employment and 
therefore could not earn any income with which to buy family requirements. 
Consequently, women had to try by all means in order to provide food to the hungry 
children. They resorted to begging for physical food or money from men outside their 
families in exchange for sex. In some cases mothers would even encourage their 
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daughters to do the same so that they can have enough food on the table. In the process, 
men who discovered their wives having sex with other men chased them away from the 
family thus resulting in many families to break up, a phenomenon that has exacerbated 
the disintegration of the social cohesion of the family.  
Frequent quarrels broke out because of inability by men to support their families. This 
resulted into sour relationship between husband and wife and consequently, men had to 
look for active women as concubines for survival. In short, both parties in the family that 
is, husband and wife engaged in sex outside the family mainly for the reasons of survival. 
This situation introduced a new dimension of ‘sugar daddies’ and ‘sugar mummies’ in the 
marriage set up which was alien to the Acholi family domain. This behaviour which 
became widely practiced in the IDPs camps because of idleness but also largely due to 
inability by spouses to fulfil their respective roles in providing for the family welfare and 
which led to a state of hopelessness has continued to affect the family relationships. 
As pastor Okello of Kitgum says,  
“Once behaviour has been entrenched in society it becomes difficult for people to break 
way from it. The war and displacement has impacted on the Acholi family domain to the 
extent that many marriages are breaking down. Even when majority of the people have 
gone back to their villages, the moral degeneration can still be observed. Cases of sexual 
violence for example men beating their wives and throwing them out of matrimonial 
homes and in some cases inflicting grave bodily harm or even murdering them are 
common these days. There are also cases where women have killed their husbands. This 
poses a big worry for the future of the Acholi society”339. 
In addition to the above, the traditional courtship of the Acholi marriage whereby the clan 
and family of the boy or girl to be married takes active role in the process of selecting a 
suitable partner, preparing and organising the marriage have been eroded. Customary 
                                                  
339 Interview with Okello, Kitgum November 2009 
213 
 
practices like carrying out information search about each party’s family background, 
exchanging gifts and performing cultural rituals necessary for creating harmony and 
binding the two families together are slowly but steadily dying out. The situation has 
been made worse by the lack of cattle which provides the bride price, but also because 
many young men and girls are moving into towns where they learn foreign habits. 
Consequently, young men no longer seek advice and involvement of their parents but 
instead randomly pick girls through casual acquaintances and present them for marriage. 
In tandem with the problem of family break-up and aggravating it is the fact that in many 
families, men have lost their traditional role as  family heads and bread winners, a role 
and function that has been taken over by women because of economic empowerment. 
Many Acholi women today are employed as domestic servants by well to do families or 
re engaged in doing petty business for example selling brooms, fruits and vegetables from 
which they get money to look after their families. Arising out of this is the fact that many 
women have become decision makers in the households. While this is advantageous in 
the sense that it has opened the avenues for women to engage in economic activities and 
therefore enabled them to make economic decisions, it has at the same time led them to 
under-look and disrespect their husbands thus eroding the value of mutual respect and 
creating disharmony in many families. It has also created feelings of failure and shame 
among men and led them to resort to gambling and drinking alcohol which has made 
them alcoholics in an attempt to hide their frustration. 
Indeed as this teacher commented,  
“The Acholi culture today is bleeding because of the social problems generated by the 
war. An Acholi man is supposed to be strong and provide security to his family as well as 
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material support by buying all the things that it needs. He proves his worth by executing 
this function in the same way like he does in the war where he can never surrender or 
give up the fight. His assets like cattle, land and produce provides him with the means of 
wealth and respect. But the war has deprived many men of these assets and made them 
powerless. It has upset their traditional values and roles to the extent that they feel 
humiliated. As a result of this, they cannot command authority and respect in the family 
as they did before and it is not uncommon to find children under single parents because 
of divorces, a phenomenon that is on the increase in Acholi society today”340.   
This observation is also noted by analysts and scholars writing about the war in 
Acholiland and its impact on Acholi culture by pointing out that lack of morals and the 
disruption of daily lives of many communities tends to make the future of the Acholi very 
bleak341. It is also important to note that within this context, women and children are the 
most vulnerable category because of their weak status in society which makes them 
subject to abuse. Moreover the structure and system of ensuring social harmony in which 
the elders play a vital role as arbitrators in family matters, settling disputes within 
communities and passing on cultural traditions and Acholi values has equally been 
affected by the war. 
Prior to the war, elders were popularly respected because of their role of imparting 
knowledge about cultural tradition especially to the youth, which they have done from 
one generation to another. This transfer of social knowledge provided the cultural and 
moral guidelines that shaped and guided the Acholi society. An important aspect in this 
was the special hut located in the family compound exclusively for elders where they 
would meet and discuss matters of social interest necessary for maintaining order and 
harmony among the Acholi people which accorded them special status in society. Within 
                                                  
340 Interview with a primary teacher in Pajule, November 2009 
341 Zachary Lomo and Lucy Hovil, “Behind the Violence: The War in Northern Uganda”, ISS Monograph 
No. 99 (March 2004) 
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this nexus, important issues would be transmitted to the youth from the wang oo (central 
fireplace) also located centrally within the homestead.  
Because of this, elders were perceived as symbols and custodians of the Acholi customs 
and values and were regarded as men of wisdom and therefore torch bearers for the 
future. Unfortunately, the war destabilised all this. According to Ladit Opio, “elders 
today are not respected and this is because the war undermined their status. Congested 
conditions in the camps led elders to mix with ordinary people even in socialising places 
which diluted their status”. During the war, alcohol became the main source of ‘comfort’ 
and people drunk excessively. Unfortunately, the elders also fell pray to this drinking 
spree which affected the way society views them342.  
Conclusion: 
This chapter has demonstrated that the war between the LRA and the NRM government 
has impacted on the Acholi community with devastating consequences in different ways. 
The major social impact has been the displacement of people from their villages and 
homes and being forced to live in the ‘protected villages’ or IDPs camps which were 
never protected. People’s lives in the IDPs camps became vulnerable not only because of 
attacks from the rebels and government forces but also because of the inhumane living 
conditions. It has also demonstrated that people have been exposed to abuses such as 
arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and many have been killed. Women and girls have 
been systematically raped. 
                                                  
342 Judy El-Bushra and Ibrahim M. G Sahl, “Cycles of Violence, Gender Relations and Armed Conflict”, 
(2005) p. 17-29, 82-97, www.acord.org.uk    
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In addition to the above, it has shown that the war has had long term consequences on the 
Acholi people in general and particularly those living in Acholiland. The Region is the 
poorest in Uganda with over 64% of the people living bellow the poverty line. The war 
has in actual fact made their condition worse off than they were before the NRM came to 
power in 1986. Moreover they have now taken on other problems such as high level of 
HIV/AIDS, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and malnutrition which are taking a 
heavy toll on society. The people are acutely malnourished with half of the children 
stunted while 30% are “wasted”, a medical term that describes a worse form of 
malnutrition. 
The war also impacted on education to the extent that the north in general and Acholi 
sub-region in particular is lagging behind other regions in Uganda. Education 
infrastructure for example schools, books and stationery were destroyed and many 
schools have not been reconstructed till to date. It also led to high school drop outs both 
at primary and secondary level. Many teachers were forced to leave the region because of 
insecurity and sought work in areas of the country where the working conditions are good 
and their security guaranteed. In effect, this led to brain drain from the region and as a 
result, many schools lack teachers in critical disciplines like mathematics, physics and 
chemistry, biology, agriculture and economics. 
It has also shown that because of lack of teachers and teaching facilities, performance at 
PLE, O level and A level exams in the north have been poor as compared to performance 
at the same level in other regions, thus showing the extent of regional inequality in 
education access, quality and hence performance. Consequently, the impact on education 
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has led the region to have the highest percentage of people with no education in the 
country with males and females at 17% and 35% respectively. In such a situation, failure 
or inability by the NRM government to ensure that gains and privileges enjoyed 
elsewhere in the country are extended to the north will not only maintain the deeply-felt 
mistrust between the north and the south, but will project the LRA as the vehicle through 
which Acholi grievances are expressed and therefore perpetuate ethnic tensions.   
Also Acholi cultural institutions and values have been affected. The respect and powers 
of the elders, men as household heads and chiefs have been eroded. Many people 
especially the youth no longer respect the elders, divorce and gender-based abuse is on 
the increase and the future of Acholi society is at stake. It has also indicated that as long 
as the LRA conflict is not brought to an end, peace and stability in Acholiland is likely to 
remain elusive and the effects of the war lasting longer or even getting worse. The point 
being emphasised is that as long as the underlying structural causes of the northern war, 
that is, the Acholi grievances of socioeconomic and political marginalisation are not 
adequately addressed, the potential for the resurgence of violence in Acholiland cannot 
be ruled out. The next chapter examines the attempts to mitigate the LRA conflict, the 
chances of success and failure and why.            
 It has also demonstrated that although the government has put in place policies and 
programmes that are aimed at socioeconomic revival of the northern region, in practical 
terms, little impact has been created on the ground. While it can be argued that these 
policies signify practical moves and therefore a process to accommodate and integrate 
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people in the northern region with the rest of the country, they at the same time appear to 
be largely a matter of form rather than content.  
This is in line with what has been pointed out in the previous chapters that the problem in 
Acholiland is generally a result of socio-political and economic marginalisation by the 
NRM government which has led to relative deprivation, lack of security and ethnic 
integration which has in turn created feelings within the Acholi people to think that they 
are not treated like people from the south. It can therefore be argued that the problem is 
primarily a problem of politics from which the economic and ethnic conflict derives. The 
NRM government has tended to politicise ethnicity and almost all other aspects of social 
life in Uganda and has maintained power through a combination of patronage client 
networks, selective use of force and intimidation, which has resulted into socio-political 
discontent and ethnic conflict. In fact, various insurgent groups that have emerged in 
Uganda since the NRM captured power in 1986 (although many of these died out save 
for the LRA and ADF) demonstrate that the policies of the ruling elites are at the root of 
insurgency and humanitarian emergency in Acholiland.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Managing the Conflict in the North and Shifting Trends in the Search for Peace 
Introduction: 
This chapter examines the nature, impact and outcomes of the measures taken to mitigate 
the LRA conflict in the search for peace in northern Uganda. In particular, the initiatives 
aimed at promoting dialogue taken by interlocutors such as Betty Bigombe, the Gulu 
Elders Peace Initiative, ARLPI, the Community of Sant’Egidio and the Carter Center and 
their role as mediators in an attempt to resolve the conflict through peaceful means will 
be examined. In addition it also examines the regional and international institutions for 
example the AU, UN and the ICC and their role in conflict resolution and to what extent, 
if at all, they intervened in the northern Uganda war.  
Examination of these institutions is based on the fact that the sanctity of human security 
has today become a major concern of the international community more than ever before 
and also because intra-state conflicts knows no system boundaries and often spills in the 
international system343. There is no doubt that conflict is part of human interaction 
resulting from many factors but mainly out of frustration of sociological needs of identity 
and recognition including political and developmental needs. To this end therefore it is 
important to examine these institutions.   
 
                                                  
343 John Burton, “Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy”, Interdisciplinary Peace Research, Vol. 3, 
No, 1, (May 1991) p. 63-72; Stefan Lindermann, “Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset: The 
Case of Uganda”, Crisis States Working Paper No, 76, (August 2010) p. 58 
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In order for conflict to be resolved, these needs must be managed and addressed to the 
mutual satisfaction of the parties involved. Success of these initiatives also largely 
depends on the involvement of all other stake holders. Hence the term management is 
used here because of its salience in everyday life and extends to conflict handling modes 
between warring parties for the benefit of society. Indeed as noted by Wallensteen, 
“conflict management can help in reducing the dangers of crisis, creating some 
confidence and lessening potential or actual suffering”344.  
Within this context, parties involved in the conflict must recognise the need for mutual 
co-existence and respect for one-another and also the need for them to negotiate 
everlasting agreements despite the fact that they have fought a bitter war. As such, an 
environment of negotiations based on the principle of trust and win-win in which they all 
emerge victorious is necessary. This chapter examines whether this took place in the case 
of the negotiations between the LRA and the NRM government and if not, whether it is 
likely to take place in future. Indeed as pointed out by Gakunzi, 
“The work of conflict resolution cannot be confined to the high-level signing of peace 
agreements between two warring parties. It entails strengthening trust between 
communities and challenging the institutions responsible for excluding certain groups. 
Conflict prevention should introduce laws and procedures which guarantee equal 
opportunities in economic activities and participatory political structures”345. 
 
 
 
                                                  
344 Wallensteen Peter, “Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System”, 2nd 
Edition, SAGE Publications Ltd. London, (2007) p. 5 
345 Gakunzi David, “Sharing Roles in Conflict Prevention in the Great Lakes Region”, In Helene 
Grandvoinnet and Hartmut Schineider (Eds), “Conflict Management in Africa: A Permanent Challenge”, 
OECD Publications, Paris France, (1998) p. 67   
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Attempts to Mitigate the War between the LRA and the GOU: 
Because of increasing humanitarian crises and the need to protect people against human 
rights abuses and attacks by the rebels and government soldiers, the state came under 
increasing pressure from governments as well as national and international civil society 
organisations to bring the war to an end and advised that the best way was through a 
negotiated settlement. Several initiatives to negotiate peace between the NRM 
government and the LRA have been made. However, these initiatives have been 
beleaguered with a number of problems346 which include mutual distrust and suspicion, 
inadequate financial and logistical support, lack of direct face-to-face with Joseph Kony, 
limited diplomatic and international support and most importantly, lack of political will 
on the part of the NRM government 
The Betty Bigombe Peace Negotiations (1993-1994): 
In 1993 Museveni appointed Betty Bigombe as minister of state for the pacification of the 
north, a portfolio whose responsibility amongst other things was to deal with the socio-
political problems in the northern region especially those connected with the uprising. 
Betty, herself an ethnic Acholi moved to the northern town of Gulu, established her office 
and resided in the NRA’s 4th Division Garrison Headquarters. Although the portfolio of 
‘pacification of the north’ was perceived by the Acholi community especially the elites as 
derogatory and insulting as they considered it to imply conquest and subjugation347, they 
nevertheless waited to see what her role and function were and how this would influence 
                                                  
346 Jonna R. Quinn, “Getting to Peace? : Negotiating with the LRA in Northern Uganda”, p. 1-24, retrieved 
from; http://politicalscience.uwo.ca/faculty/quinn/gettingtopeace.pdf    
347 See Ben Ochola Latigo, “Acholi, Victims of the Northern War and Isolation”, Kacoke Madit, 4th-5th 
April 1997,p.3,  http://www.km-net.org.uk/conferences/KM97/papers_pdf/victims.pdf   
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the brutal repression that was being meted on the Acholi people, coupled with the 
decades of marginalisation and the security situation that was deteriorating very fast.  
Soon after settling in her new office in Gulu in 1993, she started initiatives that were 
aimed at finding means and ways to reach out to Kony. She had to find someone trusted 
and a confidant of Kony to act as an intermediary who could reach to him. Her instinct 
and skill told her she should scrutinise the LRA documents that the NRA had captured 
during operations as the starting point, although she also sought contact with Kony’s 
commanders through their wives in the villages and IDPs camps348. Going through these 
documents which she requested for from the NRA officers, though she never told them of 
her intentions to contact the LRA, she looked for names that were mentioned repeatedly. 
One of the names identified was that of Ladit Yusuf Okwonga Adek. Her rapport 
engagement and interaction with him would later enable her not only to learn crucial 
information about the reclusive LRA leader but also act as an entry point in her initiative 
project to contact him.  
It should be realised that the initiative to contact Kony was entirely hers and only 
informed the army after establishing contact with him through Ladit Adek and being sure 
that the relationship and link would continue. The decision not to inform the NRA was 
because she did not know whether it could compromise its operations but in large part 
due to inability to contemplate its reaction given the fact that it had preferred the military 
campaign rather than dialogue. Indeed when the NRA learnt of the initiative through 
                                                  
348 See, Betty Bigombe “I needed to Talk to Joseph Kony”, (March 2010), 
 http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/i-needed-talk-joseph-kony 
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Colonel Waswa the division commander in Gulu, the reaction from officers was mixed 
with some appreciating the move while others wanted her to “negotiate the surrender of 
the rebels”349.  
Moreover, Museveni never openly supported the initiative, but preferred to remain 
ambiguous ostensibly to ‘kill two birds with one stone’ that is, if it worked out, to 
disapprove those who criticised him for his militaristic policy and if it failed, to prove 
what he had all along been saying that the rebels had no meaningful agenda rather than 
killing people. He however gave Bigombe a go ahead but advised her to liaise with the 
NRA commanders especially in Gulu. On 25th November 1993 the first face-to-face 
negotiations between the LRA and the GOU took place at Pagic in Aswa district and was 
attended by Bigombe, senior NRA officers and elders among them Yusuf Adek, Kony’s 
confidant and intermediary whose efforts and linkage charisma led to this historic 
meeting and negotiations.  
Despite security hiccups emanating from each of the two opposing forces insisting that its 
forces guards the venue, the matter was quickly sorted out and the two parties would soon 
sit down together in a confidence-building environment and begin deliberations that 
would pave the way and framework for subsequent negotiations. It is important to note 
that Kony did not attend this meeting, probably because of security reasons and instead 
sent his senior commanders. The meeting was also attended by elders, cultural and 
spiritual leaders, including Bigombe’s link men. 
                                                  
349O’Kadameri Billie, “LRA/Government Negotiations”, (2002), http://www.c-r.org/our/accord/northern-
uganda/negotiations-1993-94.php   
 
  
224 
 
During the meeting, the LRA put forward the following pints and requests. First, that the 
past should be forgotten and a new chapter opened, since this marked a new beginning. 
What the LRA meant by this was that it should not be blamed for the human rights 
violations during the war as it had agreed to the peace talks in good faith and besides, it 
was not a lone party in the war and insisted that this was important if the negotiations 
were to succeed. Second, that it should not be seen or regarded as a force that has been 
defeated but rather as responsible and understanding people who wanted peace. Third, 
that its fighters should not be referred to as rebels but people who have decided to return 
home rather than surrendering. 
Fourth, a request was made to allow it mobilise its fighters who were scattered in the 
region including those abroad in Europe and other countries in order to bring them home. 
According to the LRA representatives, if everyone was not mobilised to come home, then 
some people would remain fighting and the war would continue. Fifth, they requested 
that government treats their sick and wounded and that both parties supervise this 
exercise. Lastly, they pointed out and recommended that the traditional Acholi cleansing 
ritual performed by elders be carried out as a mechanism for reunion of brothers and 
kinsmen who had been enemies. 
 This initial phase of talks was held under an atmosphere of mutual respect and 
recognition especially as Bigombe used her skills and tried to convince the rebels that 
government recognised their grievances and was willing to resolve them in an amicable 
manner. Indeed as pointed out by O’Kadameri, “confidence had been established to the 
point where the LRA was later able to send their representatives to the NRA’s Gulu 
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barracks, where Bigombe lived to discuss the progress of the talks”350. But yet despite 
these developments, ambiguity, confusion, lack of political clarity, support and guidance 
especially from Museveni tended to mar the progress, scope and direction which created 
feelings of betrayal in Bigombe and also led to scepticism about the success of the 
negotiations among the observers of the talks. She was also under immense political 
pressure to go slow as she had been accused of giving much concession to the LRA. 
Some analysts have pointed out that this was perhaps because she was on the road to 
success that would lead her to carry the fame, praise and recognition for resolving the 
LRA conflict through dialogue and bring peace in northern Uganda where many had 
failed. 
To majority of the Acholis, these talks looked promising with a hope that the war was 
about to come to an end and that the marginalisation problem which had dodged past 
governments and pushed the Acholi people to the periphery, was about to be a thing of 
the past. It was an opportunity that would mark the beginning of the end of the suffering 
of the Acholi people. This is because Bigombe was talking the (friendly and rapport 
building) language the rebels could understand and besides this, she was a daughter of the 
soil. She demystified the distorted image of the Acholis that had been projected by the 
NRM government that Kony was a killer, the LRA was a senseless group without a cause 
and devoid of any agenda351 and that the Acholi people were not interested in ending the 
war.  This point is made clear in her own words after the encounter with Kony when she 
says that,  
                                                  
350 Ibid, http://www.c-r.org/our/accord/northern-uganda/negotiations-1993-94.php  
351 Daily Monitor 9th November 2007 
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“Of course Kony speaks sense. I remember one night while i was in the bush talking 
peace with the leader, i went with him one mile away from the crowd, and he spoke 
perfect sense. The use of spiritual powers does not stop him from speaking sense”352.  
Because of the talks, the optimism for peace became high and some LRA commanders 
came out of the bush, mixed freely with the NRA, to the extent that they entered the 
barracks and also met in social places where they even drank malwa353 from the same 
pot. However, uncertainty remained as some people especially within the Acholi 
community remained sceptical and suspicious about the sincerity of these peace 
negotiations and the anticipated outcome, basing their scepticism on the continuous use 
of derogatory and provocative language by Museveni and some high-ranking NRA 
commanders for example by referring to Acholis as killers354.  
Indeed as pointed out by Akello, “this was implicit in the president’s speeches, where he 
referred to the rebels in the north as ‘groups of bandits’, ‘thugs’, and ‘jiggers in the foot’ 
among others”355. According to these sceptics, the NRM was only buying time and 
hoodwinking the international community in a campaign that was aimed at lessening the 
impact of the war in Acholiland in order for it to pursue the military campaign aimed at 
crushing the insurgency356 and political dissent unperturbed. It should also be realised 
that the atmosphere outside the peace talks remained tense as the NRA continued 
                                                  
352 Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), “The Hidden War: The Forgotten People’, War in 
Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda”, (October 2003) p, 46 
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operations, albeit at low level in which civilians were arbitrarily arrested and detained, 
their animals confiscated, conducting cordon and search of villages, parading and 
searching villagers in a humiliating manner especially in operation zones outside the 
towns of Kitgum and Gulu. This did not only jeopardise the daily lives of the people but 
also tended to undermine the prospects for peace.  
As Ageta says,  
“--information from people in the villages indicated that they continued to be harassed 
and tortured contrary to what Colonel Waswa the division commander in Gulu and other 
senior NRA commanders were saying that the army had stopped all operations and was 
determined to pursue peace negotiations. This behaviour of the army led many people to 
suspect its intentions and those of the government. Even if the rebels may have been 
playing ‘tricks’ as alleged by the government, the continued harassment of people and 
the behaviour of the NRA commanders who accompanied Bigombe to the talks clearly 
indicated that there was no goodwill on the part of government. Yet despite this situation, 
the LRA remained committed to peace negotiations”357.   
On 11th January 1994 the two teams met again in Pagic and this time Kony physically 
attended the negotiations. In his speech, he gave the reason why they decided to go to the 
bush by saying that they were fighting for democracy in order for the people of Uganda 
to be free but were also fighting to restore a government based on biblical morals of the 
Ten Commandments because they were given by God358. He blamed the Acholi elders 
who sent them out on this mission but later abandoned them. He further said that 
Government should exhibit honesty and sincerity in order for the talks to succeed. He 
also requested Bigombe to inform government authorities that he was willing to come out 
                                                  
357 Interview with Ageta who was close to the 1994 Betty Bigombe’s peace talks, Gulu, November 2009  
358 See Daily Monitor 29th June 2006.  In his first interview with Sam Farmar, the Times of London 
Journalist in the jungles of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kony denied meting atrocities on the 
Acholi people and said that they were fighting for democracy. He also said that they were fighting against 
Museveni because of his oppression of the Acholi people and because he destroyed their wealth and 
property. Asked about the Ten Commandments he said “yes we are fighting for ‘Ten Commandments’. Is it 
bad? It is not against human rights. They were not given by Joseph Kony and the LRA but God himself”.        
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of the bush with all his fighters and demanded for a six month period in which to 
accomplish all this.  
A follow-up meeting was held on 24th January 1994 and was attended by Bigombe, 
senior NRA officers Waswa and Tolit as well as senior LRA field commanders George 
Omona and Otti Lagony among others. The date on which the groundbreaking agreement 
between the LRA and the GOU was to be signed and which was to end the war was set 
for 2nd February 1994. The agreed venue was Lacekocot trading centre, 50 kilometres on 
Gulu-Kitgum road. Yet despite this development, the NRA seemed to think the progress 
was slow and that it was not about to achieve what it wanted which was surrender, to the 
extent that in one of the meetings held in Bigombe’s house in the Gulu barracks, 
Brigadier Mugume the then NRA Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) told Lagony that “I 
thought you had come here to negotiate your surrender”, which humiliated and annoyed 
the LRA team. This followed a remark from the LRA in which it requested for uniforms 
for its fighters on the basis that they and the NRA were now one.  
The situation continued to deteriorate rapidly as the negotiations moved into the final 
stage. The tone became increasingly harsh and tempers flared to the extent that the two 
parties overtly expressed their anger at each other. This put Bigombe as chief negotiator 
in a precarious position and threatened to derail her trust and control of the negotiations 
process as the two parties suspected the motives of the other and engaged in bickering 
and squabbles. Moreover, the fact that she had to consult the very army and Museveni 
who never openly gave her support, coupled with inability to make on-the-spot decisions 
further complicated the negotiations.  
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Following this situation, the LRA informed Bigombe that they were not willing to attend 
any other meeting because they believed the NRA was planning to arrest its leaders. The 
army believed the LRA was trying to buy time while they had already received military 
hardware from Sudan and were ready to continue with the war. On its part, the LRA 
perceived the NRA as arrogant and the Museveni government as dishonest and not 
interested in the talks. The stakes were high on both sides and time seemed to be running 
out for any meaningful outcomes. If the talks were to be salvaged from collapse, the 
parties had to be willing to compromise, but this was not done and each stuck to his guns.  
The last blow to the talks on the eve of preparations to end the war was delivered by 
Museveni on 6th February 1994 during the visit by Pope John Paul II to the district of 
Gulu. In his address to the people of Gulu at Kaunda grounds, he said that the LRA was 
not serious at ending the war but was instead taking advantage of the talks and said that 
he was giving it seven days to surrender or else the NRA would annihilate it militarily359. 
This effectively shattered hopes for dialogue and led to the collapse of the Bigombe-led 
negotiations.     
Sixteen years after these peace talks were conducted (1994-2010), people’s views 
especially the Acholis who have borne the brunt of the war point at the distrust, pretence 
and the militarism as motives that continue to drive the protagonists in the northern war 
thus making the prospects for a common agenda focused on sincere and honest peace 
negotiations an illusion. Indeed as pointed out by Burton, “as each party becomes more 
                                                  
359 This ultimatum was given by Museveni during his address to the people of Gulu at Kaunda grounds 
while he attended the anniversary of the visit by Pope John Paul II to the visit of the war-torn district of 
Gulu on 6th February 1994 
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and more entrenched in its position and as contentious and coercive tactics escalate, 
issues such as “image-loss” and “face-saving” become important motivational factors 
entrapping the parties in their positions and making them less able to understand the 
other’s interests and engage in problem-solving”360. This is in line with what Odong says, 
that, 
“The Museveni government was never interested in peace talks. It has preferred and 
continued to pursue a military strategy and has never wanted to be perceived as if it has 
failed to defeat the LRA militarily. It only agrees when the talks suite their interests and 
when pressurised by civil society and international community. But even then, 
government will continue to undermine the opponent from within by using all means 
including inducement through bribery by using money and promises of offers of position 
within its structure and the UPDF is good at this. Although this may succeed in the sense 
that it may disrupt or even destroy the internal cohesion of the opponent, it is 
counterproductive in the end. Officers of the LRA whose actions and intentions became 
suspect would be dealt with ruthlessly by Kony although some managed to escape and 
surrender to the UPDF. This often destroyed the prospects for trust and honest 
dialogue”361.  
 
The elders’ Peace Initiative (1996): 
Following the failure of the Bigombe peace talks, the security situation in Acholiland 
worsened tremendously. The LRA responded by launching violent and indiscriminate 
attacks directed especially against civilians, mass abduction of children and introduced a 
new dimension, the widespread use of landmines and blockade of mobility by making the 
arteries of communication impassable. The attacks occurred on almost daily basis and 
whole villages came under attack. The rapidly deteriorating situation became the concern 
of everybody in Acholiland and more especially the elders who are crucial pillars of 
Acholi society. Survival of the entire society was at stake. All avenues and attempts had 
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to be made no matter how difficult and risky they were if Acholiland was to be saved 
from the looming catastrophe of death and destruction.  
In March 1996, Rwot Achana led a delegation of elders and chiefs to Musevenis home 
village of Rwakitura where they met him and asked him to agree to a peaceful resolution 
of the war through dialogue and also requested him to allow some members of the 
delegation to establish contact with the LRA to which he agreed. Following this 
arrangement, some elders, notably Ladit Okot Ogony a relative of Lucy Oringa, one of 
Kony’s favourite wives and Ladit Olanya Lagony a brother to Commander Otti Lagony 
one of the high ranking field commanders in the LRA held meetings with Commander 
Vincent Bebabeba also known as Otingting who had moved from Sudan into northern 
Uganda and particularly Acholiland on a public relations mission aimed at convincing the 
civilian population and restoring their cooperation in order to create good relations with 
the LRA362. It is further reported that Kony had given Bebabeba a go ahead to interact 
with the elders if he found it was worth it but also warned that he should be careful 
because they may be government spies.      
It is also important to point out that whereas the war raged on in almost every corner of 
the sub-region, it was characterised by two levels of magnitude that is, low-intensity level 
and high-level coordinated brutal operations. The former involved smaller numbers of 
fighters sometimes moving in groups of  three or four but well scattered and roaming 
most of the time who carried out harassment and attacks in villages, schools and 
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community centres especially as the LRA looked for food and other supplies. Targets in 
the low-intensity included local council officials, family members, traders, health 
workers, students and teachers. People walking to and from the markets or schools, 
working in their gardens, or even riding bicycles on roads became vulnerable to attacks 
which in some cases involved chopping off their limbs (hands or legs) and body 
mutilation such as cutting off ears, fingers, nose or mouth lips.  
The high-intensity level attacks involved relatively bigger numbers of LRA fighters who 
converged on a target in what often appeared to be a well planned and coordinated move 
in which they exacted systematic and brutal assault that often resulted into the death of 
many people and destruction of property. The Atiak massacre which took place on 22nd 
April 1995 and in which more than 200 civilians were killed and dozens seriously injured 
is an example. These attacks often occurred unchallenged as the poorly armed LDUs 
were often outnumbered and ran away. In cases where they attempted to stage a 
challenge, many were killed and others taken captive. Aggravating and complicating the 
situation was the fact that the NRA would arrive much later after the rebels have finished 
their business and withdrawn or would not come at all even when they had been alerted 
of the presence of the rebels in the area. It is against this background and situation of 
extreme violence that the Acholi people wished to have another chance at negotiations by 
reviving the peace talks that had collapsed two years earlier.  
It should also be realised that Kony had rubbished and blamed the ludito (elders) as 
responsible for the mayhem that was taking place in Acholiland. He criticised them for 
having abandoned him whereas they originally blessed, supported and were behind the 
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war. Indeed it was reported that during the failed peace talks with Bigombe, Kony 
criticised the political elders and pointed out that it was them who had led them into 
confusion, saying that, “--it was because of their stupidity and weaknesses that I have 
become a rebel leader”363. In trying to revive the peace talks therefore, the elders were 
not only trying to execute their responsibility bestowed onto them by moral and cultural 
requirements, but perhaps also to repair the dented, or better put, ‘collapsed’ relationship 
between them and Kony and restore their image in society. 
During this time in May 1996, Uganda was preparing for presidential elections. Kony 
refused to engage in any talks but indicated that he would do so after the elections. This 
was perhaps because he thought he would engage with a different leader other than 
Museveni if that leader won the elections. The preferred person and a presidential 
candidate was one of Musevenis’s opponents and opposition leader Ssemwogerere, who 
promised to talk to rebels and who was widely supported by the electorates in 
Acholiland.  Kony therefore refused to meet the elders, waiting to see what the outcome 
of the elections would be, but perhaps also because he never trusted them as he may have 
perceived them to be NRM agents trying to repair Museveni’s image of anti-negotiations 
and therefore government decoy. Although the Acholi voted overwhelmingly for the 
opposition, Museveni won the elections and remained the president. Soon after the 
elections, the elders continued with their project of wanting to meet and talk to Kony.  
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In June 1996, Museveni visited Gulu, met and discussed with various interest groups on a 
wide range of issues but more especially, the worsening security situation. Among those 
he met were the chiefs and elders who were part of the delegation led by Rwot Achana 
that had earlier visited him in his home village of Rwakitura in March 1996 and who 
lobbied him to adopt a peaceful approach as the best method of ending the war and also 
to allow some people to establish contact with the LRA. They sought permission from the 
government and military authorities in order to travel to the rebels without being attacked 
by the UPDF which was allowed. They had also apparently received information that 
Kony wished to meet them. 
During his visit to Gulu, Museveni asked the elders and chiefs to make a budget for the 
peace process which would be funded by government. The elders worked out a budget 
and came up with a figure of four million Uganda shillings (about US $ 4, 000). 
According to Ladit Levi Arweny one of the influential elders since the Bigombe peace 
negotiations, Museveni “assigned his staff to make sure the budget was ready in one 
night. We came out with something like four million shillings but the president said that 
that was too little. Then we came out with something like seven million shillings but the 
president said this is too low. Finally we came out with a budget of around 52 million 
shillings which was given to minister Bigombe”364. 
Arweny further states that “and then before we knew it, a newsman picked it up. The next 
day the whole thing was in the papers that elders are demanding 150 million shillings. 
                                                  
364 See Ochan Otim, “Museveni’s Minister meets with Kony”, (25th March 2004) , http://www.mail-
archive.com/ugandanet@kym.net/msg12531.html  
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We were torn apart. We became immediately the enemy of the rebels. They thought that 
we were only looking for means of getting money and that we had been bought by 
government to get them killed”. It also happened that around this time, Kony sent a 
message that he wanted to meet elders and more especially Okot Ogony and Rwot 
Achana, but it appeared that information had apparently leaked to the army indicating 
that they would be killed by Kony if at all they accepted this invitation and travelled to 
meet him. The NRA therefore warned them not to travel to the bush. Despite this warning 
however, the elders remained determined to continue with their plan of meeting Kony, 
arguing that claims of intent to harm them were tricks by Bigombe aimed at frustrating 
and sabotaging their efforts since hers had failed. By so doing, all indications are that 
they, in effect ignored the warning.       
 On 7th June 1996, the two elders Okot Ogony, the Chairman of the Council of Elders 
Peace Committee and a coordinator for Cwero in Aswa county, and Olanya Lagony a 
respected elder and brother to Otti Lagony set off on a mission to get in touch with Kony 
in order to stimulate peace negotiations, but which mission would later end up in a 
disaster and one in a series of aborted trials whose anticipated results at dialogue have not 
only been risky but also uncertain, factors that have tended to characterise peace talks 
between the LRA and the GOU. It appears that even in the face of risks and dangers that 
seemed obvious, the elders resolve and determination to stop the suffering of the people 
by bringing peace to Acholiland overrode any fears of any possible contemplated 
disaster.    
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The ability and capacity of elders in such endeavours is based on a number of factors. 
First, the respect given to them in the Acholi culture and the long tradition they have 
embodied as mediators of disputes and conflict between individuals and groups in order 
to bring about peace and harmony in society gives them leverage and credibility. Second, 
their wisdom and experience spawning over generations meshed with a culture of 
dialogue gives them the ability to analyse events and situations and foretell the outcomes 
and also provide amicable and viable solutions capable of averting danger through peace-
building, reconciliation and forgiveness.  
Third, they are not politicians and neither are their actions influenced and guided by the 
ambitions of joining politics, a factor that makes them neutral, gain recognition and 
therefore acceptable to the opposing parties and thus given due audience. As such, these 
qualities accords them a special role and gives them legitimacy and goodwill as they are 
perceived as promoters and genuine emissaries of peace and justice, guided by the 
philosophy and principle of dialogue and relationship-building. Unfortunately for these 
elders, they were murdered ostensibly on the orders of Kony on reasons that, besides 
speculation, remain unclear till to date.  
On 8th June 1996, the two men are reported to have left Pagic which is about seven 
kilometres from Cwero trading centre escorted by a unit of the LRA headed by 
commander Bebabeba, ostensibly to meet Kony, and were never to be seen again except 
their bodies which were found a few days later in the bush. That such elderly people 
could stake their lives in search for peace no matter how risky and dangerous the venture 
appeared to be, underscores the magnitude of social suffering the war occasioned on the 
237 
 
Acholi people and the dire need for third party intervention. Some reports indicate that 
the money given to the two elders by government for facilitation angered Kony who 
perceived them as its agents and spies, devoid of any good intentions.  
Others say they were killed by the UPDF which found them bathing in the river and shot 
them purportedly to stop any resumption of the peace talks. Yet others say that they were 
killed by some soldiers of the UPDF masquerading as the LRA in order to prove that 
what they had predicted was correct in order to present a picture which would confirm 
and probably prove that Kony was a killer even of his own people close to him. Although 
the death of these peace emissaries, whatever the reason may be, was a severe blow to 
people’s hopes for a negotiated settlement, the spirit of finding alternative avenues to the 
military strategy, and sustained efforts for dialogue and reconciliation remained alive. 
The Community of Sant’Egidio, Italy (December 1997-February 1998): 
Following the failure by previous attempts to bring peace through dialogue between the 
LRA and the GOU coupled with the worsening humanitarian situation in northern 
Uganda, the Community of Sant’Egidio a Catholic peace movement based in Rome, Italy 
offered to play the role of mediator between the protagonists. The coming in of 
Sant’Egidio can be traced to meetings held by Acholis living in the Diaspora in which 
they discussed the war in northern Uganda and resolved that peaceful means through 
dialogue was the only viable solution. This was a good development considering the fact 
that for a long time, the Museveni regime has had strained relations with Acholis living 
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abroad, accusing them of supporting and aiding the LRA and as such, had not been part 
of the peace efforts.  
The framework and basis which provided an entry point for Sant’Egidio to act as 
mediator evolved from these meetings which not only recognised the urgent need for 
peace in Acholiland through mutual dialogue and cooperation but also exploring 
possibilities of finding a third party acceptable to both parties who would play the role of 
mediator between the LRA and the GOU. Cognisant of the fact that the military force 
was not going to be a solution to the war, the Acholis living abroad sought for approaches 
and mechanism through which the plight of their kinsmen at home could be alleviated. 
These initiatives span way back in 1996 to a meeting which was held in Toronto, Canada 
on ways of ending the war in which dialogue was salient.    
In April 1997, the first Kacoke Madit (KM), literally meaning large gathering was held in 
Great Britain, London bringing together the Acholi communities in exile including those 
who travelled from Uganda for example church leaders under the ARLPI, government 
ministers and administrators, politicians and opinion leaders to discuss the conflict and 
make recommendations on the ways to end it and bring about durable peace in northern 
Uganda and amongst all Ugandans. It was also attended by the representatives of the 
LRA, friends of Uganda, well-wishers and sympathisers of the Acholi people. It was a 
ground-breaking and soul-searching convention aimed at honest discussion rich in 
relationship building which is a crucial factor for creating common ground for peaceful 
and meaningful dialogue. Indeed as pointed out by Khadiagala, “in establishing links 
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with the Acholi exiles, the ARLPI has given the government an entry point into a critical 
Acholi constituency”365.  
The discussion at this convention was structured around three central themes, the war in 
Acholiland; Acholi unity, solidarity, reconstructing and building Acholi; and the way 
forward366.  It was pointed out among other things that the escalation of insecurity in 
northern Uganda and Acholiland in particular, was a result of complex political dynamics 
taking place in the Great Lakes Region and the Sudan. The Rt. Rev. Bishop Macleod 
Ochola II, the Bishop of Kitgum and a representative of the ARLPI summarised some of 
the effects of the war on Acholi people as follows, 
“Violent deaths of our people in the hands of various armed groups and formations; 
arson perpetrated on a mass scale in our land; rape and defilement of our women and 
girls; abduction of our young people; forced recruitment of our people into rebel ranks; 
the prevalence of general atmosphere of fear and disenchantment amongst our people; 
mass displacement of our people; creation of protected villages which have become 
breeding grounds for malnutrition and deaths resulting from cholera, measles, and other 
preventable diseases amongst our people; and destruction of our infrastructure and 
continuous decline in socio-economic growth”367.  
It was therefore recommended amongst others that the GOU must show genuine and 
open desire for peace talks with the LRA. Three months later, a second KM was held in 
London in July 1997 in which it was also recommended that the LRA and government 
enter into a cease-fire as a preliminary step to dialogue facilitated by a third party. It was 
against this background that the Rome-based catholic organisation of the community of 
Sant’Egidio was contacted to play the role of mediator, to which it agreed. As part of the 
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preparatory framework for the preliminary contact between the two parties, and perhaps 
also to show commitment to the peace discourse, the LRM/A officials shuttled between 
Italy and Sudan in August 1997 to discuss with the Sant’Egidio officials and the LRA 
High Command about the arrangement and details of the anticipated meeting with the 
GOU.  
The discussion in Rome with Sant’Egidio agreed that the LRA delegation should consist 
of persons from the military as well as the political wing. In Sudan, the LRA High 
Command was briefed that it had been agreed in principle in Italy that four persons- two 
from the military wing and another two from the political wing, should constitute its 
team. However, lack of participation by the military personnel from the LRA would later 
cause problems for the peace negotiations. It also became apparently clear that even the 
political wing was equally disorganised. The cause of this disorganisation seemed to have 
emanated from jockeying for position and influence in the political wing especially with 
the appearance of Powell Onen Ojwang, a wealthy London-based Acholi businessman 
who insisted that he should be appointed LRM/A Vice-Chairman.  
It should also be realised that, as already indicated earlier, peace initiatives were being 
pursued from various fronts and in actual fact going on concurrently, though 
independently of one another but all aimed at the same objective and that is, peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. Mobilising for peace therefore became a critical task for 
everybody who believed in sustainable peace through dialogue as a prerequisite for socio-
political and economic development and also to break away from the myth and cycles of 
violence that had exacerbated ethnic tension and led to the escalation of the conflict. 
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Within this context, civil society organisations played a crucial role as promoters of 
dialogue.  
Whereas the protagonists and the objectives of the peace talks remained the same, the 
outcomes of the initiatives facilitated by different mediators often fed into one another 
and influenced the subsequent course of events in the peace process. This is demonstrated 
for example by the Equatoria Civic Fund (ECF), an NGO headed by Dr. Leonzio Onek a 
Sudanese Acholi whose mediation efforts between the GOU and the LRA in October 
1997 were to have profound influence on the outcomes of the mediation effort of 
Sant’Egidio two months later. The point being emphasised is that the ECF arranged peace 
talks meeting between the LRA and GOU which was held in Lancaster House in London 
on the 18th October 1997 which were attended by the political wing of the LRA and 
excluded the military wing, which did not go down well with the GOU. Consequently, 
this initiative collapsed and the GOU informed the LRA that future talks must be 
conditional on participation by the field commanders, a factor that was to impact on the 
Sant’Egidio mediated talks later.           
On 6th November 1997, the representative of the LRA wrote a letter to the GOU 
proposing for peace talks and stating that they would be mediated by Sant’Egidio.  
Museveni replied the letter from the LRA representative on 22nd November 1997 stating 
that, “our delegation is ready to discuss with your representative anywhere and we are 
ready to reach a peaceful settlement within the confines of the 1995 constitution of the 
242 
 
republic of Uganda368. On 12th December 1997, peace talks between the LRA and GOU 
were held in Rome and mediated by the Community of Sant’Egidio369.  
The delegation representing the GOU included the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Amama Mbabazi and the Director of External Security Organisation (ESO), David 
Pulkol, while the LRA was represented by Obita, the Secretary for External Affairs and 
Mobilisation and Charles Loroker (google him and his profile). The head of Sant”Egidio, 
Andrea Riccardi and Father Matteo Zuupi mediated the talks. Officials of the contact 
teams of the GOU and the LRA kept on consulting their superiors during the process of 
the talks.  
The discussions at the talks which were said to have been cordial and provided an 
opportunity for further talks agreed that another follow-up meeting be held in one 
month’s time on 18th January 1998. However, at the close of the meeting, the GOU 
reiterated once again that the LRM/A field commanders must be present at the next round 
of talks. As the delegations left Rome and went home to prepare for the scheduled next 
round of talks, events on the ground especially within the LRM/A continued to unfold in 
a manner that posed serious challenges not only to the internal cohesion of the rebel 
movement but also the sustainability and prospects for success of the subsequent talks.  
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Disputes within the LRM/A over its political representation widened and generated 
confusion and disorganisation to the extent that the need to settle internal squabbles 
seemed to override the need to focus on conflict resolution and preparing for future 
negotiations. In tandem with this situation and aggravating it was the fact that because of 
this confusion, the LRA leadership seemed to be in the dark of what was going on during 
the discussions in Rome. To make matters worse, Obita who represented it was 
imprisoned and stripped of all responsibilities on the orders of Kony as he returned to 
Sudan to brief him on the meeting, accusing him to be a greedy person only interested in 
money and therefore a traitor, thus exposing the magnitude of the division and fractures 
within the LRM/A.  
In the meantime, the Sant’Egidio mediating officials became concerned about the 
intransigence of the LRA, hardline stance taken by both parties and the lack of progress 
on the peace talks and the negotiation process. With the problems of communication and 
trust between the mediating officials and the LRM/A, and between the protagonists 
themselves increasing, the process increasingly became on the verge of collapse. It did 
not come as a surprise therefore that this phenomenon ultimately led to the collapse of the 
Sant’Egidio-mediated peace initiative.                  
The Carter Center (1999-2000) 
Getting the two warring parties to negotiate remained dodgy for the most part of the war. 
This was in large part because of the history of mistrust but also due to the fast changing 
events on the ground which increased the hostility between the two sides. For example 
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the creation of the IDPs camps which was against the will of the people, military 
offensive Operation North, formation of LDUs, hostile propaganda and sustained war of 
words fuelled the war. Both parties, the LRA and the Government of Uganda (GOU) 
tried to inflict harm as much as possible on one another by all means throughout the 
1990s. For example, in September 1996 Colonel James Kazini the then 4th Division 
Commander in Gulu incited soldiers who lynched several rebel suspects in military cells. 
This incitement was also done by other officers for example colonel Semakula who also 
incited civilians to lynch suspected LRA suspects in Gulu town370, while Major Kakooza 
Mutale, the presidential advisor on military affairs called all district leaders rebel 
collaborators, which led to mass demonstration against his utterance by people in Gulu.  
As the security situation deteriorated several parties tried to look for solutions. In the July 
1998 KM held in London by the Acholi Diaspora peace network, it was recognised that 
human rights abuses and atrocities in northern Uganda in general and Acholiland in 
particular had reached deplorable scale and that negotiating peace was the only way to 
stop this situation. Consequently, several resolutions were passed and among them, a 
recommendation that the LRA and GOU enter into dialogue facilitated by a third party. 
Jongomoi Okidi-Olar, a Ugandan representative of the KM peace network was tasked to 
establish contact with GOU, the Sudan government, SPLA and the LRA with an 
objective of convincing them to agree to come into dialogue mediated by a third party. 
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The former United States of America president Jimmy Carter would facilitate the talks as 
mediator.   
In November 1998, he met the presidents of Uganda, Sudan, senior government officials 
and senior commanders of the LRA and SPLA, who agreed to negotiate under the 
mediation of a third party. In April 1999, Carter received letters from Museveni and 
Bashir in which they expressed their acceptance of the peace talks and formally 
acknowledging him as mediator. It apparently appeared clear to Carter that in order for 
the talks to achieve the objective of bringing peace between the warring parties, the 
insurgent movements of the SPLA and LRA would have to be part of the talks and that 
Sudan and Uganda must expressly agree to cease supporting each others insurgence 
movements.  
Although securing Kony’s consent and perhaps making him to participate personally in 
the talks posed the biggest challenge considering his elusiveness and conduct in the 
previous talks, the Carter team made efforts to reach out to him. In addition to this, the 
relationship between Carter and Garang, the leader of SPLA/M was not strong despite the 
fact that Carter had met him several times before. In short, participation of two crucial 
parties appeared difficult to secure. Yet despite this scenario, “Carter wrote to both 
Garang and Kony informing them that he had been asked to mediate between the two 
governments and urging them to take part in the process”371.  
The process of negotiations necessitated that the issues to be negotiated about, that is, 
agenda, time and venue for the talks be clearly spelt out. Within this framework, it was 
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also necessary to get Sudan and Uganda to agree to have the SPLA and LRA as 
participants in the talks and in actual fact, to use their influence and convince them to 
attend. To underscore the importance of this requirement and process of negotiations, a 
delegation was sent by Carter in June 1999 to discus with leaders and officials of Sudan 
and GOU including those of the SPLA and LRA about the details of the negotiations that 
would foster common approaches and thus form the basis for talks.  
The legitimacy and credibility of Carter in the negotiations was a salient factor and it 
stemmed from a number of factors. First, during his tenure as president of USA, he put 
Africa on top of his agenda for assistance and development and also visited a number of 
African countries and established good working relationship the heads of state and 
government officials. Indeed as pointed out by Brinkley,  
“The Carter administration saw Africa as the ideal place to demonstrate the president’s 
passionate commitment to human rights. --More than any other Cold War president, 
Carter believed the United States had a moral obligation to help Africa fight famine and 
disease. Then as x-president, he founded Global 2000 in 1985 to demonstrate how truly 
concerned he was about Africa’s future”372.     
Second, since the 1980s, Carter had been working with the leaders and officials of the 
Sudan government and rebels SPLA in trying to resolve the Sudanese civil war. For 
example, in 1995 he negotiated a ceasefire with Bashir and Garang popularly known as 
the “Guinea Worm Ceasefire” which enabled health workers to access remote areas of 
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the Sudan especially in the south where the disease had reached alarming proportions. 
Carter also hoped that this move would achieve the duo purpose of health workers 
eradicating the guinea worm and also create an environment conducive for peace talks 
between the belligerents and therefore bring peace in southern Sudan. As such, the LRA 
would not be much of a problem as he had already established good relationship with 
leaders in the region from which to begin. Third, his diplomatic and international stature 
coupled with experience in other conflicts such as that of Bosnia gave him a reputation of 
a real peace maker373.  
In April 1999 he received letters from Bashir and Museveni requesting him to help them 
re-establish and normalise their relations. A team of officials from the Carter centre 
travelled to the region in June 1999 for preliminary arrangements in which they met and 
discussed with officials of the government of Sudan and GOU. Each side presented the 
team with its concerns. The Sudan government pointed out that Museveni had not 
respected the previous agreements signed with him which included among others, to stop 
giving logistical support to each others rebels, using of each others territory by rebels, 
recruiting Sudanese refugees in Uganda into SPLA movement and to stop hostile 
propaganda against Sudan.  
On 30th June 1999, the delegation visited Uganda and held talks with Museveni and 
senior government officials. On his part, Museveni pointed out that the problems with 
Sudan were two, the LRA and the Sudanese civil war and accused the Sudan government 
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of trying to make Africans into Arabs. He further pointed out that while the SPLA was a 
liberation movement fighting for self determination, the LRA was a terrorist group. He 
said that whereas in the previous negotiations he had refused to negotiate directly with 
Kony, this time he was willing to negotiate with him. In the same meeting, the Ugandan 
team said that they were ignorant of what the LRA was fighting for and also accused the 
Acholis in the Diaspora of not being helpful but rather fuelling the conflict.  
According to the officials of the Carter mediation team, the differences between the two 
parties were deep, further underscoring the need to bring on board the LRA and SPLA. 
But this necessitated confidence-building measures especially if the LRA was to have 
confidence and trust in the negotiations and hopefully to attend. Verbal and written 
messages were sent to Kony in an attempt to secure a meeting with him or his 
representative but this proved futile, ostensibly due to communication problems as it was 
difficult to ascertain the authenticity of the emissaries. Arising out of this uncertainty was 
the fact that Kony was not going to attend the negotiations. But Carter did not see the 
absence of Kony as failure for the mediation venture but rather a step in the process of 
dealing with the enduring conflict however painful it was. After all, the belligerents in the 
conflict and people in the region had known that he was willing and determined to assist 
them. As such, it became apparent that if meaningful negotiations and peace were to 
occur in the region, then Carter was the preferred broker.   
In August 1999 the two delegations from Uganda and Sudan arrived in London for 
preliminary preparations aimed at drawing up the agenda for the anticipated peace talks 
between the two countries. However it imerged that during the exercise, bickering and 
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squabbles characterised the process as each party tried to insist that the list of its 
grievances be agreeable to the other, which were to form the basis for discussion. The 
most contentious issue appeared to be the case of more than 100 Aboke girls who were 
kidnapped by the LRA in October 1996 and taken across the boarder into Sudan. By 
arming and giving sanctuary to the LRA, the argument was that Sudan was by 
implication responsible, whether covertly or overtly for this act and therefore had the 
onus to compel or get the abducted girls from Kony and return them to Uganda as a 
condition for the talks.  
This was vehemently rejected by the Sudan delegation which instead accused Uganda of 
politicising the matter in order to vilify it in the eyes of the international community. It 
should also be realised that in 1994 when the SPLA overrun the southern strategic town 
of Kajo Keji close to the Uganda-Sudan boarder, many Sudanese soldiers fleed across the 
border into Uganda and were taken prisoners by the GOU and kept in Nabisojjo camp, 
established in Luwero, north of Kampala. The release of the Aboke girls and the 
Sudanese prisoners of war became sticky points and bargaining chips for both sides.     
On 5th December 1999, the two delegations met in Nairobi to draft the final agreement 
ahead of the summit of heads of state. But the deep-seated differences they exemplified 
in the August meeting in London seemed to take the centre stage. As a matter of fact, the 
two delegations could not meet face-to-face but instead the Carter Center team met each 
of them separately, thus exposing how far apart the two sides were. This did not only put 
doubt on whether the agreement would be honoured but also on implementation. 
Nevertheless, Carter helped in ironing out the contentious issues and the two parties’ 
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agreed on the final draft agreement. The final agreement was signed on 9th December 
1999 in the presence of Carter and Moi as witnesses374.    
The signing of the agreement generated excitement and expectation of resolving the 
conflict especially among the Acholi community who had borne the brunt of the war. But 
there were also sceptics who did not expect positive results basing their scepticism on the 
failure of the previous peace talks which they blamed on Museveni’s conduct and 
behaviour during and after the talks. Indeed as pointed out by the ISS report of 2009, the 
failure of the 1985 Nairobi peace talks between the Tito Okello military Junta and 
Museveni kept on haunting subsequent peace efforts in northern Uganda and “it is from 
these talks that Museveni has continually been perceived as a crafty leader that is 
disinterested in dialogue”375.  As Olweny, a local Journalist said,  
“Some people especially in Acholiland did not trust the Nairobi agreement between 
Museveni and Bashir and as such did not expect the war to come to an end because of the 
past experience and what was happening on the ground. The interaction between the 
SPLA and UPDF continued to be business as usual even though they tried to do it 
covertly. SPLA personnel continued seeking medical treatment in hospitals inside 
Uganda especially in Arua and Gulu and also coming to the military barracks ostensibly 
for military assistance. It is very easy to identify Sudanese persons especially from the 
south and moreover, it is possible that information was leaking from personnel within the 
UPDF who had links or were sympathetic to the LRA as it was difficult to eliminate this. 
It was like a children’s game of ‘hide and seek’ where participants know the tactics of 
each other and this had been going on for some time. It is highly likely that the Sudan 
government was getting this information”376.  
                                                  
374 Joyce Neu, “Restoring Relations between Uganda and Sudan: The Carter Center Process”, (2002), 
Retrieved from; http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/carter-center.php  
375 David Mwaniki, Manasseh Wepundi and Harriet Morolong, “The Northern Uganda Peace Process: An 
Update on recent Developments”, ISS Situation Report, (February 2009) p. 7, http://www.issafrica.org   
376 Interview with Olweny, Gulu November 2009 
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The optimism and euphoria that greeted the signing of the Nairobi peace accord did not 
last for long as hundreds of the LRA fighters made incursions into Uganda on 2nd and 3rd 
January 2000 and attacked the military and civilian villages. This act did not only cause 
frustration to the peace efforts but also serious social dislocations especially among the 
civilian population. The agreement collapsed and the hopes for peace shattered, at least in 
the eyes of the northern people, though not necessarily with Carter and his mediation 
team. In the meantime, as the war escalated, both Sudan and Uganda reverted to their 
blame game and counter-accused one another for acting in bad faith and dishonouring the 
terms of the accord. It took the intervention of Carter to save the bad situation from 
getting worse by personally seeking assurances from Museveni and Bashir to stick to the 
agreement and exercise maximum restraint.   
Efforts to reach out to Kony remained at the centre of the Carter peace project if peace 
and stability were to be realised, although the modalities of establishing contact with him 
remained a puzzle. The Sudanese government played the ‘gate keeper’ and the viable 
channel to him and therefore had to be used carefully but also pressurised. Within this 
context, the Carter Center requested the Sudanese government to arrange a meeting with 
the leadership of the LRA and most preferably its leader, Kony.   
The Amnesty Act 2000: 
Following the collapse of the Betty Bigombe talks (1993-94), the Elders Piece Initiative 
(1996), the Community of Sant’Egidio (1997-98) and the Carter-mediated peace talks 
(2000), the LRA continued its attacks on the civilian and military targets in northern 
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Uganda. Civilians continued to be tortured or killed almost on a daily basis and children, 
both boys and girls continued to be abducted in their thousands. In actual sense, the war 
continued unabated both in magnitude and effect. However, despite the enduring 
confrontation between the LRA and the UPDF, the GOU remained committed to peace.  
Because of increased hostility between the belligerents from 1995 to 1996 and especially 
the Atiak massacre (April 1995) and Karuma-Pakwach convoy ambush (March 1996) in 
which over 300 people were killed, the religious leaders increasingly became concerned 
as they saw no end to the conflict and realised that if the war was to be transformed, there 
was need for forgiveness. They knew that the rebels had committed atrocities for which 
they feared to be prosecuted even if they wanted to come out of the bush. Consequently, 
during their earliest activities in trying to forge ways of ending the war, they 
recommended and lobbied government for amnesty, basing their argument on the biblical 
philosophy of unconditional forgiveness377. 
 In 2000, the GOU granted Amnesty to the LRA rebels who denounced rebellion and 
came out of the bush378 as a carrot to end the violence. The Amnesty Act 2000379 was 
passed by parliament and became operational in January of that year. Although the 
Amnesty was directed mainly at the LRA fighters, it also catered for other persons who 
engaged in acts of rebellion against the GOU in the stipulated time period. Within this 
                                                  
377 Father Carlos Rodriguez, “The Role of the Religious Leaders”, (2002), http:www.c-r.org/our-
work/northern-uganda/religious-leaders.php 
378 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and Human Rights 
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context, Article three of the law states that, “An Amnesty is declared in respect of any 
Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th of January 1996, engaged in or is engaged in 
war or armed rebellion against the government of the republic of Uganda by, (a) actual 
participation in combat; (b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed 
rebellion; (c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war; or (d) armed 
rebellion; or assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed 
rebellion”380.  
 The Amnesty Act was based on the preamble which it stated as “the expressed desire of 
the people of Uganda to end armed hostilities, reconcile with those who have caused 
suffering and rebuild their communities” and “the desire and the determination of 
government to genuinely implement its policy of reconciliation--”381 The aim of the Act 
which became operational in January 2000 was to forgive all those involved in the 
rebellion against the government of Uganda, meaning that those who agreed to it and 
denounced their acts would not be prosecuted or punished for their ills committed during 
the period stipulated therein. It was widely appreciated by the civil society organisations 
and the Acholi community as one of the best ways to persuade the LRA fighters to 
abandon rebellion and come home. This was mainly because many had joined the 
rebellion against their will as they were forced through abduction and forced conscription 
                                                  
380 Kasaija Philip Apuuli, “The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders and Peace 
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literally on penalty of death382, but overall it appeared that the fear of prosecution was a 
major hindrance for those who had intentions of coming out.  
It was believed that giving blanket immunity and resettlement packages to fighters who 
surrendered their arms would give them confidence and also encourage others to do so, a 
process that would not only eliminate the use of force but also distrust between the 
belligerents and thus create avenue for reconciliation and reintegration, ultimately 
bringing peace in the region. The terms of the Amnesty Act was that it would remain in 
force for a period of six months subject to ministerial extension. Individuals interested in 
taking up Amnesty were required to report to the Amnesty Commission which was 
responsible for issuing them with certificates after which they would get resettlement 
packages.  
Many fighters took advantage of the Amnesty Act and came out of the bush especially 
during its early stages soon after promulgation. Between 2002 and 2003, over 5,000383 
fighters had surrendered and applied for Amnesty, many of whom were integrated in their 
communities. By the end of January 2005, the number of returnees who received amnesty 
rose to 14,695384. The exodus of the returnees coming out of the bush during this period 
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was largely due to the efforts of the religious leaders and the cultural leaders385 who 
embarked on community sensitisation about the advantages of the provisions of the law. 
They urged them to extend the message to their relatives and all others who were in the 
bush. They also reached out to the rebels by making use of the goodwill they had already 
established through informal network contacts and also used radios386 to create awareness 
and persuade them to take up this opportunity.  
Individual fighters who gave up rebellion and surrendered to government through 
amnesty would be taken by government officials to radio stations and made to talk about 
themselves and explain what they have gained through amnesty and encourage their 
friends still with the LRA to escape and benefit in the same way. This instilled courage 
and confidence-building among those left behind and led to many fighters to come out of 
the bush. This strategy also reduced the fears for reprisal on the part of the returnees as 
the communities from which they originated expressed willingness to forgive and accept 
them back.     
However, problems began to emerge and more especially after the key LRA leaders were 
excluded from the Amnesty Act. Initially, the law gave blanket treatment to everyone but 
was later amended by the Uganda parliament to exclude Kony and his senior 
commanders387. In explaining why amending the Amnesty Act to exclude the top 
                                                  
385 Patrick William Otim, “The Role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Uganda’s Peace 
building”, (March 2009),  
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leadership of the LRA was necessary, government argued that Kony and his top 
commanders were responsible for the prolonged northern insurgency, had refused offers 
for dialogue and also that they were blocking their subordinates from surrendering.  
However, several MPs from the opposition as well as from even within the ruling NRM 
opposed the amendment arguing that excluding Kony and his top lieutenants from being 
eligible for pardon had the potential to lead to the escalation of the conflict. For example, 
Nobert Mao of Gulu Municipality and a member of the APG said that no one should be 
excluded from the Act, arguing that even those who had not made up their mind to 
abandon rebellion could still have a change of hearts. They further pointed out that it 
would send a wrong signal to the LRA and make the amnesty Act fail to achieve its 
objective.    
The religious leaders especially the ARLPI and other civic organisations, including the 
Acholi community were also not in favour of amending the bill. The ARLPI in particular 
urged government to extend the Amnesty, arguing that “it takes time for people to trust 
one another and talk”. Even the governments Amnesty Commission pointed out that the 
proposed amendments by government would seriously damage the peace efforts. Despite 
the opposition to amend the Act from several quarters who pointed out the potential 
negative impact, the NRM government went ahead and used its majority numbers in 
parliament to pass the amendments.  
In December 2003, the UPDF spokesperson Shaban Bantariza told the Integrated 
Regional Information Network (IRIN) that the top LRA leadership would be excluded 
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from the Amnesty Act by saying that “how can they be interested in the amnesty if they 
are not interested in the peace talks? The amnesty has been renewed many times. They 
don’t want it. We are forcing it on them. So what is the point?”388 Although this 
statement can be on one hand understood to express the frustration of the military, it also 
indicated that the UPDF was determined to continue with the military force on the other 
hand. Indeed in March 2002, a military offensive codenamed Operation Iron Fist (OIF)389 
was launched by the UPDF aimed at destroying the LRA bases inside Sudan.  
This offensive had negative impact on the amnesty. In addition, it did not only fail to 
achieve its objective, but also proved to be disastrous390 as it led to the escalation of the 
conflict which witnessed thousands of the LRA fighters cross back into Uganda and 
carried out attacks on a scale not experienced before, which exacerbated the violence391 
and the humanitarian situation. As pointed out by Allen, “Operation Iron Fist made clear 
that president Museveni and the UPDF were not really interested in reconciliation”392. It 
also indicated that the UPDF preferred the military strategy to solve the conflict rather 
than peaceful means, and in actual sense reinforced Kony’s argument, which was that the 
Bantu-led government did not have good intentions for the Acholi people. 
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Consequently, Kony took advantage of this offensive to denounce the Amnesty and in 
actual fact seriously campaigned against it by telling his fighters that the government was 
luring them into a trap and also threatened anybody found listening to its programmes on 
radio, especially the Amnesty Act which he described as dangerous. As Ocaya says, “we 
were ordered not to listen to the government programmes especially amnesty. Our 
commanders said this was a Banyankole government propaganda aimed at destroying the 
LRA, and that anybody found listening to it would be dealt with seriously. They even 
confiscated some radios and destroyed them”393.   
This indicates the ethnic connotation and how peace efforts initiated by government, even 
if they may have involved some people other than the Banyankole, were perceived in 
terms of ethnicity. Moreover, in December 2003, Museveni referred the LRA to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)394 to be investigated on war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. This further complicated the situation and tended to erode any chances for 
more fighters to surrender even if they would have liked to take up amnesty, as the LRA 
tightened its grip on them by threats of death.   
Although Musevenis decision to exclude Kony and his top commanders from amnesty 
and also to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICC may have been influenced by security 
considerations and the need for justice, many people especially in Acholiland remained 
opposed to these actions saying they were going to be a roadblock in the path of peace. In 
tandem with the above situation and aggravating it was the fact that the LRA tracked 
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down and attacked those who had surrendered, killing them in some cases395, thus 
discouraging anybody harbouring intentions of surrendering. The attacks on villages 
where former fighters were living continued which in turn attracted the UPDF to conduct 
operations against the LRA.  
Although the amnesty lured a significant number of fighters to give up the war, it did not 
achieve the objective of stopping the war. This is because the amnesty idea was not 
offered in good faith but rather was an attempt to weaken the LRA. Consequently, it 
became difficult for the amnesty initiative not only to convince and entice the radical and 
die-hard LRA top commanders to come out of the bush but also for government - through 
the International Crimes Division (ICD) a division of Uganda’s High Court that was 
established - to prosecute and punish those accused of committing serious crimes 
categorised as crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.  
Within this context, it can be argued that in enacting the Amnesty Act, the Museveni-led 
NRM government was interested in using it selectively and deliberately to exclude the 
top command of the LRA and also decide on who should or shouldn’t be prosecuted, 
without taking due consideration of the flaws inherent in such a scenario. The Amnesty 
Act was thus not only ambiguous but also confusing and in conflict with sections of the 
penal code. This largely explains why Thomas Kwoyelo396, a senior commander of the 
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LRA who was injured, captured and taken into custody by the UPDF following a fight 
between it and rebels of the LRA in Ukwa, eastern DRC in March 2009 was freed by the 
court in September 2011397. His trial became controversial because of a number of 
factors. First, Kwoyelo denounced rebellion and applied for Amnesty under the Amnesty 
Act like any other rebel who denounced acts of rebellion. However, his request was 
neither responded to by government nor his eligibility determined which exposed the 
arbitrariness and weaknesses of the Amnesty Act.  
Second, he was not only held in custody incommunicado in an undisclosed location for a 
long time, but also could not access legal representation. Even when he finally got 
defence attorneys, they were not made aware of the trial opening until few weeks to the 
trial in order to conduct the necessary preparation thus showing lack of guarantees for 
credible, impartial and fair trial on the part of the government. Third, critics of 
government and the Amnesty Act pointed out that whereas other senior LRA 
commanders were granted amnesty for example Brigadier Keneth Banya and Sam Kolo, 
the refusal to extend the same to Kwoyelo indicated that his prosecution was politically 
motivated.                        
The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) (2002-2003):  
Following the failure of the previous attempts to bring peace to Acholiland, the war 
continued unabated, and in actual fact escalated. People continued to die in large 
numbers, directly or indirectly as a result of the acts and at the hands of the LRA and the 
                                                  
397 See Daily Monitor, 22nd September 2011, “Court frees ex LRA rebel Kwoyelo” 
261 
 
UPDF, property destroyed and social life disrupted to the extent that it became extremely 
difficult for communities to sustain their daily lives. As a result, people sought support 
and help from religious leaders, especially those of the Catholic and Anglican faith whose 
churches are relatively well spread in Acholiland.   Thus the vacuum left by the failed 
previous mediation efforts and the subsequent escalation of the war which led to 
unprecedented state of lawlessness, misery and suffering of the Acholi people motivated 
the religious leaders to be proactive and engage in the peace-building that would create 
an environment for dialogue. 
The initial religious leaders that came together were those of the Anglican and Catholic 
faith, though they were later joined by the leadership of the Muslim faith. In particular, 
the most prominent leaders of these religious denominations and advocates for dialogue 
who started the peace initiatives have been Bishop Macleod Baker Ochola, of the 
Anglican Diocese of Kitgum, the Right Reverend John Baptist Odama, the Catholic 
Achbishop of Gulu, the Right Reverend Nelson Onon-Onweng, the Anglican Bishop of 
northern Uganda, Sheikh Musa Khalil, the Muslim Chief Khadhi of Gulu and Sheikh 
Suleiman Wadrif, the Chief Khadhi of Kitgum398.   
These leaders came together under a loose but well coordinated inter-faith framework in 
order to overcome their differences which had for a long time hampered their efforts to 
work together. This tended to surprise many people, especially considering the fact that 
the NRM government not only viewed them with suspicion as they were perceived to be 
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rebel collaborators and divisive to people along ethno-religious lines, but also received 
little sympathy from their counterparts elsewhere in the country, but especially those in 
the south, who considered the war in the north as an Acholi affair, and therefore tended 
not to offer support. This shows the extent to which the Acholi society was viewed on 
ethnic lines and as people interested in war, especially by those in the south. Indeed as 
pointed out by Olara, “right from the time they set foot on Acholi soil, the NRA had a 
preconceived mindset that the Acholi were “uniquely evil” and that it was only a matter 
of time before they attacked the NRA. Therefore, the NRA would not give them that 
opportunity. They were going to “smoke out” this war mentality and have it eradicated 
before it erupted”399.       
Moreover, these faith bodies had been also characterised by rivalry arising from each of 
them making distinctive claim-truths while referring to the other as false, which in actual 
fact demonstrated the incompatibility of the doctrines that defined each of them, a legacy 
that kept them wide apart right from the time they were established in Uganda. 
Consequently, this made people sceptical about the outcome of their intended objective. 
To many people therefore, the question has been why did they come together, what have 
they done and what has been their major achievements? United in purpose under the 
umbrella body they called the Acholi Religious Peace Initiative (ARLPI), these leaders 
together with the Catholic Comboni Fathers begun a series of initiatives aimed at forging 
a way forward that advocated for non-violent means of resolving the war.  
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The ARLPI is thus an inter-faith framework that brings together the religious leaders of 
four different religious denominations- Anglican, Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox, 
together with their respective constituencies to work towards peace through community-
based peace building, dialogue and reconciliation, and by facilitating an environment of 
trust and cooperation between the LRA and the GOU which would bring about harmony 
and mutual co-existence between the Acholi ethnic group and the Bantu ethnic groups in 
the south. Within this context, initiatives such as prayer gatherings for peace, peace 
workshops, seminars, peace marches, demonstrations and peace-seeking errands have 
been some of their major activities. They had to work for the voiceless. Indeed as pointed 
out by Rodriguez, they begun “--ecumenical initiatives to ‘speak for those who cannot 
speak for themselves” 400 as and as witnesses to the northern conflict401    
Initial efforts to stem the war which culminated in preliminary frank and honest 
discussions about the causes of the war and its impact on the Acholi people and therefore 
how to resolve it, begun in 1996, mainly in the district of Kitgum. Between 1997 and 
1998, these efforts had spread throughout Acholiland. For example, in 1997, they 
organised joint peace prayers and marches in the towns of Gulu and Kitgum and issued 
joint message that condemned the war and recommended peaceful means of ending it402, 
                                                  
400 Father Rodriguez Carlos, “The Role of the Religious Leaders”, (2002), http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/northern-uganda/religious-leaders.php  
401 Father Carlos Rodriguez, “The Northern Uganda War: The “Small Conflict” that Became the World’s 
Worst Humanitarian Crisis”, Health Policy and Development, Vol. 2, No, 2, (2004) p. 81-84  
402 Tim Allen, “War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court’s 
Intervention”, (February 2005), p. 66-70  
264 
 
a view that they have continued to advocate for till to date403. In February 1998, the 
ARLPI was formally inaugurated, with offices and staff in Gulu and Kitgum towns.  
One of the ARLPI’s landmark events in 1998 was the “Bedo Piny pi kuc” (sitting down 
for peace discussion) conference which sought to engage the stake holders in the northern 
conflict in exploring peaceful ways and means of ending the enduring war. This was 
based on what its preamble termed “kacel pi kuc” (together for peace) and its Mission 
Statement which states that, “ARLPI is an inter-faith organisation that works for peace 
and development by transforming violent conflict through dialogue, negotiation, 
mediation and reconciliation in order to promote sustainable peace building and 
development in northern Uganda”404. The conference drew participants from the Acholi 
community, religious leaders, Members of Parliament (MPs), NGOs, and the UPDF 
among others, who for the first time sat down to discuss the war which the government 
had not only vowed to end by military force, but also distorted the image of the Acholi 
people as trouble causers. 
It was pointed out in this conference that the genesis of the war was because of repressive 
methods of the NRM/A in Acholiland, destruction of property, humiliation and 
vilification of the Acholi people which alienated them from participating in the politics of 
the country and made them internal refugees in their own home. Indeed as pointed out by 
Besigye, “the LRA should not have started at all or it would have ended soon after it 
broke out had the NRM not marginalized the Acholi. The war would not have begun in 
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the first place had government not mismanaged the politics by marginalizing the 
Acholi”405. Marginalisation therefore led to stigmatisation and demonization of the 
Acholi people as an ethnic group, one which started as early as 1986, soon after the 
NRA/M set foot in Acholiland. 
In 1999, the ARLPI in conjunction with NGOs and civic organisations increased their 
efforts in the search for peace and carried out a number of activities, These included 
community sensitization and awareness for conflict source and dangers, lobbying for 
dialogue, amnesty, dismantling of IDPs, gender-based seminars to bring women leaders 
in the peace process, documentation of conflict and peace issues, national and 
international lobbying and advocacy for peace in Acholiland and training of Volunteer 
Peace Animators (VPAs) within the community.  
The latter has been instrumental in multiplier effect through training others in identifying 
the causes of conflict and developing strategies to avoid or resolve it, and also extending 
the message of the need for peace, reconciliation, development, tolerance and 
forgiveness, acceptance and reintegration of returnees which became bedrock for healing 
and restoration of relations at the local level within the communities. This helped a lot 
and led to communities to accept the former fighters who either directly or indirectly 
occasioned brutal atrocities against them and to allow them resettle back in the 
community.   
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In the same year (1999), the ARLPI in conjunction with a local NGO, the Agency for Co-
operation and Research in Development (ACORD) organised an international peace 
conference under the theme, “Peace Research and the Reconciliation Agenda” which 
drew participants from other conflict-ridden areas like Teso, Karamoja, West Nile406, 
Lango, and Bundibugyo to share experience and also combine efforts in the search for 
peace through non-violent means.  Other peace activities conducted by the ARLPI 
include the formation and participation in the joint peace District programmes, for 
example the Kitgum Joint Forum for Peace (KJFP)407 and the Gulu District 
Reconciliation and Peace Team (DRPT)408, contributing to the resettlement programme, 
identifying with the most vulnerable and setting up of reception centres for returnees, 
especially the Formerly Abducted Children (FAC). These projects attracted funding from 
local as well as international organisations409. 
One of the major achievement was the highlighting the plight of the children who had to 
trek long distances from their villages to the town centres where they would sleep on 
shop verandas in order to escape abduction and death by the LRA.  Some of these 
children had to travel a distance of over 15 kilometres every evening on a daily basis and 
go back the following morning. Even when it was rainy, making the temperature at night 
very cold, they had to do this because they had no alternative. Because of travelling at 
                                                  
406 Khadiagal Gilbert, “The Role of Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Peace Building in 
Northern Uganda”, USAID, Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project,  (March 2001), p. 8-10, 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACY566.pdf  
407 See Record and Proceeding of the Rally held at Lacekocot by Team “A” on Friday 11th February 2000, 
http://www.km-net.org.uk/about/partners/arig/rally.htm  
408 Ern K. Baines, “The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern 
Uganda”, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, No, 1, (2007), p. 91-114 
409 See New Vision 22nd July 2008, Gulu gets Shillings 520m Peace Project. The Gulu Reconciliation and 
Peace Team (GDRPT) received 200 000 Euros in 2008 from European Union and Save the Children in 
Uganda as assistance towards its programmes and activities of conflict resolution and reconciliation among 
the people of northern Uganda  
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night, they were called “Night Commuters”410. In June 2003, in a move aimed at raising 
international awareness about the plight and also demonstrating solidarity and 
compassion with the suffering children, the leaders of the ARLPI spent cold nights by 
sleeping with them on the verandas and streets of Gulu municipality.  
As pointed out by Otim, “in one of the most dramatic advocacy events, the leaders of the 
ARLPI walked to Gulu town and slept next to children on the verandas. American Free 
Press (AFP) quoted these religious leaders to have said, “We shall just carry our blankets 
as children do, so as to highlight their plight to the world”411. Since its inception, the 
ARLPI have travelled several times abroad and addressed international audiences in their 
efforts to further raise the conflict in northern Uganda and the plight of the Acholi people. 
These activities have earned them credibility and made them popular both at home and 
abroad. Although they have not been directly involved in mediation between the GOU 
and the LRA, they have played a number of roles but the most salient one being that of 
the bridge that links the two warring parties including other stake holders.  
Nevertheless, they have also met difficulties and challenges during the course of their 
activities in the process of searching for peace. Insufficient funding, poor coordination 
with UPDF units in operational zones, and negative attitude by government towards the 
Acholi people have had an impact on their activities. Two of the biggest problems have 
been mistrust by the LRA, government politicians and some senior officers of the UPDF, 
                                                  
410 Florence Ochola, “How to ensure that reparation do not further stigmatize victims, particularly 
children”, (March 2007), http://www.redress.org/downloads/events/StigmatizeVictimsFO.pdf  
411 Otim P. William, “The Role of the Acholi Traditional Leaders Peace Initiative in Uganda’s Peace 
building”, (March 2009), 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/role_acholi_religious_leaders.jsp?nid=6827  
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including the involvement of the ICC in trying to prosecute the leaders of the LRA, 
which has hampered reconciliation and peaceful conclusion of the war. 
Sometimes they have been perceived and branded as collaborators of the other side by the 
LRA and the GOU as well, a factor that has not only frustrated their efforts, but also put 
their lives in danger. Arising out of this is the fact that some religious leaders have been 
killed, shot at while in peace meetings, harassed, detained, others threatened with 
deportation, while others have been issued with ultimatum for death especially from the 
LRA. On 26th April 2001, Father Tarcisio Pazzaglia, an Italian Missionary from the 
Comboni Order and Rwot Aywek were shot at by the UPDF while meeting junior 
officers of the LRA in Pajule, Kitgum district, despite the fact that Father Pazzaglia had 
alerted the military authorities prior to this meeting412.   
The meeting was one in a series that had been conducted by the religious leaders aimed at 
convincing the rebels to negotiate peace with the government. Despite this incident and 
continued harassment by the UPDF, the religious leaders continued their efforts to 
contact the rebels and convince them to enter peace talks with government as they were 
sure that dialogue was the most feasible and best way of ending the conflict. Their efforts 
had paid off as they led to the release of several abductees, many of them children and 
women, including fighters escaping from the bush for example, seventeen fighters led by 
Major ‘Oneko-Mon-Ki-Koko’ who escaped from Sudan in October 2001 with the help of 
the Pajule Comboni Mission.   
                                                  
412 Father Carlos Rodriguez, “The Role of the Acholi Religious Leaders”, (2002), http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/northern-uganda/religious-leaders.php  
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On 28th August 2002, Fathers Tarcisio Pazzaglia, Giulio Albanese and Carlos Rodriguez 
came under heavy attack by the UPDF while meeting representatives of the LRA in 
Timangu, Kitgum District to convince them to release more abductees and to negotiate 
with government. They narrowly survived death but were arrested and detained by the 
UPDF413 despite their explanation of goodwill intentions and plea of innocence. To make 
matters worse, the act of storming the venue for the meeting by the UPDF raised concern 
in the LRA circles and made them suspect that it may have been a trap by the priests and 
which led Kony to be angry to the extent that he ordered his commanders to kill the 
religious leaders if they attempted similar contacts.  
In December of the same year, Father Carlos Rodriguez was threatened with deportation 
by the UPDF after being accused of “making false allegations” against the UPDF. The 
spokesman of the UPDF, Shaban Bantariza, is quoted to have said that, “he is always 
misrepresenting what is happening on the ground”414. However, critics pointed out that 
the priest’s threat of deportation emanated from his criticism of the way the army was 
handling the war in northern Uganda. In 2003, the LRA attacked the Comboni 
Missionary headquarters in Opit, 40 kilometres South East of Gulu town, torched nearby 
huts, looted and destroyed church property before abducting about 30 people415. Despite 
these setbacks, the religious leaders are still determined to continue with peace efforts. 
This is demonstrated in their New Year messages in which they emphasise their 
commitment to reconciliation, moral rehabilitation and building peace in the 
                                                  
413 Father Carlos Rodriguez, “Acholi: People Want Peace but the Men with Guns Don’t”, 
http://www.acholipeace.8k.com/leadership.html  
414 Omar Kezimbira, “Ugandan Army Seeks Priests Exit – BBC”, http://www.mail-
archive.com/ugandanet@kym.net/msg11087.html  
415 See LRA rebels decline mediation of religious leaders and attack two missions, (June 2003), 
http://www.mail-archive.com/ugandanet@kym.net/msg04051.html  
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community416.  They have also told the United States leaders that the military force will 
neither work against the LRA nor end the conflict because the situation is complex as it 
involves splinter groups and tribal conflicts417.  They particularly advised president 
Obama to support non-violent means of settling the conflict, such as negotiations418.   
The ARLPI are also not in favour of the ICC prosecution of the LRA leaders, a view that 
is also held by most ordinary Acholi people. Indeed it has been pointed out that attitudes 
in northern Uganda have tended to shift towards non-prosecutorial alternatives419. They 
argue that prosecution will neither bring everlasting peace nor end the war and that 
instead compromise should be adopted for the sake of peace.  Thus the ARLPI warned 
that the threat of legal action would put the peace process in the north at risk. Speaking to 
the French News Agency (AFP), Archbishop John Baptist Odama said that, 
“The peace process has been put in jeopardy. We all thought that the (local) peace 
process was the only avenue to yield real fruits, but it seems it has not been given enough 
time. We do not question the existence of the ICC or its principles. However, we feel that 
the presence of the court here and its activities are in danger of jeopardising the efforts 
to rebuild the rebels’ confidence in peace talks. How can we tell the LRA soldiers to 
come out of the bush and receive amnesty when at the same time the threat of their arrest 
by the ICC hangs over their heads?’420    
                                                  
416 See Peace and Hope in the Great Jubilee Year 2000: A New Year Message of the Acholi Religious 
Leaders on the Ocasson of the World Day of Peace, January 1st 2000, http://www.km-
net.org.uk/about/partners/arig/hope.htm  
417 See Ugandan Bishops tell US leaders military option won’t work against rebels, 15th September 2010, 
http://www.arlpi.org/september-15-2010-ugandan-bishops-tell-us-leaders-military-option-won-t-work-
against-rebels  
418 New Vision 28th May 2010, Acholi warn Obama on Kony 
419 Linda M. Keller, “Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan 
Alternative Justice Mechanisms”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No, 209, (2008), p. 
228 
420 Waldimar Pelser “Will ICC Prosecutions Threaten Ugandan Peace Process?” (November 2005) 
http://iwpr.net/report-news/will-icc-prosecutions-threaten-ugandan-peace-process  
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That there is relative peace in Acholiland currently does not guarantee that it will endure 
the test of time, as long as the underlying structural causes remain insufficiently 
addressed. Because of this, the ARLPI continue to stress that they are willing to play the 
role of the “bridge” between the LRA and the GOU. This is underpinned by a declaration 
in a joint statement at the end of the International Conference of Religious Leaders on the 
LRA Issue, which took place in Kisangani, DRC, between 2nd - 4th February 2010 in 
which they expressed commitment to peace and resolved to lobby for the completion of 
the Juba Peace Talks and also that the GOU should continue to pursue this initiative in 
order to find a durable solution, as one of the recommendations421.  
Despite their demonstrated ability and willingness to act as peace interlocutors and 
continued pressing for dialogue between the GOU and the LRA, the ARLPI have 
continued to face challenges. The UPDF’s conduct and rhetoric has demonstrated lack of 
patience in peaceful means to end the war and this has negatively impacted on the efforts 
of the religious leaders to bring the two warring parties together. It has tended to prefer 
and rely on military strategy which is opposed by religious leaders because it increases 
the civilian casualties, is a hindrance to reconciliation and therefore an obstacle to 
peaceful resolution of the conflict.  
This has created challenges from both sides. It has led them to be regarded with suspicion 
especially by the LRA and therefore put their lives at risk while the GOU has tended to 
                                                  
421 The ARLPI attended an International Conference of the Religious Leaders on The LRA Issue from 2nd 
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discourage them from contacting the LRA. However, despite these challenges, the 
ARLPI remained determined and vowed to continue pressing for dialogue between the 
GOU and the LRA and to play the role of “bridge” even in the face of serious risks and 
setbacks,422 the result of which is the current relative peace in Acholiland. It should also 
be realised that although the current peace has been largely because religious and cultural 
leaders insisted and led peace negotiations, the war between the LRA and the GOU has 
not been conclusively brought to an end, but instead what has changed is the war theatre.   
Betty Bigombe’s Second Peace Attempt (2004-2005): 
Following the collapse of the peace talks between the GOU and the LRA in 1994 as a 
result of Museveni’s ultimatum to the rebels to surrender within seven days or face 
military annihilation, Bigombe who had initiated these talks moved to Washington, 
United States of America in 1997 to work with the World Bank. She worked as a senior 
social scientist in the post-conflict unit as well as a consultant in the Bank’s Social 
Protection and Human Development Unit and also as a Senior Fellow at the United States 
Institute of Peace (USIP). Despite her relocation outside Uganda, she remained strongly 
committed to bring about peaceful end to the conflict in her home region of northern 
Uganda and also convinced that dialogue was the most viable way to ensure durable 
peace.  
                                                  
422 Museveni wrote a letter to Archbishop John Baptist Odama instructing him to stop making contacts with 
the rebels because the LRA was planning to kill him. But the ARLPI said that although they had no way of 
verifying the allegation, if the LRA has any message to pass on, they will continue to do so. They further 
said that, “we are not interested in politics. We think People’s blood should not be spilt any more. We have 
a clear agenda, to stop the deaths of people. We will continue appealing to both parties to sit down and 
talk”. http://newsite.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=34877     
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While in Washington, she maintained contacts with stakeholders in the northern Uganda 
war which she established while working as a minister in the region, and more especially 
with the LRA high command and the various peace emissaries. She realised that in order 
to overcome her felt frustration by the lack of political will on the part of the GOU and 
the UPDF to end the war, which she experienced during the previous failed attempt when 
she acted as a mediator between the two warring parties, there was need to use pressure 
by involving other parties especially the international community. This would also give 
credibility to the talks. Her network contacts established while in Washington would 
guarantee this.  
In February 2004 while watching her TV she saw footage of the Barlonyo massacre in 
which more than 200 people were murdered, many of them hacked to death while others 
were herded in their huts which were torched and roasted alive by the LRA rebels423. This 
followed a series of horrendous attacks and atrocities which included among others, the 
Atiak massacre, and the abduction of 132 girls from St. Marry’s College Aboke, which   
attracted world attention and condemnation. She had been following events in northern 
Uganda which continued to unfold ever since her mediated peace talks which failed as a 
result of government calling off negotiations on the eve of signing of the agreement.  
The underlying causes of the war remained unaddressed and led to its enduring and 
escalation. Indeed according to her, “when underlying causes of conflict remain un-
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addressed, there is a reasonable likelihood that conflict will flare up again”424. This same 
observation is noted by Ssenyonjo when he points out that, “--even if the LRA rebellion 
is suppressed, it is likely that more rebellions will emerge and instability will continue 
until the underlying political questions have been appropriately resolved”425. The 
worsening humanitarian situation became of major concern to her. This is underpinned in 
her statement as she prepared to leave Washington for Uganda when she said that, 
“people are dying. Children are not going to school- it just can’t go on anymore”426.  
Arising out of the above was the fact that the military strategy had failed to bring peace in 
northern Uganda. Indeed she further said that, “i am also a strong believer that military 
victory will never bring sustainable peace. You can subdue people, you can humiliate 
them, they feel they have no voice, they will go underground- it will resurface”427. The 
rebels had also escalated and expanded their operations, covering a wide area that 
included DRC, Central African Republic (CAR) and parts of Western and Southern 
Sudan. 
In March 2004, she took leave from World Bank and flew to Uganda to make another 
attempt at peace negotiations by playing the role of mediator. Backed by the UN, UK, 
Norway and Netherlands, she travelled to Sudan from May 2004 and begun shuttle 
diplomacy between the Sudanese officials, GOU and the LRA in an attempt to put the 
                                                  
424 Tabu Butagira and Kakaire, “Corruption prolonged the LRA war, says insider”, (September 2007), 
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Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 
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peace project back on track. Although she could not meet Kony as he remained elusive, 
she maintained discreet link with some members of the LRA high command. With the 
support of Sudan government, she travelled to Juba where she stayed between May and 
June 2004 using her influence to contact the LRA. In particular, her link with Sam Kolo, 
an influential and senior LRA field commander who was regarded as a moderate, seemed 
to rejuvenate a sense of optimism in giving peace talks another chance.       
Consequently, she succeeded in arranging a series of meetings between the LRA and 
various groups which included GOU officials, religious leaders, Acholi cultural leaders, 
civic society, the UPDF and MPs. Her efforts also led to a ceasefire declaration between 
the belligerents and a landmark meeting in Palabek in December 2004 which witnessed 
the Ugandan delegation led by the minister of Internal Affairs shake hands with senior 
LRA commanders after several years of bitter hostility. However, in December 2004, 
violations of the ceasefire by both parties curtailed her mediation efforts and threatened 
to derail the peace process.  
In addition to this, the surrender of Sam Kolo, the main LRA negotiator in February 2005 
to the UPDF428, with whom she had been in close contact tended to compound the 
situation as the LRA seemed to view her as a government operative429. In tandem with 
this situation and aggravating it was the fact that the GOU requested the ICC430 to 
                                                  
428 Kasaija P. Apuuli, “Amnesty and International Law: The Case of the Lords Resistance Army Insurgence 
in Northern Uganda”, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5, No, 2, (2007) p.1-30   
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investigate the LRA, which subsequently issued arrest warrants for Kony and four of his 
top lieutenants. Nevertheless, despite these setbacks, her mediation efforts, like in the 
first attempt of 1994 became one of the most successful peace overtures which provided 
the foundation for the Juba peace talks. Although she still believes dialogue is the only 
viable option to bring the war between the LRA and GOU to amicable end, it is not clear 
whether she is still in contact with the LRA.  
The Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008):     
In 2006, the LRA and the GOU agreed to hold talks in the southern Sudanese town of 
Juba.  These talks which began on 14th July 2006 and lasted for 22 months before 
collapsing in April 2008 were facilitated by the government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
with Dr. Riek Machar, as the Chief Mediator. Several other individuals representing 
local, regional and international bodies and governments were also involved. They 
included among others, Joaquim Chissano, former president of Mozambique as a Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, Japheth R. Gitugi, government of Kenya, 
Francisco Caetano Madeira, republic of Mozambique, Lt. Gen. (Rtd) Gilbert Lebeko 
Romano, for South Africa, Ali I. Siwa, Tanzania, David W. Gressly, UN Deputy resident 
and Humanitarian Coordinator Southern Sudan, Andre M. Kapanga, DRC, Heidi 
Johansen, for Norway, Anna Sundstram, European Union, Timothy R. Shortley, USA 
and Bryan E. Burton for the government of Canada.   
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Deliberations began on day one July 14th 2006 with members of the negotiating teams 
from the warring parties presenting their positions. The LRA put forward the following 
demands. 
1. Ceasefire: an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities   
2. IDP camps people to go back to their villages 
3. Land: the issue of land grabbing must stop until the population is put in a position 
to make a judicious decision 
4. The army to reflect a national character in terms of regional balance and must pay 
allegiance to the constitution rather than the president. 
5. Political persecution and marginalisation of the north and East must stop 
immediately and a proportionate power sharing arrangement that takes into 
account regional balance effected 
6. Development of the northern region which has been marginalised since 
independence must be addressed 
7. Equal opportunities for proportionate employment, education and access to public 
resources for all Ugandans 
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8. The use of derogatory language demonising certain sections of the population and 
sowing the seeds of hatred and disunity must stop henceforth  
On its part, the Uganda government put forward the following; 
1. Renounce and abandon all forms of terrorism 
2. Cease all forms of hostilities 
3. Disband and handover all weapons and their inventory 
4. Assemble in agreed upon areas for demobilisation, disarmament and 
documentation 
5. Combatants who qualify will be integrated into the UPDF and those who wish to 
go home will be reintegrated into civilian life 
6. Government to re-engage cultural and religious leaders to reconcile demobilised 
combatants with their community 
The talks were conducted in a cordial atmosphere of relative calm but were also 
characterised by accusations and counter accusations, sometimes tempers flaring, and 
absence of the field commanders on the LRA negotiating team. Despite these problems, 
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the process witnessed the signing of 5 protocols in 21 months431. These protocols are; 
Cessation of Hostilities (COH), Comprehensive solutions to the problems of Northern 
Uganda, Accountability and Reconciliation, Final (permanent) Ceasefire, and 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).   
Although the above five agreements were crucial in as far as bringing peace and stability 
in northern Uganda in general and Acholiland in particular is concerned, the Protocol on 
Accountability and Reconciliation was the most important aspect of the Juba peace talks. 
In fact it was considered the backbone of the talks that would break or give impetus to the 
peace process and ensure the future stability of Acholiland. This was because in order for 
justice to prevail, issues to do with human rights violations that were committed during 
the course of the war and the need to promote and ensure durable peace was a paramount 
prerequisite. As such, the agreement provided for the use of both formal and informal 
mechanisms of justice, reconciliation and conflict resolution. 
Within this framework, a special division of the Ugandan court system was to be created 
and mandated to exercise jurisdiction432 over individuals alleged to have committed 
serious crimes, especially those described as serious war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The agreement further provided that state actors shall be subjected to existing 
formal criminal and civil justice measures while non-state actors shall be subjected to 
special justice processes433 as well as local mechanism carried out under independent and 
                                                  
431 See Report of International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace With or Without Kony, 
Africa Report No, 146. (December 2008) p. ii 
432 See, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Article 6 (6.1) 
433 Ibid, Clause 4.1 
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impartial investigations434 by the state. It also provided for the application and use of 
“Mato Oput”, the Acholi traditional justice and conflict resolution mechanism performed 
to reconcile parties formerly in conflict after full accountability. 
As the debate on accountability and reconciliation continued to be salient, questions such 
as who would be responsible for selection of those considered to have committed serious 
crimes and under what criteria raised further concern among the participants. The main 
argument hinged not on whether accountability and reconciliation should be carried out, 
but rather how it should be implemented, that is, through which mechanism. The LRA 
stressed the need to recognise the causes of the war and that all parties must accept 
responsibility for the atrocities committed, suggested and recommended the application 
of the traditional justice mechanism and payment of compensation.  
On its part, the GOU insisted that in order for justice to be seen to be done formal courts 
must try those responsible for serious crimes, arguing that this was in line with the 
requirements of the Rome Statute of the ICC that is aimed at preventing impunity435. It 
should be realised that in 2003, Museveni referred the LRA to the ICC436 for 
investigation, making Uganda the first country to make such referral437 and continued to 
rely on it as one of the strategies to pressurise the LRA to end the war. It is no surprise 
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therefore that the ICC was recognised438 in the Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation.  
The legal justice mechanism and its implementation thus became a sticky issue during the 
Juba peace process. In a lengthy discussion under the themes; international legal 
standards, Uganda legal justice, traditional mechanism and accountability, the parties, 
amid tensions recognised the importance of traditional justice mechanism and the role it 
plays in conflict resolution and reconciliation, but could not agree that it should be the 
sole accountability mechanism to be adopted. This made the Ugandan position 
problematic. Arising out of this situation is the fact that Musevenis position on 
accountability, to a large extent displayed inconsistency, as he repeatedly stated that he 
was willing to request the ICC to lift the indictments, but only if the FPA was signed 
first.  
Indeed as pointed out by Dagne, “--president Museveni announced on July 19th 2007, that 
warrants for the top LRA leaders will remain in place until a final peace agreement has 
been reached: “we are not going to ask the ICC to lift the arrest warrants. If the LRA 
leaders don’t conclude the peace talks, they could be arrested and taken to the ICC or get 
killed. If they conclude the peace deal, that is when the government can write to the ICC 
to say we have found an alternative solution”439.  From this assertion, it can be argued 
that Museveni was not, and to a large extent continues not to be interested in dialogue but 
rather coercion and force in dealing with the LRA, an issue that many people especially 
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439 Dagne Ted, “Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in Northern Uganda”, Congressional Research 
Service, (May 2009), p. 6-7, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA501201   
282 
 
the Acholi accuse him of. Indeed Museveni is quoted by Egeland in his book “A Billion 
Lives: An Eye Witness Report from the Frontiers of Humanity” as never interested in 
dialogue and having said that, “let me be categorical--there will only be a military 
solution to this problem”440.  
Although the parties managed to sign the Agreement on accountability and reconciliation 
on 29th June 2007, the issue of indictments remained a thorny issue, and one that 
threatened the success of the peace process. The ARLPI advocated for the suspension of 
the indictments in order to ensure that dialogue was given a chance to succeed by 
pointing out that the timing came at a very sensitive and critical moment441 when 
dialogue was taking place. Arising out of this situation is the fact that the final protocol 
which was supposed to be signed on 10th April 2008 to symbolise the Final Peace 
Agreement (FPA) could not take place as Kony never showed up at the agreed venue for 
signing. In explaining his refusal to sign the FPA, he said that this was because matters 
regarding his security were not sufficiently addressed442. By this he was referring to the 
warrants of arrest that were issued against him and four of his top commanders in 
October 2005443. According to Kony, the warrants had to be withdrawn first if he was to 
sign the FPA444.  Indeed as pointed out by Kriksciun, the LRA emphasised that “they will 
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not sign a peace deal unless the ICC -- lifts its arrest warrants for its leader, Joseph Kony, 
and four of his senior associates”445.    
The issue of the ICC did not only become a roadblock to peaceful resolution of the war, 
but has also proved to be controversial because Museveni considered it as a means to 
bring the rebels to the negotiating table446 rather than a means of bringing the violators of 
human rights to justice and also with little regard to its implications and consequences to 
ending the war.  Whereas it has been pointed out that the ICC weakened the LRA and 
therefore forced it to accept and participate in the Juba peace process, it has neither 
achieved its overall objective of bringing the perpetrators to justice nor ending the 
confrontation between the LRA and the GOU. With the refusal by Kony to sign the final 
agreement, the peace negotiations were declared collapsed and Kony and his troops have 
since relocated in an area covering the jungles of DR Congo, Central African Republic 
(CAR) and southern Sudan where atrocities against civilians and clashes with the UPDF 
troops pursuing him continue to take place. 
The United Nations (UN): 
The United Nations was founded on the premise “to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war”447. This means that protecting human kind from disasters arising out 
of, for example wars by stopping them or even preventing them from happening is one of 
its cardinal aims. Despite this goal however, the UN neither intervened nor played a 
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significant role in the war, at least in the early stages, between the LRA and the GOU 
until 2003, seventeen years after it had been going on, despite the presence of conflict 
Early Warning and Response Mechanism (EWRM) in its framework448. For all these 
years, the war in Acholiland and the plight of the Acholi people remained hidden from 
the international community.  
As the plight of the Acholi people worsened and led to the deaths of many people, the 
world bodies, it can be argued, tended to keep quiet or ignored the phenomenon perhaps 
thinking that it was under control by the GOU. In fact UNICEF estimated that the number 
of children forcefully abducted by the LRA to be 25,000, while human rights 
organisations put the number of people killed at 300,000 with many more reported 
missing or disappeared in unclear circumstances449. It was only after Jan Egeland, the 
then Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 
Coordinator briefed the UN Security Council in April 2004 by asking such questions as, 
“where else in the world have there been 20,000 children kidnapped; where else in the 
world have 90 percent of the population in large districts been displaced; where else in 
the world do children make up 80 percent of the terrorist insurgency movement”450 that 
the UN started rethinking about the situation in northern Uganda.  
It is against this background that many Acholi people think that the conflict in their home 
region could have perhaps been subdued, lives saved and the suffering avoided or 
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lessened, if the UN was to act first. However, it should be realised that the UN’s inability 
or slow response, at least in the early stages of the war stem from various angles and are 
intertwined with its legal protocols and workings. One of these is to be found in the 
principle of sovereignty of the state, although since the September 11th 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States of America, the principle of sovereignty has increasingly 
been violated.   The concept of sovereignty of the state is enshrined in Chapter two of the 
UN’ Charter. According to this chapter, 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. (---) Nothing contained in 
the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter--”451. 
This concept of sovereignty has tended to give leverage to repressive authoritarian rulers 
to violate people’s human rights and do anything they like in their countries without 
being checked.  In the meantime, people continue to suffer and the economies decline 
because huge resources continue to be channelled to building military machinery at the 
expense of other sectors as dictators continue to rely on the ethnicized military as a power 
base and an instrument that maintains them in power. Indeed as pointed out by Reno, 
“international support for African sovereignty offers additional resources to manage 
political rivals or would-be rivals by giving the rulers the prerogative to decide who has 
access to the country’s territory” and enables them “to shield transactions from the eyes 
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of outsiders”452. The same observation has also been pointed out by other scholars by 
saying that the way rulers exploit the principle of sovereignty by “--confining a 
diversionary conflict within the state’s borders gives the state’s government considerable 
advantage by allowing it to frame the conflict in terms favourable to itself”453.  
It is also worth noting that in one of the UN Secretary General’s Reports, Kofi Anan, 
former UN Secretary General stated the following in 1998;  
“For the UN, there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition 
than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the 
promotion of human security and human development. Ensuring human security is, in the 
broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the UN”454.  
Two years later in 2002, he stated the following; 
“--i have stressed that conflict prevention lies at the heart of the mandate of the UN in 
the maintenance of international peace and security--- conflict prevention strategies offer 
the greatest potential for promoting lasting peace and creating an enabling environment 
for sustainable development”455.  
In the same report, he recognises the need to prevent conflict by stating that,  
“One of the principle aims of preventative actions should be to address the deep-rooted 
socio-economic, cultural, environmental institutional and other structural causes that 
often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts”456.   
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It is important to note that all this was being said when the war in Acholiland was taking 
place. Besides condemning the war, no immediate practical action for example by 
investigating or deploying UN peace keeping troops was effected despite the various 
voices within northern Uganda that were calling on the UN for action.  
In addition to the above is the fact that different sets of people who flee their homes and 
who ordinarily qualify to be refugees are treated differently by the international 
community. The point to note here is that according to international legal conventions, 
refugees are those people who escape from their homes for example because of war and 
who flee across international borders. This means that if you flee from your home 
because of the same reasons but remain in your country, the international community will 
not recognise you to be a refugee according to international legal convention and 
therefore you will not be protected by the international community. 
Toole and Waldman point out that, “refugees are clearly defined by international legal 
conventions and, therefore, are entitled to protection and assistance by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In contrast, persons who flee their homes 
for the same reasons as refugees but who remain inside their own countries enjoy no such 
legal status”457. They continue to point out that “these ‘internally displaced’ persons are 
particularly in a precarious situation because they are often beyond the reach of 
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international agencies, which rely on cooperation of national governments to deliver 
relief aid”458.  
The African Union (AU): 
The African Union was formally constituted in 2002 after dissolving the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU). The Charter of the AU stipulates several important principles, 
among them, “to promote peace, security, and stability --- as well as to engage in 
effective intervention under grave circumstances”459. It was established with robust 
emphasis on providing African solutions to African problems. In 2004, the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC), the AU’s arm responsible for addressing conflict through 
prevention, management and resolution was established460. However, this mechanism had 
already been established under the OAU in 1993461 except that this time it adopted a new 
name and new mandate.  It should also be realised that the war in Acholiland started 
during the period of the OAU and at the time of its transformation into the AU, the war 
was still raging on and in actual fact had entered its 18th year. Although the AU has 
intervened in a number of conflict situations by conducting peace missions on the African 
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continent, for example in Burundi, Darful and Somalia462, in the case of northern Uganda, 
the Acholi people feel it let them down.   
The one million dollar question is why should situations become catastrophic with tens of 
thousands of people dying, leave alone emerging in the first instance, when the 
mechanism for monitoring and prevention of conflict has been put in place? 
Alternatively, at what level does a situation turn into catastrophic as described in Section 
4 of the Charter? These and perhaps several other questions will continue to pose a 
serious challenge to the AU in as far as it’s in/ability and capacity to deal with conflicts 
on the African continent is concerned. That this mechanism is armed with an early 
warning system which is based on intelligence gathering and information network 
analysis among other protocols in order to provide response action but yet conflict tends 
to be nurtured and rage on in member states, speaks a lot in terms of challenges facing the 
AU and conflict management.  
One of the major responsibilities of the PSC is also “to assess potential crisis situations 
and send fact-finding missions to trouble spots” but for northern Uganda war, this doesn’t 
seem to have been the case.  It can therefore be argued that Acholiland, which by its 
geographical location is at the epicentre of a region prone to instability, was never given 
due attention. In a situation of this nature, repressive regimes are bound to continue 
oppressing their people and targeting some ethnic groups overtly or covertly, moreover 
with impunity which has led to enduring conflicts on the continent.  
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Several factors can explain why it has tended to be difficult for the African Union to 
intervene in the conflicts on the African continent. First, the contemporary African 
politics is based on a system of sovereign states in which non-intervention is the norm. 
For example Section 4 of the AU Charter states that “Non-interference by any Member 
State in the internal affairs of another and the right of the Union to intervene in the 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely; war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”463.  The concept of 
sovereignty provides authoritarian rulers protection from their acts being effectively 
scrutinised and also from being accountable to their own people including the 
international community.  
Arising out of this is the fact that the warnings and calls for help from people who are 
about or have started to be attacked are often ignored as the ruler convinces the 
international community that the situation is under control, in effect hiding his heinous 
acts under the shield of sovereignty, thus resulting into misery and suffering of the people 
as has been the case with the war in Acholiland464.  This in turn creates impunity in the 
military forces to violate the citizens’ rights under the disguise of crushing a nascent 
uprising. Because they have the backing of the person holding the highest office in the 
country, the president, who is also the commander-in-chief, the military personnel behave 
in such a way that the state of chaos continues as they direct their efforts in building a 
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political economy of war fare.  But this creates more disorder, socio-political discontent 
and further weakens the state as its legitimacy increasingly becomes under question. In 
such a situation, the rulers can only survive through patronage networks and the use of 
selective force and intimidation.  
But there is also a bigger problem in the early warning and response mechanism of who 
should be warned and who should act on this warning465.  This is especially so because 
many rulers on the African continent share similar characteristics of authoritarianism, bad 
governance, corruption and the tendency to perpetually elongate their stay in office, in 
effect becoming life presidents and as such they tend to lack moral authority to give 
warning of a potential conflict or suggest solutions even when it is happening in the 
neighbourhood, unless if such action will serve their personal interests.  
In the nexus of conflict resolution, it has also been argued that the role of conflict 
resolution through mediation can best be done by countries in proximity of the country 
where the war is taking place and more especially the neighbouring countries. The idea 
behind this reasoning is that “due to their cultural affinity and common social and 
historical configuration, the people of a region normally have more intimate knowledge 
of the evolution and political sensitivities of the conflict in question---. Their general 
sense of solidarity, arising from common histories, experiences, geographic contiguity 
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and cultural compatibility, can play a central role in the process of consensus building in 
times of crisis”466.   
But even within this intervention framework and strategy of proximity and 
neighbourhood, problems of neutrality and impartiality are bound to arise and even if a 
neighbouring country facilitates and mediates peace talks, cases of abrogating the 
agreements are not new especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The NRM government is a 
good example here, having dishonoured the Nairobi peace-talks agreement with the Tito 
Okello Military Junta in 1985 and preferring a military solution rather than peace 
negotiation467.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC): 
The ICC was established on 1st July 2003 by the Rome Statute Section 16, as a permanent 
international institution with the objective and “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, ---, and shall be 
complimentary to national criminal jurisdictions468”. These crimes include genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. In December 2003, Museveni referred the LRA 
to ICC for investigation concerning human rights violations and war crimes469. In January 
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2004, Moreno Okampo, the ICC prosecutor formally opened an investigation into the 
northern Uganda war.  
This was at a time when efforts in search of peace especially through dialogue were being 
undertaken by various parties, particularly the ARLPI, an interfaith peace building and 
conflict transformation organisation that was formed in 1997 as a proactive response to 
the war and suffering of people in Acholiland. The government’s move of referring the 
LRA to the ICC impacted negatively on the ARLPI’s efforts in the search for peace. 
While they recognised Uganda’s position as a signatory to the Rome Statute, and its 
attempt to address issues of human rights violations moreover with impunity around the 
world, they at the same time expressed reservations about its ability to bring peace in 
northern Uganda, especially because of what they called “Lack of sensitivity for current 
initiatives taking place to bring about peace and justice--”470. In addition to this, it was 
perceived negatively as being partisan, especially by the people in the north because it 
was invited by Museveni, himself a party to the conflict and also given the fact that 
officials of ICC had held joint press conferences with him and other GOU officials.  
In 2005, the ICC indicted Kony and his four top commanders; Vincent Otti, Raska 
Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen471, and issued warrants for their arrest. 
From the time the ICC exerted its influence on the war between the LRA and the NRM 
government, events on the ground changed, but these changes were both for the good and 
bad. Good in the sense that for the first time, it put international pressure on Kony and the 
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LRA to come to the negotiating table in Juba, which led to the signing of five agreements 
between 14th July 2006 and 29th February 2008. This was a significant achievement since 
the war began 21 years ago in 1987. Although the comprehensive peace still remains an 
illusion, as the two parties are still at war, though outside Uganda’s international 
boundaries, the relative peace in northern Uganda in general and Acholiland in particular 
can be said to be a result of this pressure. On the other hand, the ICC’s involvement and 
especially its indictments on Kony and his top lieutenants has turned out to be one of the 
major obstacles to achieving comprehensive peace between the NRM government and 
the LRA, a factor that makes sustainable peace in northern Uganda fragile and 
uncertain472. The leadership of the LRA indicted by the ICC have categorically stated that 
they cannot (and perhaps will never) sign the comprehensive peace agreement unless and 
until the indictments are withdrawn.  
Kony has persistently blamed the indictments against him and four of his top lieutenants 
on Museveni’s propaganda and manipulation. On 28th June 2006, he and his number two 
Vincent Otti appealed to the ICC to come to their Garamba base in DRC in order to hear 
their side of the story. Their appeal was made through Bellie O’kademire, a presenter on 
Radio France International (RFI) whom they called and said that “ICC should come 
quickly to Garamba but without the warrant of arrest. We are ready to host them for three 
days so that they get our side of the story”473.  
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They argued that the ICC had convicted them before hearing their side of the story and 
further said that “we are ready to go to The Hague but first listen to us”. Prior to this 
interview, Kony spoke to Sam Farmar, the Times of London journalist whom he met in a 
lengthy face-to-face interview in the jungles of the DR Congo. Asked about the killings, 
abductions and mutilations that were perpetuated in his name, Kony said that, “that is not 
true. It is just propaganda. Museveni went into the villages and cut off the ears of the 
people, telling the people that it was the work of the LRA. I cannot cut off the ear of my 
brother---it was Museveni who destroyed our wealth and property--I don’t kill civilians, I 
kill the soldiers of Museveni”474.   
The ICC arrest warrants have been one of the most challenging issues to the GOU in the 
search for peace and justice with regard to the northern Uganda war. This is because, if 
the arrest warrants are withdrawn, then Kony and his commanders would not only get 
away with impunity, but it would also send a bed message to countries that are signatory 
to the statute, some of whom have almost or similar internal problems they would like to 
refer to the same court in future. In addition to this, “when a nation ratifies the Rome 
Statute, it automatically accepts the oversight of the ICC”475. It is also worth noting that 
the Juba agreement acknowledges the ICC476 . Although not elaborate, it acknowledges 
the prevention of impunity according to “--the requirements of the Rome Statute of the 
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International Criminal Court--”477 and obliges government to “address conscientiously 
the question of the ICC arrest warrants relating to the leaders of the LRA/M”478.  
The issue of the ICC continues to be a tricky one and a constraint in as far as justice, 
durable peace and stability are concerned. Meanwhile, the ICC on its part has insisted 
that it cannot drop the indictments on Kony and the LRA as this would compromise the 
mandate of the court. However, the referrals have neither ended the war nor brought the 
perpetrators to justice, but instead has sparked a debate both in the national and 
international circles as to whether they are a roadblock to peace negotiations and 
therefore whether they should be dropped or withheld479. Within this context, many 
people especially the Acholi who have been the main victims of the war prefer peace first 
and justice later. The rebels also have insisted that the indictments must be dropped if a 
final agreement is to be reached  
It is against this background that the LRA negotiating team visited The Hague in June 
2006 with an objective of persuading the prosecutor to withdraw the indictments against 
Kony and his commanders, but did not get the assurance. Even if the ICC is acting within 
its mandate and with good intentions of prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity, its influence has led to devastating consequences on the resolution of the war, 
and peace and stability in the region and more especially in the areas of eastern DRC, 
Sudan and CAR where governments control is fluid and therefore Kony can move at 
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ease. Military confrontation between the LRA and UPDF has continued in CAR where 
several attempts to destroy the LRA have not only ended in failure, but also resulted in 
heavy civilian casualties of the people in the area. In the meantime, Museveni has 
continued to insist that the ICC warrants of arrest will remain in place480 until Kony signs 
the FPA and renounces violence.   
Mato Oput: 
This is a traditional justice mechanism used by the Acholi people in resolving disputes. It 
is based on confession of one’s wrongdoing, apology, compensation, and forgiveness. 
The Acholi people have a long history of resolving conflict481 and stymieing potential 
disputes and their escalation within intra-clan, inter-clan and inter-tribal communities 
through this traditional mechanism that has been carried on from generation to 
generation. Under this mechanism, the offender who has for example committed a crime 
of theft or killed another person is expected to accept and confess his wrongdoing in the 
presence of people representing different parties. These parties include the family or clan 
or tribe of the wrongdoer, the victim or relatives and people from the side of the victim to 
whom the truth has to be explained as to why he did it and ask for forgiveness, giving 
assurance that he will never do it again.  
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This Acholi traditional ritual of cleansing, forgiveness and reconciliation makes use of 
different items which carry different meanings and cultural significance but which overall 
symbolise appeasing and togetherness. These include eggs, ‘pobo’ tree482, sheep, goats, 
‘kwete’483, and gifts such as cattle, produce and money. The egg symbolises something 
that does not have a mouth and therefore does not abuse or insult. It thus signifies 
innocence, peace, holiness and therefore cleanliness. During the performance of the 
reconciliation ritual, the two parties, the perpetrator and the victim or representative(s) of 
the victim will each step on the egg and the ‘pobo’ tree. This will be followed by 
presenting of traditional gifts from both parties. For example each party will bring a ram 
and stand facing one another while holding the ram. Thereafter the animals will be slit 
open and blood from both mixed with ‘kwete’ in the calabash and both parties will lower 
their heads and sip from this brew at the same time.  
At this moment women will make ululations accompanied by traditional songs and peace 
and reconciliation will be regarded as restored. These tools have been used by the Acholi 
people for generations and the traditional practice is aimed at bringing about order and 
harmony in the community whenever there is calamity, misunderstandings or disputes. 
Indeed as observed by Vorke, the aim of the traditional justice mechanism “--is not 
punishment of the perpetrators for deeds done in the past, but restoration as a basis for 
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reconciliation”484. Reconciliation is necessary for peace and tranquillity in society in 
general and restoration of cordial as well as social relationship between conflicting 
parties in particular. Within this process, the conflicting parties have to come to 
consensus that what has been told as truth is the real truth, in which case the perpetrator 
apologises and asks for forgiveness from the victim(s) who will in turn reciprocate 
acceptance and forgive. 
However, critics of the traditional justice mechanism point out that it can only work in 
limited contexts and in specific communities where there are shared values and 
relationships and that therefore it is not suitable for the complex war between the LRA 
and the NRM government as it involves diverse parties from different backgrounds. The 
different parties in the sense that it has for example involved firstly, conflict among the 
Acholi (Acholi against Acholi) and secondly, Acholi against the NRM government. 
Moreover, according to one Acholi legislator, “the NRM government is not comfortable 
with the traditional justice mechanism especially in as far as truth-search and truth-telling 
is concerned because it requires confessions from perpetrators and victims. This will 
implicate it in committing atrocities against the Acholi people despite the fact that it has 
maintained denial and thus put it at the same level with Kony”485. This is because the 
perpetrators would come face-to-face with the victims and in the case of the UPDF 
soldiers, reveal who ordered them.  
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Should this happen, then it would be a big blow to the NRM government which has over 
the years maintained intense and high-level propaganda by depicting the LRA as 
terrorists486 and killers.  It would also confirm allegations that the UPDF masqueraded as 
Kony rebels and attacked the civilians inside Uganda and Sudan in order to discredit the 
LRA. It should also be realised that throughout the conflict, the GOU has attributed all 
the attacks on civilians on the LRA. This is despite the fact that some incidents of violent 
attacks against civilians have been reported to have been carried out by the UPDF 
although it vehemently denies these allegations.  
For example the 14th June 2008 attack in Pageri Payam487, Southern Sudan in which a 
civilian was killed and others injured and the attacks on Kakokeji488 in the same month in 
which a trader was killed were found out to be the responsibility of the UPDF 
masquerading as the LRA and not the LRA as was claimed by the UPDF. This strategy of 
scapegoating was also used by the then NRA guerrillas in the Luwero Triangle, as 
already indicated above by masquerading as the government army of Obote, the UNLA 
which was predominantly Acholi and committing atrocities against the civilians which 
they blamed on the army, and subsequently persuaded the civilians to join the guerrillas. 
This perhaps explains why the NRM government and some top UPDF officers have 
refused calls for the truth-search and fact-finding in the wars that have taken place in 
Uganda, in which it has been involved and more especially in northern Uganda, to the 
                                                  
486 See Monitor 29th June 2006 
487 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace With or Without Kony, Report No. 
146, (December 2008) p. 13  
488 Ibid, p. 13 
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extent that it has threatened those calling for such adventures with arrest and 
prosecution489.  
During a military Heroes Day ceremony to award medals to individuals who participated 
in the five-year NRA/M struggle which was held in Luwero on 10th June 2010, Museveni 
warned the UPC Party president against making statements that the UPDF committed 
atrocities in Acholiland and also that it was the NRA/M guerrillas that were responsible 
for the massacres in Luwero. In his address during this ceremony, he insisted that it was 
the Obote II government army, the UNLA that carried out the massacres saying “why 
were they killing innocent people? They were doing it with impunity. They would go to 
the village arrest children elderly and women and massacre them--”490.  
Searching for the truth therefore cannot be in the interests of the UPDF nor the Uganda 
government. This is because in the process of truth-telling, some soldiers and other 
NRM/UPDF operatives are likely to confess their part in committing atrocities and reveal 
the commanders who ordered them thus vindicating government. Critics also have 
pointed out that the over two decades-war and displacement has dealt a serious blow to 
the Acholi cultural fibre and the traditional way of resolving conflict. The chiefs and 
elders as the custodians of traditional values no longer command authority and respect 
and the young generation, majority of who have grown up in camps are not interested in 
the traditional ways of life.  This seems to be true especially considering Rwot 
                                                  
489 See Monitor 10th June 2010. Mr. Otunu has consistently accused Museveni and the NRA of having been 
behind the Luwero massacres.  
490  
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Achana’s491 observation when he says that in the past chiefs used to provide for the 
people, but now it is the other way round. Chiefs have lost everything, have lived with 
people in camps and people are instead the ones looking after them. In such a situation 
and conditions, they cannot have authority and respect they used to have.  
Conclusion: 
The chapter has demonstrated that a number of attempts to resolve the war between the 
LRA and the GOU have been conducted. They have included the Betty Bigombe-led 
peace talks (1993-1994), the Acholi elders’ peace initiative (1996), the Rome Catholic-
based Community of Sant’Egidio-led mediation (1997-1998), the Cater Center (2000), 
the Amnesty Legislation (2002-2003) and the Betty Bigombe second attempt at reviving 
dialogue and putting the peace talks that had collapsed in all the above efforts back on 
track. It has also examined the role played by the AU, UN and the ICC in trying to 
mitigate the conflict and to what extent have their involvement influenced and shaped the 
dynamics of the war.  
The chapter has also shown that the Acholi religious leaders through the ARLPI, an 
interfaith framework, have intervened and tried to bring the GOU and the LRA through 
dialogue as the best viable method of ending the war in order to foster reconciliation, 
peace and harmony in Acholiland. Of all these attempts, the Betty Bigombe-led 
mediation proved to be one of the most successful peace overtures. They provided an 
                                                  
491 Rwot David Onen Acana  II is the paramount chief and the cultural head of the Acholi people 
overseeing all the 54 smaller chiefdoms locally known as ‘Ker’ that are spread all over Acholiland. During 
pre-colonial and colonial days, the Rwot who is a central figure of the Acholi people had executive, judicial 
and legislative powers and in addition to this he was the link between the living and the dead, and it was his 
duty to offer sacrifices to the ancestors on behalf of his people.  
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entry point for the subsequent parties and their mediation efforts, and more significantly, 
the foundation for the Juba peace talks which, for the first time, culminated into the 
signing of five peace protocols of which the relative peace that has taken place in 
Acholiland can be attributed to. In particular, her mediation effort between the LRA and 
the GOU between 1993 and 1994 came close to striking a deal that many people believe 
would have witnessed the end of the war, had the GOU not called off the talks on the eve 
of signing the final peace agreement.  
However, despite all these mechanisms and efforts, the FPA has remained a far dream 
and the military confrontation between the LRA and the UPDF has continued unabated, 
although since 2008, this is taking place outside Acholiland and the international borders 
of Uganda. Furthermore, although the Acholi people, many of whom lived in IDPs camps 
have been able to return to their villages, continued military confrontation between the 
LRA and the UPDF and the widespread perception among the Acholi of continued 
socioeconomic and political marginalisation by the NRM government, has continued to 
pose challenges as well as generate debate about the future of Acholi sub-region and its 
people in as far as sustainable peace and stability are concerned. The next chapter 
summarises the main arguments and looks at the future of Acholiland in the context of 
the NRM politics, absence of FPA and enduring confrontation between the LRA and the 
UPDF.             
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section highlights the Conceptual and 
Empirical contribution of the thesis to the paradigm of ethnicity and conflict and its 
impact on social cohesion, human security, socioeconomic development and above all, 
peace and stability. The second section summarises the general conclusion of the thesis. 
The first section tries to answer the question, “What is the contribution of the Study to the 
understanding of manipulation and politicisation of ethnicity, and the militarization of 
politics in a broader perspective and in the Ugandan context in particular?”  
This is because ethnicity has become a popular field of study in social sciences especially 
to peace activists, authors and scholars492 in the areas of anthropology, international 
relations and political economy, including human rights personnel wishing to investigate 
intra-state violence, civil war, domination, repression and genocide. It should not be 
surprising therefore to acknowledge that research findings have established that ethnic 
politics lies at the heart of turmoil and violence that has ravaged many societies of the 
countries on the globe and more especially on the African continent, with devastating 
consequences on human life and infrastructure.   
Whereas there has been concerted efforts at the national and international level to deal 
with intra-state violence which has led to the stymieing of a number of civil wars on the 
African continent, the reality on the ground indicates that several ethnic groups in a 
number of countries are still engulfed in ethnic violence and that the rulers of these 
                                                  
492 See for example, William Easterly, “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict”, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, Vol. 49, No, 4, (July 2001) p. 687- 706; Daniel N. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic 
Factionalisation in Africa”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No, 4, (October 2004); Zeric 
Kay Smith, “The impact of liberalisation and democratisation on ethnic conflict in Africa: An empirical test 
of common assumptions”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38, No, 1, (2000) p. 21-39   
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countries continue to exercise ethnic politics, patrimonial practices493, militarization of 
politics and politics of exclusion or winner-takes-it-all, which fuels resentment, hostility 
and violence on the part of the deprived and that this trend is not about to stop.   
 
Conceptual and Empirical contribution of the Study to the understanding of 
ethnicity and conflict  
Conceptual contribution: 
Understanding the contribution of the study of ethnicity ought to begin by acknowledging 
the fact that ethnicity has been and continues to be a subject of debate among scholars of 
social science. The debate tends to be on the method of including and excluding potential 
ethnic groups for purposes of defining an ethnic entity, rather than whether such an ethnic 
group exists and whether its manipulation and politicisation leads to ethnic violence. As 
such, the debate tends to be concerned with the definition of ethnicity, especially in as far 
as essential characteristics that can be generally accepted in determining an ethnic group, 
because the concept of ethnicity has come with various connotations across time and 
space494   
Within the context of this debate, others regard ethnic politics as a temporary 
phenomenon. Indeed as pointed out by Wimmer495, “others regard ethnic and nationalist 
politics as transitory phenomena, the birth pains of the modern age that will be forgotten 
as soon as democracy and civil society have grown to maturity”. Whether this may be 
                                                  
493 Diana Cammack, Fred Golooba-Mutebi, Fidelis Kanyongolo, and Tam O’Neil, “Neopatrimonial 
Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006”, Overseas Development 
Institute, (December 2007)  http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4746.pdf  
494 Elliot Green, “The (Mis)use of Ethnicity in Current Political Economy Literature: Conceptual and Data 
Issues”, Paper presented at UNU WIDER conference on Making Peace Work, Helsinki (June 2004) p. 1-32 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/greened/UNU%20WIDER%20Paper.pdf  
495 Wimmer Andreas, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity, Cambridge 
University Press (2002) p. 1 
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true or not, the reality is that it is increasingly becoming an uphill task to convince many 
people in the developing countries and especially those on the African continent, that 
‘nationalist or ethnic politics is a transitory phenomena that will be forgotten once 
democracy has grown to full maturity’ because many leaders have manipulated 
democracy for their own selfish ends to the extent that the concept of democracy has 
tended to cease meaning to the very people who are supposed to enjoy its fruits.  
Uganda under Museveni’s leadership presents a clear example of manipulated democracy 
based on vested personal interests and indeed as pointed out by Muhumuza, “Uganda’s 
transition to democracy under Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime 
is a typical case of a flawed democratic transition that has fallen prey to vested political 
interests and manipulations”496. It is not surprising therefore that ethnic politics continues 
to be practiced by rulers in several countries especially on the African continent through 
neopatrimonial clientele linkages where authority is maintained through personal 
patronage rather than through ideology or law497, which brings into question the assertion 
that ethnic politics, is a temporary phenomenon on transit. 
 Nevertheless, despite the divergent views about ethnicity, there is a common 
understanding among scholars that ethnicity per se and “--ethnic diversity is not a cause 
of conflict, but can easily be manipulated by greedy elites, arguing that ethnic groups can 
be re-imagined to suit their economic needs”498. The thesis has illuminated this case in 
the Ugandan context. The study has therefore shown that first; ethnicity alone is not the 
                                                  
496 Muhumuza William, “From Fundamental Change to No Change: The NRM and Democratization in 
Uganda”,  p. 21-42,  http://www.ifra-nairobi.net/cahiers/Cahier_41/2Muhumuza.pdf  
497 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa”, World Politics, Vol. 46, No, 4, (July 1994) p. 453-489 
498 Elliot Green, The (Mis)use of Ethnicity in Current Political Economy Literature: Conceptual and Data 
Issues, p. 6-7 
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problem as members of an ethnic group derive ethnic identity, belonging, embodiment 
and prestige through sharing common characteristics such as culture and ancestry. 
Ethnicity becomes a problem only when it is manipulated and politicised by scrupulous 
politicians for their selfish ends. This argument is pointed out by Kaufman when he says 
that; 
“I argue that violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to 
create a domestic political context in which ethnicity is the only politically relevant 
identity....by constructing individual interest in terms of threat to the group, endangered 
elites can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilise the population against the 
status quo and, can better position themselves to deal with future challenges. In other 
words, leaders of ethnic communities provoke ethnic war in order to keep (or, perhaps, 
grab) power for themselves”499.  
In several countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the use of ethnicity as a tool in contemporary 
politics and conflict is so common, to the extent that even when some members of the 
ruling party are aware of its negative effects, cannot criticise the system either because 
they are benefiting from it or they fear the wrath of the rulers. However, a Member of 
Parliament and the ruling NRM O party who hails from the Banyankole ethnic group 
where Museveni comes from could not hide his sentiments, because of the concern over 
inter-ethnic rivalries that are steadily increasing in Uganda and said the following; 
“I am very concerned by the situation in which Uganda finds itself today especially the 
hatred amongst the different peoples and more especially between the northerners and 
westerners which has greatly undermined inter- ethnic group cohesion and nation 
building. The ‘disease’ is even spreading to members of other communities for example 
the Banyoro and Bakiga who previously lived together in harmony. I blame all this on the 
leadership of the country especially the president. Museveni has been telling his 
followers especially those in the central and south west that he is the bridge between the 
north and south and that if he was not to be there, chaos would return to haunt the 
southerners because the killer northerners would come back. He uses this as a political 
blackmail and strategy to maintain a support base but unfortunately this has led to more 
                                                  
499 Kaufman J. Stuart, “Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War”, Cornell University Press 
(2001) p. 4-5 
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resentment, disenchantment, despair and more division among the people than uniting 
them”500.         
 Secondly, ethnic conflict is not a result of intergroup differences such as religion, 
economic potential or education but rather domination and polarisation of relations. This 
point is supported by Lake and Rothchild by pointing out that, “--ethnic conflict is not 
caused directly by intergroup differences---or the stresses of modern life within a global 
economy”. It is because, “As groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a series of 
dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the 
potential for tremendous violence”501. Based on this argument, it is plausible therefore to 
conclude that the LRA war was borne out of the Acholi people’s fear for their physical 
safety including socio-political and economic concerns because of the repressive policies 
of the NRM regime.   
Thirdly, ethnicity should be understood as a social construction that increasingly became 
a political tool of post-colonial African state-centric politics. As such, ethnicity should 
not be understood as a ‘primordial given’, but rather as a political mechanism designed 
and manipulated by various social forces, especially the political elites in the contestation 
and control of political power and economic resources. This is often done by physical 
means through the use of the military and psychological attacks deliberately targeted at 
particular ethnic groups especially those perceived as potential threats to the survival of 
the regime in power.  
                                                  
500 This was said by an MP of the ruling NRMO party because of his concern of the dire situation the 
country is in, which according to him is because Museveni is obsessed with power and tends not to care or 
listen to advice. See also, Diana Cammak, “Big Men’ Governance and Development in Neopatrimonial 
States”, (September 2007) Overseas Development Institute, p 1-11; Daily Monitor 1st March 2011 “Bidandi 
Ssali’s Letter  to President Museveni after 2011 Polls”   
501 Lake A. David and Rotchild Donald (Eds), “The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion 
and Escalation”, Princeton University Press (1998), p. 4 -5 
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Within this context, the regime makes the targeted ethnic group(s) to be perceived as the 
‘bad guys’ by the other ethnic groups in a bid to create justification for the ethnic 
purging. It also creates the divide and rule strategy that is reminiscent of the colonial 
legacy. But ethnicity is not only used by the state. It is also used by the ethnic group(s) 
who sees itself or themselves as being unjustifiably denied and deprived of 
socioeconomic and political opportunities and as such as the deliberate victims of the 
state. The leaders and influential people in these ethnic groups often mobilize ethnic 
support amongst their people in order to ‘fight back’ at their attacker. This is one of the 
dimensions of the genesis of ethnic conflict and civil war.  
 
Contribution to the understanding of ethnicity and conflict in the Ugandan context: 
In the context of Uganda, the study has made the following illumination of how ethnicity 
has manifested itself in the Ugandan politics, especially under the NRA/M regime, which 
has led to Museveni’s vindictiveness of the Acholi people.  
First, ethnicity played a crucial role in the rise of the NRA/M right from its inception as a 
guerrilla movement in the early 1980s, its manpower composition and especially the 
leadership of the key positions of command and control of the fighting force and 
Museveni has continued to use the military to entrench himself in office502. The NRA, a 
guerrilla force formed by Museveni in 1982 which comprised of the initial 27503 fighters 
who fired the first shot against the Obote II government at Kabamba military garrison and 
which later transformed into UPDF was dominated by westerners and has continued to be 
                                                  
502 Mwenda M. Andrew and Roger Tangri, “President Museveni and the Politics of the Presidential Tenure 
in Uganda”, Journal of Contemporary African Politics, Vol. 28, No, 1, (February 2010) p. 31-49 
503 Museveni Y. K. “Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda”, 
London, Macmillan (1997) 
310 
 
so. For example, out of the seven (7) Army Commanders in the last 29 years (1980-
2011), only one came from outside the Banyankole ethnic group. It is also worth noting 
that the small Bahima sub-ethnic group which comprises 2% of the Banyankole control 
key sectors of the army and dominate the upper echelon of the UPDF504.   
Uganda is an ethnically diverse country. There is no justifiable reason why for almost 
three decades of the NRA/M government’s rule, the army cannot have army commanders 
that are representative of the country’s ethnic heterogeneity. The fact that (senior) 
commanders from other ethnic groups and especially from the north e.g. the Langi or 
Acholi are conspicuously absent from the top command structure does not only suggest, 
but demonstrates that the regime is highly dependent on ethnic militarisation of the 
security forces for continued survival.  
Secondly, the thesis has also shown that Museveni has been conscious and in actual fact, 
unwilling to implement multi-ethnic cohesion in the army. By under-representing other 
ethnic groups for example the Acholis from the army, Museveni has not only satisfied his 
desire of building a lopsided and partisan army that would serve his interests, but also 
tried to minimise or eliminate the risk of being deposed from power by those who would 
resist his divisive and ethnic policies that are aimed at favouring loyal members of his 
ethnic group at the expanse of national ethnic integration and harmony.  
The nexus of the war in the north contributed to the realisation of this strategy. Indeed as 
pointed out by Mwenda, “the fortification of the west-centre coalition and the north’s 
exclusion was aided by civil unrest in northern Uganda”505. That this behaviour is 
consciously inherited from the colonial legacy and a history of ethnic marginalisation 
                                                  
504 Andrew Mwenda and Roger Tangri, “President Museveni and the Politics of Presidential Tenure in 
Uganda”, Journal of Contemporary African Politics, Vol. 28, No, 1, (February 2010) p. 44 
505 See the Independent, 19th January 2011 
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shows not only to what extent the ruler is willing to use brutal force against certain 
sections of society which he or she is supposed to protect, but also doing it with impunity.    
Third, the regimes policies and ethnic politics sought to ostracise the ethnic groups in the 
north and more especially the Acholis while it did not do the same to other peoples. 
Whereas the NRA guerrillas exhibited cordial and friendly relations with the people in 
the war zones and the pacified areas especially in the south and central Uganda during the 
armed struggle that led it to the capture of state power in 1986, it did not do the same to 
the people in northern Uganda. As the victorious NRA troops advanced northwards, the 
language shifted from ‘cooption’ to ‘liberation' and in actual fact became tougher and 
uncompromising. Indeed as pointed out by Ocitti, the NRA deployed with harsh brutality 
as it entered the north. One local newspaper stated that;  
“The approach of these (NRM) agents working in the new war zones is more militarist 
than political. It seems to be more of a conquering mission, of breaking their backs than 
of winning over the people’s hearts.... Therefore unless there is a change of attitude 
towards them, (people in the north and east of the country) by the powers that be, they do 
not see their salvation in the NRM but elsewhere”506.  
The Acholi former soldiers were accused by the NRA/M of killing Ugandans and 
especially the people in Luwero triangle and looting their property, an act of which they 
vowed to punish the former soldiers dearly. It should be no surprise therefore that 
appalling incidents of brutality directed against the Acholi people for example the NRA 
entering villages and burning houses and granaries, and also looting properties for 
example secondary schools trucks being taken and cattle rustled from Pabo by the NRA’s 
65th Battalion, killing people attending funeral rights, the Buchoro massacre, raping 
                                                  
506 Ocitti Jim, “Political Development and Democratic Practice in Uganda, 1952-1996”, Lewiston, New 
York: The Edwin Mellen Press, (2000) p. 341  
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women and children507 seem to indicate a grand plan that was well sought out and 
orchestrated by the NRA in order to ostracise the Acholi people.  
Ostracization of the people in northern Uganda and more especially the Acholi is also 
observed by Arya when he points out that “northern Uganda is treated differently by the 
central government in official and unofficial talks. There is a condescending attitude of 
‘let them have it’ reflected in actions and inactions, reverberations and counter-
reverberations – perhaps as a consequence of the colonial north-south divide”508.  
Further evidence of ostracising the Acholi people is shown by Asiimwe, a retired NRA 
soldier who participated in the fighting against the Acholi-led army of Obote II 
government and the Tito Okello Military Junta in 1986 when he points out that, “there 
was no possibility that Museveni could treat the people in the north like the way he 
treated those in the south and west. This is because they were his main opponents during 
the war and he used to tell us that they were the worst criminals especially the Acholi and 
Langi soldiers. Every time we were reminded that the ‘adui’ (enemy) was the Acholi 
soldiers and that we should deal with them harshly”509.  
Fourth, Museveni’s populist policies of political participation, national ethnic integration, 
socio-political and economic reforms purportedly to fight sectarianism and build a 
harmonious Uganda seems to have been aimed at generating national support and 
legitimising his regime rather than building consensus based on the principle of all 
inclusive and round-table stake-holders participation through dialogue that is a 
                                                  
507Chris Dolan, “What do You Remember? A rough guide to the war in Northern Uganda”, ACORD (2000) 
http://museveniwarcrimes.blogspot.com/ :   Documents on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
Committed by Yoweri Museveni 1970-2008  
508 Arya Fabious Okumu, “The Regional Dimensions of the War in Northern Uganda”, 
http://www.iss.org.za/uploads/CPRDNORTHERNUGANDA.PDF  
509 Interview with Asiimwe, Kampala, 2009 
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prerequisite and bedrock for building trust and ethnic harmony. However, it should be 
realised that in the early years from 1986-1990, he tended to be consultative and listened 
to the other point of view, a factor that not only generated him local and international 
support but also promised to reduce ethnic and regional divisions.   
About ethnic manipulation and disharmony in Uganda, a former minister in the Museveni 
government had this to say; 
“At the beginning you would think that Museveni was the salvation that would galvanise 
Ugandans. He used to emphasise that if Uganda was to be stable and develop, then the 
people must be united first and used to say that this was one of his principle tasks. That 
people perceived him as someone who was ready to fight ethnic divisions and 
sectarianism which he attributed to past leaders was good enough to attract him 
widespread support. It was a common message in his speeches wherever he went around 
the country. I remember the closed meetings he held with the elders from the north in 
1987 and specifically from the districts where Amin, Obote and Tito Okello come, 
assuring them that their sons and daughters would get equal opportunities of jobs in 
government like any other Ugandan and that all Ugandans would be treated equally 
whether you are from the north, south or elsewhere. As such, many Ugandans including 
some sceptics in the north though gave him a benefit of doubt saw in him a uniting father 
who would bring unity, peace and stability that had eluded past regimes. But this rhetoric 
was not followed by practical reality. Though he picked a minister among the rebels, 
accepted some rebels who surrendered to join the UPDF and in actual fact promoted 
them to higher ranks, at the same time many northerners continued to be arbitrarily 
arrested and detained510, others disappearing mysteriously while others escaped from the 
country into exile. The use of ethnicity did not and has not only taken place in the north 
but also elsewhere in the country for example in Kibale – Bunyoro between Banyoro and 
Bakiga. The man is full of deception and manipulation and will use whatever strategy as 
long as it suits him to retain power at all costs”511.  
 
It can therefore be concluded from the above that Museveni’s acceptance of populist 
reforms and embracing or perhaps better put, rhetoric of ethnic integration was not 
because he subscribed to them but rather for purposes of maintaining a strong grip on 
power and attracting donor support that is crucial for the country. In fact he has been put 
                                                  
510 See Juma Okuku, “Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratization Process in Uganda”, Discussion 
Paper No, 17 (2002) 
511 Interview with a former minister South Africa, 2010; The name of the former minister cannot be 
revealed because of the sensitivity of the matter 
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at task by even members of his own party to explain why most people holding key 
government positions are from western Uganda and are closely related to him and yet he 
claims to be against sectarianism and ethnic chauvinism. In an attempt to answer this 
allegation, he has laboured to explain that people from his ethnic group are dominant 
because of their individual contribution to the struggle that brought him to power in 1986.  
However, one major question that will continue to be asked is, ‘after Museveni staying in 
power for a quarter of a century and still continuing, why should his government continue 
to be dominated by people from the same ethnic group’? His legacy as an individual and 
statesman will be evaluated against such underpinnings. However, a number of questions 
remain unanswered which in my view form grey area that requires further academic and 
scholarly investigation and analysis.  
Questions such as ‘why does the international community tend to act as a passive 
bystander when an ethnic community or group of people become victims of social 
political and economic vindictiveness by their own government that is supposed to 
protect them?’, ‘why does the international community pass resolutions, implement them 
and act swiftly in some cases purportedly to protect people from oppression emanating 
from their ruler(s) for example in Libya and yet turn a blind eye in others?’, ‘how can the 
victims of oppression develop their own coping mechanism in the face of a tyrant that 
maintains a strong grip on power’? ‘what are the new strategies and mechanisms that can 
be used to curtail or eliminate ethnic politicisation and conflict in order to bring about 
peace and stability in the world at large and the African continent in particular and above 
all to protect and preserve the security and sanctity of people at risk in a country’?    
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In conclusion, the study has demonstrated that examining contemporary ethnic 
manipulation and conflict through the lens of ethnic hatred, oppression and vindictiveness 
sheds more light and explains why explanations based on purely political economy and 
stereotypes such as ‘barbarism’, ‘witchcraft’, ‘lunacy’, ‘common criminal’ and ‘war lord’ 
to describe an insurgent group and its leader like the LRA and Kony are inadequate. In 
the absence of ethnic integration, clear and objective dialogue, access to socioeconomic 
and development opportunities, the Acholi people will continue to feel 
socioeconomically and politically excluded from a government they perceive to be 
ethnically biased.       
                  
  
General Conclusion 
The debate about the northern Uganda question in general and the Acholi people in 
particular concerning social, economic and political challenges under the NRM 
government continues to take place in  academic, political and civil society organisations 
discourse especially as regards resolving the long standing political and economic 
grievances. The main issue in this debate is not about whether the Acholi people will like 
or dislike, approve or disapprove the legitimacy of the NRM government, but whether it 
can integrate and elevate them to the level of the rest of the country especially in the 
areas of major concern such as, economic development, political, social, land, education, 
health and above all, durable peace, security and stability. Government is responsible for 
providing its citizens with basic socio-economic and political services, security and 
protection within the framework of the social contract and mutual trust between it and the 
316 
 
citizens, against anything that is likely to impact negatively on their rights and 
freedoms512.  
Within this context, the NRM government and its policies is the principal determinant as 
to whether the socio-economic and political situation of the Acholi people will change 
and for the better, remain the same that is, marginalised and lagging behind in the above 
mentioned areas as compared to the people in the south or even become worse. It should 
also be realised that in order for development to take place, peace and stability are a 
prerequisite513. Efforts must be directed towards national reconciliation in which 
balancing the ethnic and regional composition of the armed forces, national ethnic 
integration and resolving conflict by bringing groups formerly at war on board through 
dialogue are important factors. In the case of Acholiland, this will depend on addressing 
the broader causes and sources of the civil conflict514. Analysing the future of stability 
and development in Acholiland under the NRM therefore necessitates examining the 
NRM political dynamics and relations between the north and the south. Within this 
nexus, the extent and the manner in which the Acholi grievances have been addressed can 
help us determine whether there has been economic improvement and political 
accommodation or the potential for continued political challenges remain high.   
 
                                                  
512 Steven J. Heyman, “First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment”, 
Duke Law Journal, Vol. 41, No, 3, (December 1991), p. 508-538 
513 Kees Kingma, “The Role of Demobilisation in the Peace and Development Process in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Conditions for Success”, African Security Review, Vol. 5, No, 6, (1996), 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No6/Kingma.html  
514 Khadiagala M. Gilbert, “The Role of Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)in Peace 
Building in Northern Uganda”, (March 2001) p, 17-18 
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Continued Perceptions of Marginalisation: 
When the NRA/M captured power in 1986, it stopped violence and ethnic killings to a 
large extent that had characterised Uganda during the reign of Amin and Obote. 
Consequently, it restored order especially in the central, south and western Uganda. This 
enabled it to embrace the structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) with the backing of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), which led to the 
turning around of the economy that had been in decline. In the early 1980s and 1990s it 
was referred to as one of Africa’s success stories because of its remarkable economic 
growth. But this growth and development only took place in the south of the country. It 
did not and has not translated to the north.  
The north remained poor in terms of social and economic development and in fact 
became worse as the south progressed. Arising out of this situation and as pointed out by 
a number of scholars and independent observers, 
“Many northerners dislike Museveni and the NRM, and believe that the president has 
intentionally ignored the serious social and economic conditions that afflict their 
communities. Unlike most of southern Uganda, there has been virtually no economic 
growth and development in the northern part of the country since Museveni’s rise to 
power. In fact, social conditions and personal security have worsened in a number of 
northern communities. Until the Uganda government is able to build better relations 
between north and south and to bring development projects and outside investment into 
the northern communities in the same manner as it has done in the south, the LRA will 
continue to find the handful of willing recruits”515.  
 
 
 
 
                                                  
515 Ambassador Johnnie Carson, “A Legacy in Danger”, a paper presented in a Conference under the theme 
“Uganda: An African “Success” Past its Prime?” (2nd June 2005),  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Uganda2.pdf  
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The same view is held by Diclitch and Lwanga by pointing out that,  
“Although the movement regime has improved the socioeconomic situation since the 
Amin and Obote regime, the improvements have been unequal regionally and ethnically, 
and still far below minimal international standards”516.            
 
It is not surprising therefore that for the last 25 years the NRM has been in power 
Acholiland has reflected the highest poverty level (23%) while the western has the lowest 
(4.52%)517. Indeed as ladit Aguma says, 
“Majority of the Acholi people today have become paupers. Although the war has been a 
contributing factor, many Acholis put the blame on Museveni and the NRM Banyankole 
government. Young people have grown up knowing that World Food Programme is the 
only source that can provide food. Many others have turned to churches for food aid but 
it is not even enough. But the biggest fear is that if Museveni and his NRM continue to 
remain in power, then we Acholi do not hope for any bright future. We shall continue 
remain in poverty and suffering because he knows we don’t like him since we do not vote 
for him in elections”518.   
 
The issue of poverty is also observed by Barkan when he points out that,  
“The proportion of the population living in poverty is also much higher in some areas of 
the country than in others, suggesting that the process of poverty alleviation has been 
highly uneven, both geographically and sectorally. Thus while the proportion of the 
population living in poverty across the south and in the west is now roughly 27%, the 
percentage across the north is 63%.---these figures suggest that Uganda’s economic 
“miracle” has benefited some ethnic groups far more than others, a fact that sows the 
seeds of potential conflict along ethno-regional lines”519.        
 
This has led to many northerners and especially Acholis to view their dire economic 
situation as a deliberate move by Museveni and his southern-led NRM government to 
punish them because they do not vote for him and therefore are perceived as anti-NRM. 
                                                  
516 Diclitch Susan and Lwanga Doreen, “The Politics of being Non-Political: Human Rights Organisations 
and the Creation of a Positive Human Rights Culture in Uganda”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, No, 2, 
(May 2003), p. 487-494   
517 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) 2010 Statistical Abstract, p. 19-20; See also the Weekly Observer 
18th February 2009, ‘West gets richer, Poverty Settles in Northern Uganda’.  
518 Interview with Aguma, Gulu November 2009 
519 Barkan D. Joel, “An African “Success” Past its Prime”, A paper presented in a Conference under the 
theme “Uganda: An African “Success” Past its Prime”, (2nd June 2005)  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Uganda2.pdf   
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In the minds of many Acholis therefore, it is a punishment for the poor Nilotic speakers 
of the north by the more prosperous ethnic Bantu speakers of the south, a scenario they 
think will continue as long as Museveni and the NRM government remains in power.  
During his tour in Acholiland for the presidential campaign of 2011, Museveni told the 
Acholis to vote wisely or else they risk losing out on essential government programmes. 
He is quoted to have said that “The problem is that you (Acholi) have been voting 
unwisely in the previous elections. You must start to vote the party that wins and you will 
see your sons and daughters in government”520.  
Acholis have also been referred to as “biological substances”521, “backward”, 
“primitive”, “chimpanzees”522, “murderers”, “killers”, and “Anyanya”, derogatory 
phrases that have not helped the healing situation, in order to foster ethnic harmony, 
political accommodation and eliminating the north-south divide. Such utterances coupled 
with years of social, economic and political unrest as well as politicized ethnicity is likely 
to entrench the perception of deliberate continued marginalisation and feeling of 
resentment in the minds of many Acholis, thus further undermining the development of 
ethnic harmony, tolerance and reconciliation. Whether directly or indirectly, Museveni’s 
comments can be interpreted to mean that the regime shall not tolerate dissent or 
disloyalty, an issue that is likely to make the Acholis think that the NRM will continue to 
purge them and therefore make them worried.    
                                                  
520 See Mao praises Museveni, http://allafrica.com/stories/201004140780.html  
521 Omara-Otunu Amii, “The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
30, No, 3, (September 1992), p. 450-451 
522 Todd David Whitmore, “Genocide or Just another “Casualty of War?” 
http://practicalmattersjournal.org/issue/3/centerpieces/genocide-or-just-another-casualty-of-war-1   
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Continuous low-Intensity Conflict and living with Fear: 
As the war between the LRA and the UPDF continue unabated, albeit at a low level, in a 
distant land outside Acholiland and Ugandan borders, people in northern Uganda in 
general and Acholiland in particular remain fearful that the rebels can come back any 
time. There is no credible sign or guarantee that all this is about to end. Indeed as Mao 
said, “there is still that fear that the LRA is in a neighbouring country and you never 
know the Great Lakes Region is a very volatile region”523. The UPDF has continued to 
prefer and pursue a military strategy rather than dialogue in an effort to end the war.  
 
However, past experience has demonstrated that this is not only impossible but also 
unrealistic, as successive military offensives such as “Operation North” (1991), 
“Operation Iron Fist” (2002) and “Operation Lightenin Thunder” (2008) have all 
miserably failed to achieve their objective of destroying the LRA’s fighting capability 
and have instead led to the rebels to retaliate with brutal attacks in their wake. The Acholi 
people know that the military strategy cannot defeat the LRA but will instead increase 
hostilities to the extent that the rebels can come back any time and launch fresh attacks.   
 
Whereas there has been relative peace in Acholiland from 2008 since the LRA relocated 
outside Uganda, its continued existence creates an environment of fear and insecurity 
within the Acholi people. To make matters worse, the enduring military confrontation 
between the LRA and the UPDF in the jungles of DRC and CAR524 is a constant 
                                                  
523 The Independent, 14th July 2011, ‘Document is not a rebel force – Mao’ 
524 The Independent  4th July 2010, ‘7,000 UPDF enter Central African Republic to pursue runaway Kony’ 
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reminder to them that the rebels can come back to Acholiland and the potential dangers 
they are likely to face again as the rebels start fresh attacks. This is because such a 
scenario has happened in the past525, where the LRA fighters crossed into northern 
Uganda and attacked civilians with ferocious brutality on a scale not witnessed before, 
ironically when the GOU had pronounced their demise. It has also been reported that 
Kony plans to return526 to Uganda and continue with the war. 
Moreover, Kony has vowed to die fighting527 rather than surrender and be taken to The 
Hague, while Museveni has vowed to destroy the LRA528. This situation has become a 
stalemate, continue to cause concern, anxiety and fear among many Acholis who are 
worried that the resurgence of the war cannot be ruled out as long as both parties remain 
stuck to their guns. According to Okumu,  
“Memories of death and destruction in which many people were hacked to death, limbs 
cut off, bodies mutilated, huts torched with people locked inside, children both boys and 
girls forcefully abducted to be made sex slaves and killing machines, many of whom have 
never been seen by their parents and are feared dead, remain fresh in people’s minds till 
today. They fear that Museveni’s continued stay in power is likely to bring back the 
war”529.   
 
Arising out of this is the fact that some people decided to remain in IDPs camps while 
others went back to their villages.  According to Peter Odok W’Oceng, the LC5 
chairperson of Pader district, about 233,849 IDPs still remained in Pader camps by 
                                                  
525 Van Acker Frank, “Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered”, African 
Affairs, Vol. 103, No, 412 (July 2004) p. 335-357 
526 Enough Project, “Does LRA Presence in Garamba constitute a real threat to Uganda?” 
http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/does-lra-presence-garamba-constitute-real-threat-uganda#   
527 Daily Monitor 25th May 2008, ‘I will die fighting- Kony’ 
528 Daily Monitor 6th June 2008, ‘Museveni Vows to destroy LRA’s Kony’  
529 Interview with Okumu, Pajule October 2009 
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August 2010530. According to him, the reason was because there were doubts in the 
minds of most IDPs who chose to remain in camps as they were not sure of the outcome 
because of the failed peace talks. In addition to this, about 5,000531 people remained 
living in IDPs camps of Potika ‘A’ and ‘B’, Aweno-Olwiyo, Pangira, Ngomoromo, 
Akilok and Muchini in Lamwo district and Orom in Kitgum district by December 2010.  
It is not clear whether these people have left the camps and gone back to the villages. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of whether they have left or not, this demonstrates that there is 
still fear among the Acholi people, and they attribute this fear to a number of factors.  
First, their argument is that there is lack of credible guarantees for safety and security 
coupled with uncertainty of durable peace. This is one of the biggest problems that is still 
felt in the minds of many people, and one that is perhaps likely to take a longer time to 
overcome, if at all.  As a former IDP said,  
“I still fear the rebels can attack us any time. They can sneak in unnoticed and surprise 
everybody. They have done it in the past and i know they are still capable of doing it. This 
is their home area and they know it better. They do not like Museveni and the NRM and 
he has also said that he will destroy Kony. Now that he has remained in power, i fear the 
fighting will continue and the rebels can come back here. My two children were abducted 
and my wife was killed in front of me. I survived by the mercy of God. I live with this 
memory every day and i am sure many others whose children were abducted or family 
members and friends were killed are going through the same. The fear of another war 
and going back to the camps is very devastating, but what can we do”532.  
                                                  
530 New Vision 13th August 2010 
531 New Vision, 7th December 2010, ‘5,000 still living in IDPs camps’, This was revealed by Charles 
Ssekatawa, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) field coordinator in Uganda    
532 Interview with a former IDP, Puranga, November 2009 
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Second, the hostility and military confrontation between the LRA and the GOU still rages 
on despite the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Juba in 2006533. The context of 
this fear has also been noticed by other researchers and independent observers of the 
northern conflict. For example, the Refugee Law Project of the Faculty of Law of 
Makerere University Kampala in its report of 2002 observes that in expressing this fear, 
some Acholis have said that,  
“The LRA can enter from Sudan and disturb us. That makes us not sleep day and night 
fearing they will come---. I came here to be safe, but when i heard of the movement of the 
LRA it is not safe for me here. Any time my remaining children might be abducted.--we 
are so fearful of Kony’s people, they are like mad people. They can come any time. They 
take children, make people carry things, rape, and even kill old people. We know any 
time death might come”534.   
Third, people think that the UPDF will not provide them with adequate protection in the 
event of the war breaking out again. The UPDF’s response to rebel attacks against 
civilians in the past still remains in question. As such, people’s attitude towards the 
UPDF is that of an army that is likely to desert them at the hour of need because of its 
inability or slow response to rebel attacks. Such response often resulted into many people 
being massacred by the LRA and people have not forgotten this situation. Moreover, the 
UPDF compounded the situation by attacking unarmed civilians, sexually abused women, 
destroyed crops, schools and boreholes and confiscated livestock535, thus compounding 
the situation.  
                                                  
533 See Appendix 1, ‘Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the LRA and the GOU’ 
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Indeed as pointed out by Gersony,  
“Brutal beating of civilians during questioning in rural areas was described as routine. 
This is reported not only when army patrols reach villages through which rebels may 
have passed, or which they believe to be collaborating with the LRA. Several close 
observers assert that villages sometimes inform the army of LRA which they have been 
encouraged to do. But by the time the army arrives, the LRA has already departed. 
Civilians are then brutally questioned and accused of having assisted the LRA. If the 
civilians have done so, it is usually because they had no choice which the army’s slow 
reaction to their reports tends to reinforce. Rape continues to be a continuing 
problem”536.  
He further points out that  
“A widespread complaint in Gulu town is that at night UPDF soldiers in civilian dress, 
or civilian thugs with whom such soldiers collaborate, prey upon the civilian population 
through looting – and in isolated case – killing of those who resist. In cases where such 
thugs have detailed information about funds which the victims have recently received, 
more elaborate collusion is suspected. A number of cases have apparently been 
confirmed by the local authorities”537.        
This situation is still fresh in people’s minds and they still perceive the UPDF as a 
potential source of violence that is likely to traumatise them and bring back the suffering 
which they underwent for many years.  One woman in expressing this fear and her ordeal 
said that, 
 “In 1998 i went with my daughter to the bush to look for firewood. On our way back we 
were ambushed by the rebels who raped us. They then took my daughter and i have never 
seen her again. They told me they could not take me because i had ‘cen’ (evil spirit) but 
luckily enough they did not kill me. I was by then living in Pabo camp. When i went to the 
army detach to report, i was told by the detach commander that i was deceiving because 
Acholis were joining the LRA willingly. That i was pretending because many children 
were being used as spies. I was even tasked to describe and explain the details of the 
                                                  
536 Gersony Robert, “The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field-Based Assessment of the Civil 
Conflicts in Northern Uganda”, USAID Report (August 1997), p. 46 
537 Ibid, 46-47 
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incident and the rebels who ambushed us. One month later, the rebels attacked the camp. 
Many people were killed including my husband. The soldiers guarding the camp would 
run away. I was forced to relocate to near Gulu town. Although we are now staying in 
our villages, nothing much has changed. The government army still remains the same 
and i can see many of the soldiers who tortured us during the war”538.  
Such incidents and memories appear to be fresh in people’s minds and tend to increase 
their fear, if renewed violence was to take place again, thus demonstrating the context 
and extent to which they live with expectation of further attacks, although they cannot 
explain how and when this is likely to take place. Fear of cattle rustlers is one other factor 
the Acholis are still worried of under the NRM rule, despite government’s promise to 
restock Acholiland with cattle and also efforts to stem the vice of cattle rustling that 
devastated many areas in eastern and northern Uganda by decimating the livestock and 
which reached climax during the war. The Acholis accused the UPDF of not stopping the 
Karimojong worriers from raiding their animals during the war and have the belief that 
the same thing could happen again if war starts in Acholiland.  
Some in actual fact alleged that the UPDF masqueraded539 as Karimojong to steal their 
animals while yet others said that they colluded with the cattle rustlers as a deliberate 
strategy to punish the Acholi people for rebelling against government. Indeed as pointed 
out by Gersony, “The attitude of most Acholis ranges from deep suspicion to absolute 
conviction that lawlessness of this magnitude could not have occurred if it had not been 
instigated – or at least approved - at the highest level of government”540. This belief and 
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fear is still enduring in Acholilansd as this trader in Kitgum made similar observation by 
saying that,  
“I hear government saying that cattle rustling will never take place again because it has 
disarmed the Karimojong worriers. I cannot trust this government because today it says 
one thing and tomorrow another. They failed to stop our cattle from being stolen, 
moreover in areas where they were heavily concentrated and now they are saying it will 
never happen again. Who can believe them? First, they are the same people who allowed 
open access of our land to the Karimojong and colluded with them to steal our animals. 
The Karimojong have got many guns and the government cannot remove all of them. I 
fear they can attack us any time. Secondly, today Museveni and the UPDF are saying it 
because Kony is not here but if the LRA returns, the warriors will attack us again”541. 
That these attitudes and perceptions among the Acholi people that were common 
especially during the early period of the anti-NRM insurgency war in the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s continue to persist till to date, though now seem to be minimal, 
demonstrates the extent to which the Acholi people continue to live with fear under the 
NRM rule. In addition to the above, many Acholis think Museveni and the UPDF are 
exploiting the situation to their advantage. Museveni has been persistently trounced since 
2001 by the opposition candidates in votes received from northern Uganda in general and 
Acholiland in particular during the presidential elections, an issue that has angered him. 
The northern region has largely remained a constituency that overwhelmingly supports 
and votes for the opposition while the south and the west have remained stronghold for 
the NRM.  
 
                                                  
541 Interview with a shopkeeper in Kitgum, October 2009 
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The Acholi people thus believe that Museveni has maintained a low-intensity war against 
the LRA as a means of perpetual punishment for their refusal to endorse his leadership 
and legitimacy. His motives are embedded in the argument that the LRA is a terrorist 
organisation with a predominant threat to Uganda’s security, the GLR and Horn of Africa 
regions’ stability. Indeed as pointed out by Mwaniki, Wepundi and Morolong, “Museveni 
has very often used the LRA card to frame the domestic political debate in his 
country”542. In addition to this, the low-intensity war enables him to justify huge defence 
expenditure and creation of “classified” accounts through which patronage resources are 
channelled. This also allows him to maintain a large army in the north, in the name of 
“protecting” the Acholi people. The perception of the Acholis towards the NRM and its 
continued rule and its impact on their lives therefore can be described as that of anxiety 
and uncertainty. In order for durable peace to take place in Acholiland and in order to 
curb the Acholi fears, the war must be resolved peacefully. 
It is against this background that the civil society organisations, peace activists, religious 
leaders, MPs and the international community have continued to insist and advise that the 
GOU and the LRA reconsider peace talks. For example, in 2008 shortly after the Juba 
peace talks had collapsed, the Greater North Parliamentary Association (GNPA), a group 
that brought together about 90 MPs from the war-affected regions of east and north urged 
the GOU to resume talks with the LRA. The group pointed out that it was unfortunate the 
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UPDF and the LRA were already sounding drums of war again, yet it is possible to be 
patient543.  
The ARLPI through ecumenical strategies continue to be at the fore front in the struggle 
for peace and stability in Acholi sub-region. They have continued to emphasise and 
appeal to the GOU to resolve the war with the LRA through dialogue. In a petition to the 
US government, they pointed out that, “a negotiated end to the conflict that leads to the 
demobilisation of the combatants would be ideal and therefore should be pursued if there 
is a viable opportunity”544. The call for peace talks has also been emphasised by the 
former IDPs. In actual fact, they have gone a step further to call for forgiveness by saying 
that, “we know that the LRA killed our people, but we want them to be forgiven so that 
we can enjoy long-lasting peace. We want the government to resume peace talks with the 
rebels so that they stop killing civilians wherever they are”545.   
During their visit to the USA in September 2010, Archbishop John Baptist Odama and 
the Anglican Bishop Macleod Baker Ochola of Kitgum Archdiocese told the Catholic 
News Service in Washington that the issue is no longer the LRA and Uganda, but rather 
regional. They also met State Department officials. Citing numerous occasions on which 
force did not work against the rebels, they said that regional dialogue with the LRA 
rebels would work better than a military solution. They also said that capturing or killing 
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Kony would not necessarily end the conflict, because the situation is so complex and 
includes splinter groups and tribal conflicts. “We are afraid”546 Archbishop Odama said. 
The ARLPI have also called for peaceful resolution of the conflict during national, 
regional and international547 conferences, including annual New Year’s messages548.   
Land Conflicts: 
The debate on land in Acholiland has remained one of the most controversial and 
contentious issues since early 2000 when the NRM government expressed the desire to 
acquire land in Acholi sub-region for “national” development – even though it later 
seemed to have backed down -   largely due to the resistance and threat of ‘war’ by the 
Acholi MPs and the peasants. Although this threat led the government to go slow on the 
issue, it neither abandoned the intentions nor reversed its decisions as can be 
demonstrated by a number of acts that have since taken place. This situation has created 
fear among the Acholi people, as they perceive the government to have a “hidden” 
agenda to grab their land. 
Although the widespread fear and belief among the Acholi people that the Museveni 
regime wants to grab their land came up after the creation of IDPs camps in 1996 
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whereby people were forced to vacate their villages and live in these camps, the genesis 
of the negative impact on the land can be traced to 1998 when the NRM implemented the 
land reform and policy in Uganda. However, before examining the land reform policy 
and its implications on the land systems, it is important to understand the land tenure 
system in Acholi sub-region, its salience and the relationship between the Acholi people 
and the land.  
Land in Acholiland is communally owned. It belongs to everyone in society. Its 
protection and utilisation rests in the authority of the Acholi culture, overseen by the 
cultural and clan leaders. Writing on land in Acholiland, Kligerman points out that, “land 
tenure is communal, often described as ‘cultural’ or ‘customary’ and passed patrilineally 
through localised families and clans via male heirs; women have access to land only 
through their husbands and male heirs. Non-clan members can use cultural land, but are 
unable to claim ownership. Communal land is not titled and therefore often is not 
recognised as “owned” by the government and investors”549.   
It has been passed on and used from generation to generation in this manner. As such, it 
has been and remains the most important source of their livelihood, by providing 
opportunity for growing crops, livestock rearing, hunting as well as firewood and 
building materials. Acholis also regard land as a link and medium of communication with 
their ancestors through burial grounds. One former IDP succinctly described their 
relationship with land as that of absolute survival by saying that “anything that alienates 
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us from our land would amount to sentencing us to death. It has to be resisted by all 
means”550.   
However, a series of events – though insignificant at first – have had profound 
consequences on the Acholi land and engendered conflict amongst the Acholi community 
in the form of land wrangles and also fear of losing it to the powerful people within or 
connected to the NRM regime. But first, let us turn our lens on the Land Act of 1998, as 
it is the bedrock and basis upon which subsequent land conflicts have tended to radiate 
from. The NRM promulgated this Act basing itself, primarily on the argument that the 
land tenure system in Uganda needed reform in order to stimulate investment and 
development, by making land in rural and urban areas available to the market.  
According to this Act, 
“All Ugandan citizens owning land under customary tenure may acquire certificates of 
ownership (Article 237 (4) (a) and Section 4 (1) of the Act. Any person or community 
holding land under customary tenure may convert the customary tenure into freehold”551. 
The Act also “empowers government to compulsorily acquire land in the public interest, 
Section 15 (1)”552. The target was mainly the ‘Mailo’ land and customary or communal 
land systems that have been and continue to be practiced especially in central and 
northern Uganda. The objective was to make the land under these systems to be 
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accessible through buying or otherwise by individuals and government who would then 
transform it into private and public land by having title and ownership in their names. 
The reasons advanced by the NRM government in favour of transforming the customary 
and ‘Mailo’ land into private and freehold ranged from “misuse” of collectively owned 
land, fragmentation into small pieces through inheritance, and a hindrance to economic 
development. This marked the beginning of arbitrary acquisition of land by individuals 
and government and one that set them on the path of collision with land owners in 
different parts of Uganda, and in this case, the Acholi people. Moreover, the definition of 
‘public interest’ and who should determine ‘public interest’ is very ambiguous. It is 
within this framework and context that the land in Acholiland became subject for grab 
especially after people were forced to move into IDPs camps.  
Indeed as the ARLPI points out,”soon after the forced removal of people from the 
countryside, Maj. Gen. Salim Saleh started some kind of commercial farming business in 
kilak County, engaging people in this enterprise under conditions tantamount to 
exploitation, since people were given money to engage into farming but had to repay 
double the amount after the harvest. People were so desperate that theyu engaged in this 
kind of business. During our consultations with the people in the camps, many expressed 
fear that the policy of putting the population of Acholi into camps was a well-calculated 
move to grab their land”553.    
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In his address to parliament concerning the issue of Acholiland, the chairman Acholi 
Parliamentary Group (APG) expressed people’s fear and pointed at the following 
incidents in order to prove the real threats over Acholiland by saying that, 
“In 1992, the government of Uganda signed a protocol with the government of Libya 
giving away the following large chunks of land; Bukaleba Beef Ranch, 4,000 hectares, 
Aswa Ranch, 46,000 hectares, Maruzi Ranch, 16,376 hectares. In 1999, a company 
called Divinity Union Limited came up with a proposal to turn Uganda into what it 
called the Bread Basket of Africa. The land targeted for this proposal was basically in 
Acholi sub-region. APG fought this and it never took off. In May 2003, a programme 
entitled Security and Production Programme (SPP) was produced. ---the proposal was to 
plan and turn the IDPs camps into permanent settlements. The three districts of Acholi 
then – Gulu, Kitgum and Pader – convened a meeting of about 380 selected people in 
Kitgum in October that year and the proposal was unanimously rejected, save for two or 
three people who supported the idea. In December 2005 as presidential election 
campaigns were gaining momentum, the Office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on 
Reconstruction of northern Uganda, Luwero and the Rwenzori came up with yet another 
project called “Food Security First 2006-2010, Gulu, Kitgum and Pader”. The Senior 
Presidential Advisor was none other than General Salim Saleh. The project was to cost 
UG Sh. 92, 181, 230, 000. This project proposed to allocate 2 acres of land to each 
family in the three districts of Acholi. Each family would then choose two crops to grow 
from among the list of crops given. The list of crops does not include millet, which is the 
main staple crop in Acholi. The question is; if the Acholi are on their land, who was to 
allocate them two acres per family? What would happen to the rest of the land? How 
does one provide food security in Acholi without millet? And so on so forth”554. 
He further points out that, 
“During the recent tour of Acholi sub-region by APG, we received report that some 
unknown people had surveyed a huge chunk of land measuring ten (10) square miles 
under the protection of UPDF at a place called Got Apwoyo in Purongo Sub-county, 
Nwoya County, Amuru District. APG went to this area and walked the thick grass looking 
for mark-stones. One freshly planted marc-stone was found. It was photographed and 
recorded on video by the journalists accompanying the APG. APG also saw two (2) large 
farms being guarded by the UPDF soldiers. One was reported to belong to Colonel 
Walter Ochola, the RDC Gulu, and the other to Colonel Charles Otema Awany, the 4th 
Division Commander. In addition, APG had received reports of a serious land dispute 
between a lady called Harriet Aber and Hon. Maj. Gen. Julius Oketta in Amuru Sub-
                                                  
554 Hon. Okello-Okello John Livingstone, Chairman Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG), “Statement to 
Parliament on the Issues of Acholi Land”, (2006), 
http://www.upcparty.net/memboard/acholi_statement.htm  
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county, Kilak County, Amuru District. This matter is now before court and i cannot say 
much about it. The cultural leader of the area also put an announcement over radio 
MEGA FM appealing to the parties to the dispute to stop using UPDF soldiers and the 
gun. The scenarios listed above are some but not all the attempts that have been made to 
grab the land in Acholi. In view of all this, APG met in Kampala before the 
commencement of its tour of Acholi, which run from the 23rd November – 2nd December 
2006 and resolved on the issues of land as follows; ----that land grabbers who use force 
or tricks to acquire the land will be fought in all possible ways. They are not any different 
from bank-robbers. Land is the only asses that the people of Acholi are left with. It should 
not under any circumstances follow the livestock”555.  
The study has therefore demonstrated that the conflict in northern Uganda and 
particularly the war between the LRA and the GOU is an ethnic conflict produced by the 
political dynamics of the NRM government policies. It is a result of manipulation and 
politicisation of ethnicity, militarisation of politics and repression within the context of 
the struggle for access to and control of political power and resources, in which the ethnic 
groups in northern Uganda and particularly the Acholi people have been largely 
marginalised. It has also demonstrated that this has been a result of the colonial legacy of 
divide and rule which led to the north-south divide and which has been perpetuated by 
the successive post-independence Ugandan rulers and which has been exacerbated during 
the NRM rule.   
Because they controlled the political scene as well as dominating and controlling the 
armed forces since independence, the people in the north and especially the Acholis were 
seen as a potential threat by the NRM government. Their military skills and capacity and 
the fact that they put up serious resistance against the NRA during the war in Luwero 
meant that they had to be dealt with militarily if the NRM was to rule unchallenged. The 
political power so captured by the southern-led government had to be maintained not 
                                                  
555 Ibid 
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through negotiation with the Acholi military men but rather through military force by 
clamping down on dissent and those perceived as potential threat and also who were 
considered to have “eaten” for long.  
This does not only expose the failure by the successive post-independence Ugandan 
rulers to ensure national ethnic integration but also hegemonic access and control of 
political power and resources that has characterised Ugandan politics since independence, 
in which the use of the gun has been favoured and used as a first resort. Within this 
context, the hostility against the leaders of the deposed governments has often been 
extended to the members of the ethnic group from which they come. Caught in this 
complex web of ethnic hatred and hostility directed at particular leaders, the whole ethnic 
group directly or indirectly becomes victim for revenge and purging.  
Thus the tendency for victorious rulers – often men in uniform or using men in uniform – 
has become a vicious circle in Uganda. For the Acholi people, the entire ethnic group was 
stereotyped and the hostility against the Obote regime, Tito Okello and the Acholi 
soldiers who were blamed for the past mistakes by the NRM was extended to them. The 
case of the war between the LRA and the NRM government fits within this explanation 
and scenario. However, like it happens often in almost every situation where oppression 
and marginalisation takes place, the oppressed people will try to resist subjugation and 
this can be expressed in different forms, irrespective of the magnitude and consequences 
of their actions.  
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It has also demonstrated that there is widespread perception and fear among the Acholi 
people that their situation is not likely to improve as long as Museveni and the NRM 
government remain in power. Arising out of all this is the fact that Museveni’s rule and 
legitimacy remain in serious question in Acholiland. The LRA war demonstrates that it is 
an ethnic conflict born out of perceiving the ethnic groups in the north and in particular 
the Acholi people by the NRM government as enemies of change who have refused to 
endorse the NRM leadership.  
It has also demonstrated that when an entire ethnic group is stereotyped and targeted with 
revenge attacks, oppression and humiliation ostensibly as punishment for the assumed 
mistakes of individuals coming from that particular ethnic group, the consequence is 
resistance and retaliation by some members of that ethnic group. In the case of northern 
Uganda, the LRA symbolises this resistance. As long as there are no genuine steps to 
address the northern grievances of socio-political and economic marginalisation in an 
honest and amicable manner through round-table stakeholders’ dialogue and framework, 
then ethnic conflict and violence are bound to continue.     
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